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Throughout its entire history the Board of Ordnance 
was forced to rely upon the civilian gun trade for its 
supplies of small arms, with foreign purchase to 
supplement domestic output when necessary. Until Britain's 
greatly increased military commitments under William III 
this reliance proved reasonably satisfactory, but the 
chaotic conditions which develo ed during the long War of 
the Spanish Succession (1702-13S brought realization that 
a new, more contralized, system of control and inspection 
was required. 
Between about 1710 and 1730 there was created by the 
Board of Ordnance a new system involving the use of 
selected highly skilled and reliable workmen from the gun 
trade chosen by the Board, and not the Gunmakers Company 
as previously, and agreed patterns developed by the Board. 
The sequence of production was also changed, and, instead 
of supplying completely finished arms, some contractors 
now supplied the several component parts (locks, barrels, 
furniture, smallwork and stocks) which were inspected 
during manufacture and then delivered into Ordnance 
storehouses from whence they were issued by the Board to 
other contractors for making into complete arms. This new 
system has been described as 'the Ordnance System' to 
emphasize the new, Ordnance-centred focus of the 
operation. 
The new system came into full operation from the late 
1720s, and was expanded satisfactorily to meet the needs 
of the Wars of 1739-48. The system operated most 
successfully during the Seven Years' War, producing a more 
than adequate quantity of a wide variety of arms with a 
minimum of foreign purchase. Between 1763 and 1775 a 
variety of new arms for the various branches of the 
service, and a new standard arm for the line infantry was 
introduced and production proceeded within the Ordnance 
System. 
During the American Rebellion the system began to 
break down in the face of labour problems, bad timing, 
excessive demands and a finite workforce. Government 
requirements were achieved only by making a number of 
expedient alterations to the system. By the end of the war 
it was clear that future Ordnance production demanded a 
new approach to achieve any increase in requirements. 
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The idea Of creating a work which dealt in detail 
with the development, manufacture, procurement and 
distribution of British military small arms during the 
Eighteenth Century first occurred to me after reading the 
classic work on the subject, Howard L. Blackmore's British 
Military Firearms 1650-1850, which first appeared in 1961. 
The information contained between these covers suggested 
that there was much more of the same available. Subsequent 
conversations with Mr. Blackmore over the years revealed 
that the attitude of the publisher and their assessment of 
the market at the time he submitted his manuscript had 
resulted in the failure to print an entire second volume. 
With this realization, and with Mr. Blackmore's 
encouragement, I began the research which has led in 
recent years to the formulation of the present study, 
designed to give as complete a history as the records 
will allow of the interacting network of people and 
processes which produced small arms for the Board of 
Ordnance during the years when a particularly Ordnance- 
focused modus operandii was employed by the Board to 
achieve this production. 
This work is not intended to be a either a socio- 
economic or an administrative study of the Board of 
Ordnance and War Office, nor is it designed as an 
examination of the political structure or the strategic 
significance of the Board within the framework of 
Eighteenth-Century British government. This administrative 
and organizational approach has been most ably used by 
H. C. Tomlinson in his thesis 'The Organization and 
Activities of the English Ordnance Office, 1660-1714' 
(University of Reading, 1974) and its published version 
'Guns and Government: The Ordnance Office under the later 
Stuarts' (London, 1979). These aspects of the Board have 
been touched upon in the present work only insofar as they 
relate to a clearer understanding of the role played by 
the Board and its various officers and employees in the 
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operation of that part of the Board's functions concerning 
the supply of small arms. These processes include design, 
procurement of components, manufacture, inspection, 
storage, maintenance and issue of military firearms. 
The questions which will be dealt with in this study 
include the following: what types of small arms did the 
Board of Ordnance acquire, and by what particular means; 
who made the arms, and how were they made; how did the 
Ordnance methods of manufacture differ from those employed 
by the civilian gun trade in making arms for commercial 
sale; to whom were the Board's arms issued, for what 
reasons, and by what means. The procedures and techniques 
applied to each process from the decision to acquire or 
manufacture arms, to the final disposal of the arms from 
Crown ownership will be examined. Within this context both 
administrative and manufacturing processes will come under 
scrutiny so far as the documents and examples of arms will 
permit. My own broader involvement with the history and 
use of antique firearms, and the study of their 
manufacture, for more than thirty-five years, enables me 
to place the manufacturing system used by the Ordnance in 
the wider sphere of the civilian guntrade of the period, 
and the essential interaction of the Board with the 
civilian trade will be demonstrated. 
The system with which we shall be dealing amounted to 
the governmental administration of a segment of a pre- 
existing civilian craft industry, not the operation of a 
self-contained government department. Almost every 
activity of the Board across its wide spectrum of 
responsibilities was based on the hire by contract of 
existing private-sector facilities. Small arms were not 
manufactured within the Tower by Small Gun Office workmen 
in other than pattern quantities until the period 1804-15, 
and no permanent large-scale Government gun factory came 
into operation until just after the Crimean War and the 
end of the Board itself. During our period there was no 
desire on the part of the Board to operate its own 
gunmaking facilities, and no mention of it in the existing 
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documentation, and Parliament would never have granted the 
funds required for such a comprehensive function when 
apparently adequate facilities already existed in the 
I private sector. ' It was an age of private enterprise, and 
also one of fragmented, departmentalized, largely ad hoc 
governmental activity. This aspect of the Board's 
operation and its place in the overall governmental 
contribution has been brilliantly examined by C. Richard 
Middleton, and although his study focuses on the mid- 
Century, the records suggest that his conclusions apply to 
a far wider periodJ 
So much of policy making and decision taking was done 
verbally by those participating in Eighteenth Century 
government that the modern historian iý often left with 
what would now be considered as 'gaps in the records' but 
which, in fact, never existed at all in the documentary 
evolution of any given event. This factor, in addition to 
the actual gaps in centuries old records, does leave the 
historian of the Eighteenth Century with a situation in 
which the answers to some questions can only be derived 
from later, often indirect, evidence. So it is with the 
activities of the Board of Ordnance, especially where some 
operation is initiated, or a design introduced or 
changed: generally we must work backwards to discover the 
date of the change. Some questions cannot be answered from 
the records, or from examination of examples of the arms 
themselves, and these are best left as questions in the 
absence of other than late Twentieth Century criteria to 
work with. Fortunately there are few of these problems, 
and the Ordnance records are, with specific exceptions, 
very complete. 
In a study which involves the use of both documents 
and artifacts, it is impossible to achieve a balanced 
view, and often impossible indeed to achieve a correct 
conclusion, without making use of both types of evidence. 
This was made strikingly clear to me when, after more than 
two years of organizing the documentary materials, in 
conjunction with access to various public and private 
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collections of British military small-arms in this country 
and abroad, I was offered the chance of cataloguing the 
collection of British military small-arms at Colonial 
Williamsburg, in Virginia, U. S. A. Unlike any of the 
collections in England or Europe, not excepting the Tower 
of London's Royal Armouries, the Williamsburg collection 
contains several or many examples of a single type of arm. 
When these are closely examined and compared with the 
evidence in the documents, it is possible to draw a number 
of vital conclusions about the design and production 
methods which were quite impossible prior to such an 
examination. Although the documents do not suggest it, 
the products of the Board's system of manufacture reflect 
a far greater degree of unity, similarity) and precision 
than could be concluded from seeing only single examples. 
The results for this particular study are contained in the 
Conclusion. 
1. Middleton, C. Richard. "Te Administration of New- 
castle and Pitt: the Departments of State and the 
conduct of the War, 1754-1760, with particular re- 
ference to tle campaigns in North Arnerica. ' Pb. D., 
University of Exeter, 1968. 
5 
A NOTE ON THE SOURCES 
Five broad categories of manuscript primary source 
materials have been used to construct this study. In the 
order of their importance and frequency of use, they are: 
War Office, Colonial Office, State Papers, and Admiralty 
Papers all from the Public Record Office (PRO), and the 
Additional Manuscripts (Add. Mss. ) collections at the 
British Library (BL)o 
The text of this study is based largely upon the 
Minute Books of the Board of Ordnance, specifically on the 
copy made for the Surveyor General, which are in the 
Public Record Office at Kew under the classification of 
War Office (WO) 47. These provide what little information 
there is on the origins of small arms development, and on 
the day to day operation of the Office and its numerous 
officials. Additional information on these areas is also 
found in the Treasurer of the Ordnance's Ledgers (WO 48), 
which often add details to a brief mention in the Minutes, 
and also give information on the periods of employment and 
salaries of various Office employees. Unfortunately there 
are gaps in - the Minutes, particularly between 1720 and 
1749, and what information is available for that period 
comes from the Bill Books (WO 51) and the Warrant Books 
(WO 55). These latter two sources, along with the 
Treasurer's Ledgers and the Small Arms Books (WO 50) 
(which cover the years- up to 1729 during which time small 
arms were billed- separately from other Ordnance 
indebtedness), are also the foundations for the meagre 
descriptions and production figures of the various types 
of small arms. 
Pagination in these volumes is often absent or 
confusing, since many of them have later been given a 
separate set of numbers, sometimes for folios and 
sometimes for pages. I have stayed with the series 
representing pagination as far as possible, and where 
confusion exists I have used only the relevant date for 
the entry which is always close enough to enable the 
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reference to be located with a minimum of effort. While 
many of the volumes have indexes, these, as with most 
indexes where one is searching for firearms references, 
have been found unreliable; I have always searched a 
volume page by page rather than rely upon an index. Not 
only has this practise proved more time consuming, but it 
has also, on occasion, produced unexpected information. 
Standards of book keeping and office administration 
in Eighteenth-Century goverment offices were extremely 
haphazard and imprecise) even though a 'system' may have 
been laid down. A vast amount of information was conveyed 
verbally and/or noted on scraps of paper or in temporary 
notebooks which were thrown away when filled and dealt 
with. A bevy of clerks in various offices were put to 
entering whatever was required on the day, and the result 
is that each of the above categories of books contain 
information which one would not expect to find in that 
particular class of volume. There is considerable 
correspondence in the Warrant Books; the Minutes contain 
details on production, technical details, and tables; the 
Treasurer's Ledgers often record technical details not 
given in the Bill Books. In order to arrive at any 
complete coverage of a period or a production analysis it 
is therefore necessary to examine the entire spectrum of 
volumes, extract all relevant information, and then sift 
it all and see what is present and what is lacking. In the 
case of each of the major wars (1740-48,1755-63,1775-83) 
1 have been through the books at least twice and in most 
cases as many as four times, because the imprecise nature 
of notation and description has often made it impossible 
to recognize a statement as relevant until other pieces of 
the puzzle have fallen into place. These other pieces 
often appear many years later in the records than the time 
at which the event took place for which one is looking. To 
look up a specific event in terms of date is possible only 
in the Minutes; and these contain the least amount of 
technical details and personnel references. With regard to 
the Bill Books, these are especially difficult since there 
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are many volumes for any given year, particularly during 
wartime. There are, for instance, thirty-seven volumes for 
the years of the War of Jenkins' Ear and the Austrian 
Succession (1739-1748), forty-four volumes covering the 
Seven Years' War (1755-1763), and forty-nine volumes for 
the American Rebellion (1775-1783). 
The most distressing discovery made in the course of 
researching for this study was a single folder at the 
Public Record Office, WO 44/304: 'Weeding of Ordnance 
papers and books- lists 1834-5. ' This contains 
correspondence and lists from various Ordnance clerks 
working in the 1830s, relating to the examination of 
masses of old Ordnance records which were being evaluated 
for possible disposal. Among the items listed for 
destruction were the following: 
Journals of Receipts and Issues, 1642-1766: 2026 
books. 
Artificers Warrant Books 1665-1778: 34 books. 
Day Books: 120 books. 
Bills Received in the Clerk of the Ordnance Office, 
1761-1773: 9 books. 
Quarterly Bills of Artificers, Work done at the 
Tower, 1723-1728: 1 book. 
Proof Book 1714-1733: 1 book. 
Accounts and Vouchers of Stores received and issued 
at the Outports, 1718-1776: 200 books. 
Entries of Bills 1648-1780: 33 books. 
What might have been learned from these volumes is, 
simply, incalculable. The items listed above relate only 
to our period, there were many more of earlier and later 
date. 
This study attempts to deal as much with the arms 
themselves, their identification and physical description, 
as with their manufacture, and this has required the 
recognition and actual handling and examination of as many 
pieces from the period as possible. The chief source in 
Great Britain has been the collections of the Royal 
Armouries at H. M. Tower of London; but these collections, 
while containing several examples which are the only ones 
identified to date, as well as a wide spectrum of the 
types of arms produced for the Ordnance, lack a vital 
characteristic absolutely necessary for almost all 
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positive identification: bulk. To look at a single example 
may suggest tentative identification on the basis of the 
very vague general features mentioned in the written 
record. But the single example being referred to may well 
represent a failed pattern which was not produced, or one 
which was produced only with significant modifications. 
Until one is able to examine several examples of the same 
arm, preferably side-by-side, it is often unwise to draw 
any firm conclusions on the characteristics of that 
particular arm. It is only when seen in quantity that the 
broad manufacturing techniques employed can be seriously 
studied, and minor variations in finish delineated and 
seen for what they are. it was only when I discovered 
several of the first pattern Eliott carbines in the Royal 
Collection at Windsor Castle, and more than a dozen of the 
Liege-made Short Land Pattern muskets on the walls of the 
King's Guard Chamber at Hampton Court Palace, that each of 
these types could be confirmed as what they were. For 
these reasons, the collections of the Museum of Scottish 
Antiquities, the Scottish United Services Museum, the 
Smithsonian Institution, and particularly Colonial 
Williamsburg, have been invaluable in supplementing the 
single specimens of the Tower collections, allowing 
confirmation and study of the various patterns in adequate 
numbers. Without the Williamsburg collections it would 
have bene impossible to observe at first-hand and assess 
the significance of the changes which clearly occurred 
between several of the mid-century periods of musket 
production which, taken in conjunction with the 
documentary evidence, make it clear that Ordnance 
production was far more organized and systematic than had 
been thought previously. Indeed, it was on the basis of 
these examinations and the establishment of clear 
differences between the various periods that I have felt 
justified in putting forward specific pattern date- 
designations for the main lines of musket production. 
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For ease of reference the chief documentary sources 
used are listed below. Where only a part of the period is 
covered, the dates are given, otherwise they include the 
entire period: 
ADM 1/4001-4013. Letters from the Ordnance Office. 
CO 5. America. Original correspondence with the 
Secretaries of State. 
SP 41. Domestic, Military. Papers from War Office and 
Board of Ordnance to Secretary of State. 
SP 77. Foreign. Flanders. 
WO 1. War Office. In-Letters, 1755-1783. 
WO 3. War Office. Out-Letters. 
WO 46. Out-Letters from the Master General, Board and 
Commander-in-Chief, General. 
WO 47. Minutes of the Board of Ordnance, 1714-1722; 
1724-6; 1749-1783. 
WO 48. Ordnance Treasurer's Ledgers. 
WO 49/234. Imprest Book, 1729. 
WO 49/238. Entry Book of Bills, 1742-6. 
WO 50. Small Arms (Bill) Books, 1709-29. 
WO 51. Bill Books 1715-1783. 
WO 55. Reports, 1753-83. 
WO 55. King's and Board of Ordnance Warrants. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Words in UPPER CASE letters within an article are 
themselves separately defined elsewhere in the Glossary. 
Definitions have been worded to make clear the usage 
applied by the Ordnance, and they may vary accordingly 
from the pure dictionary definition. 
B. 
BARREL. The forged iron tube which forms the basis of the 
small arm, containing the propellant charge and 
projectile. 
BAYONET. An attenuated version of the pike designed for 
use with longarms, introduced in the British army 
during the 1670s in the form of a 'plug bayonet' 
whose blade had a tapered wooden handle which was 
pushed into the muzzle of the barrel. By the start 
of our period the 'socket bayonet' was in common 
use and became a standard accompaniment to the 
musket from 1722. Blades varied in length from 9" 
for some carbines, to 17" for the standard musket, 
and were normally triangular in section although 
flat, double-edged blades were in use during the 
1720-1750 period. The socket of the bayonet had a 
zig-zag slot cut into it, by which the bayonet was 
fixed on the SIGHT near the muzzle of the barrel. 
BORE Calibre). The inside diameter of the barrel. Usage 
in the Eighteenth Century focused on the ball size 
rather than the barrel diameter as is done today. 
It was defined as the internal diameter measured 
by the number of balls of that diameter in a pound 
of pure lead. 'Musquet bore' meant a bore size 
which would accept a ball of a certain diameter 
plus an amount of WINDAGE; in our period this 
translates as an actual bore size of . 76", with a ball diameter of . 693", normally referred to as a bore of. 14 or 143-2 to the pound. There were four 
standard bore sizes for small arms used by the 
Board during our period: wall piece (6ý to the lb) 
musket bore (14 to the lb. or 1.4k from 1753), car- 
bine bore (20 to the lb), and pistol bore (34 to 
the lb). These correspond to contemporary measure- 
ments of . 690" and . 693", . 615", and . 517", being 
the ball size, not the diameter of the barrels, 
which were, respectively, . 76", . 65" and . 56". 
BREECH. The rear section of the barrel. 
BREECHPLUG. An iron plug threaded at its forward end which 
screws into the breech of the barrel to close it. 
It has a flat strap extending backwards from its 
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upper section, with a hole drilled to take the 
Breech-Pin or Barrel Tang Screw, which secures the 
rear of the BARREL to the STOCK. 
BRIDLE. (Tumbler Bridle, Pan Bridle). Support pieces on 
the LOCK. The Tumbler Bridle supports the TUMBLER 
spindle against. sideways movement, and helps to 
keep the tumbler in line with the nose of the 
SEAR, by supporting the Sear Screw. The Pan Bridle 
is integral with the outer edge of the PAN, which 
extends forward and supports the Hammer Pivot 
Screw at its outer extremity, as well as the 
action of the HAMMER itself. The use or non-use 
of bridles gave rise to three descriptions of 
LOCK, which see. 
BUTT. The broad, tapering area of the STOCK lying to the 
rear of the GRIP (wrist, small or hand) of the 
stock and its termination. 
BUTTPLATE (Buttcap). The metal covering to protect the 
rear end of the BUTT; -plate is used for longarms, 
-cap for handguns. In our period usually of heavy 
cast brass secured by two screws through the plate 
and a cross-pin through a lug on the underside of 
the tang. 
C. 
CALIBRE. Measurement of the inside diameter of the BARREL 
expressed in hundredths of an inch. See BORE. 
CARBINE. An ambiguous term used to describe a lightweight 
arm of a smaller bore than a musket (but sometimes 
of musket bore) and sometimes,. but not always, 
shorter than a musket. It cannot be used as a 
generic, but only as a specific term, in relation 
to Eighteenth Century military arms. 
CARBINE BORE. . 65" calibre, or 20 to the lb. See BORE. 
CARTRIDGE. A means of carrying propellant and projectile 
as a single combined unit. In the Eighteenth Cen- 
tury this was achieved by rolling the ball and 
powder together in a cylinder of tough paper. In 
British service the paper was rolled around a 
former, the ball was inserted at one end with a 
layer of paper between it and the powder section, 
and then tied in position with twine; for a musket 
six drams (165 grains) of coarse powder was then 
poured into the rear portion of the tube, and the 
end twisted closed. 
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CASE HARDENING. A method of heat treating iron, which 
gives the exterior surfaces a much denser, harder 
composition. The longer the heating process is 
continued, the deeper the hardening penetratesq 
which may cause brittleness. 
COCK. On a flintlock, the external arm fitted with JAWS at 
its upper end to hold the FLINT. Fitted to the 
square of the TUMBLER at its base by the TUMBLER 
SCREW. The fall of the cock against the HAMMER 
strikes sparks from the hammer to ignite the PRIM- 
ING CHARGE in the PAN. The term generally used for 
the analagous term on percussion and cartridge 
arms is hammer. 
COCK-SCREW (Jaw-Screw). The vertical screw threaded into 
the lower JAW of the COCK which tightens the jaws 
on the FLINT. It also serves as a grip for the 
thumb in drawing back the cock. 
COMB. Used to describe the narrow upper section of the 
BUTT against which the cheek rests in firing a 
longarm, and also for the vertical arm at the top 
rear of the COCK which supports the top JAW and 
FLINT. 
E. 
ESCUTCHEON. See THUMB PIECE. 
F. 
FEATHER-SPRING. V-spring which holds the HAMMER in either 
the closed or open position over the PAN. Secured 
to the LOCKPLATE by a small screw through a FINIAL 
at its lower rear extremity. Usually called the 
HAMMER-SPRING by the Ordnance, 
FINIAL. The ornamental termination of the TRIGGER GUARD 
TANG, front and rear, the TAILPIPE, and the 
HAMMER-SPRING. 
FIRELOCK. The Ordnance and army term for a flintlock 
MUSKET. 'Musquet' is generally used by the Board 
when discussing manufacture &c., and firelock when 
dealing with issues. 
FLATS (Lock- and Sidepiece-). The flat parallel sections 
of the STOCK into which the LOCK and the SIDEPIECE 
are inletted, and which have some form of ornamen- 
tal aprons or terminations throughout our period. 
FLINT. A hard stone of nearly pure silica, quarried and 
then fashioned by chipping (known as knapping) 
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with special tools to the desired shape. Used in flintlock ignition system to strike sparks for ig- 
niting an external PRIMING charge. Supplied to 
the Ordnance in four sizes, wallpiece, musket, 
carbine and pistol. Throughout our period the 
general shape of the flint was a wedge, compared 
to the later platform shape. The flint was wrap- 
ped in a thin piece of leather or lead and gripped 
in the JAWS of the COCK, and was expected to last 
about twelve fires before being replaced. Until 
the early 1790s the Ordnance flints came from Kent 
and were much criticised by the army for their 
poor quality. The Duke of Richmond re-located the 
supply of flints to Suffolk in the early 1790s. 
FORE-END. That part of the STOCK lying forward of the 
LOCK. 
I 
FORE-END CAP. A protective metal cup fitted to the upper 
termination of the FORE-END. See NOSE-CAP. 
FULL COCK. The second notch filed into the TUMBLER, to 
which the COCK is drawn in order to fire the 
piece, where the nose of the SEAR engages until 
released by the TRIGGER. 
FURNITURE (Mounts). Protective pieces of metal fitted to 
the STOCK of longarms and handguns, comprising in 
general (with variations in use according to type 
and pattern) the NOSE-CAP, PIPES, SIDEBAR, SIDE- 
PIECE, TRIGGER GUARD, TRIGGER PLATE, THUMB PIECE 
and BUTTCAP or BUTTPLATE. In our period normally 
of cast brass. 
FUSIL (FUZEE). An ambiguous term from the French often 
used interchangeably with CARBINE, but more often 
with the intention of implying a superior I uality 
of liýhtweight arm, e. g. normally 'Officer s 
fusil rather than 'Officer's carbine. ' In Ord- 
nance usage fusils were always of CARBINE BORE. 
G. 
GRIP (Hand, Small, Wrist). The narrow, virtually circular 
section of the STOCK between the LOCK and SIDE- 
PIECE FLATS and the BUTT, gripped by the hand 
which will pull the TRIGGER, and often inlaid 
at the top with a THUMB PIECE. 
H. 
HALF-COCK. The first of two positions filed into the 
surface of the TUMBLER, to hold the COCK in a 
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safe position away from the face of the HAMMER but 
not yet in the FULL COCK position. 
HAMMER. (Battery, Steel, or incorrectly, 'frizzen'). The 
L-shaped piece of forged iron which serves as a 
cover. for the PAN, and whose vertical CASE HARDEN- 
ED section provides a surface from which sparks 
are struck by the FLINT in the falling COCK. It is 
pivoted at its base by a transverse screw into the 
LOCKPLATE, and held in position, either open or 
closed, by the pressure of the HAMMER-SPRING or 
FEATHER-SPRING, which also creates resistance 
against the falling flint to generate, sparks. It 
is white-hot particles of the hammer, not of the 
flint, which form the sparks to ignite the 
PRIMING. 
HAMMER-SPRING. The Ordnance term favoured over FEATHER- 
SPRING., 
HEELPLATE. Ordnance term for BUTTPLATE. 
I. 
IMPREST. A document granting advance payment for items to 
be supplied or services to be rendered. 
i. 
JAWS (Top, lower). Flat surfaces formed at the top of the 
COCK to hold the FLINT firmly in position. The 
lower jaw is integral with the body of the cock, 
and the top jaw is held parallel to the lower by 
the JAW-SCREW (Cock-Screw) and the COMB of the 
cock. Both jaws have raised teeth on their inner 
surfaces for a better grip on the flint-leather. 
JAW-SCREW. See COCK-SCREW and last entry. 
L. 
LOCK. The firing mechanism of a firearm, based on the 
LOCKPLATE. Throughout our period the flintlock 
was the standard ignition system. The external 
parts consisted of the PAN, COCK, HAMMER and 
HAMMER-SPRING. The internal parts were the 
MAINSPRING2TUMBLER, BRIDLEý SEAR, and SEAR- 
SPRING, each of these having their securing 
screws. Ordnance locks were divided into Land 
Service and Sea Service, and again into Plain 
(without any bridle to either the tumbler or 
pan), Bridle [or single-bridle], with only a 
tumbler bridle, and Double-Bridle with both a 
tumbler bridle and pan bridle (from 1740). In 
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sizes there were Wallpiece, Musket, Carbine and 
Pistol locks. A further division divided locks 
into flat and round, with flat locks generally 
used for either very high quality or else for 
Sea Service arms, with round locks kept for the 
majority of regular Land Service arms. 
LOCKPLATE. A plate with a flat inner surface and either a 
flat or slightly rounded outer surface (see LOCK) 
which served as a base for mounting the mechanism 
of the lock, and to secure that mechanism to the 
STOCK by the use of transverse screws or SIDE- 
NAILS. 
LOOPS (Barrel-). Small flat iron studs or tennons dove- 
tailed and brazed on the underside of the BARREL, 
through which holes are drilled to accept the PINS 
and the upper SLING SWIVEL SCREW which secure the 
barrel in the FORE-END of the STOCK. 
M. 
MAINSPRING. The principal motive power of the LOCK. A 
large heavy V-spring -fixed by a stud and screw on 
its upper limb to the inner surface of the LOCK- 
PLATE, with the tip of its lower limb bearing on 
the front, or toe, of the TUMBLER. 
MOUNTS. See FURNITURE. 
MUSKET (Musquet). A smoothbore longarm of large bore size 
generally defined as intended for military use. 
The barrel is long enough so that when a bayonet 
is fixed it may serve as a pike for repelling 
cavalry. The Ordnance defined two distinct cate- 
gories, Land Service and Sea Service. 
MUSKET BORE. . 76" calibre, or 14 or 14k to the lb. See BORE. 
MUSKETOON (Musquettoon). A short barreled longarm with a 
large calibre bore, primarily intended for naval 
use. The barrels, either of brass or iron, were 
usually formed with reinforcing bands towards the 
MUZZLE, resembling a cannon barrel, and the muzzle 
was often slightly flared to assist loading. Those 
made for the Ordnance have heavier barrels and 
less flare at the muzzle than those made for the 
civilian trade. Very few were set up -during our 
period, suggesting that they had a very long ser- 
vice life and infrequent use. 
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MUZZLE. The mouth, or front end of the BARREL, into which, 
asa muzzle-loading arm, the charge for the weapon 
was introduced. 
N. 
NAILS. An Eighteenth Century trade term for screws. Henceq 
breechnail = breech tang screw, sidenalls = lock- 
screws. 
NOSE BAND. A reinforcing strip of sheet brass or iron let 
into the extreme front end of the FORE-END on many 
arms until the late 1740s, replaced by the NOSE 
CAP from the mid-1750s. 
NOSE CAP. A cast brass protective cup rivetted to the 
front extremity of the FORE-END on MUSKETS and 
CARBINES intended for BAYONETS and STEEL RAMMERS 
from 1755. 
P. 
PAN. The teaspoon-shaped receptacle forged integral on the 
upper edge of the LOCKPLATE to contain the PRIMING 
charge which ignites the main charge in the 
BARREL. 
PAN BRIDLE. On Double Bridle LOCKS (pistols from c. 1738 
and muskets from 1740) the forward extending arm 
on the outer edge of the PAN which supports the 
outer end of the HAMMER pivot screw. Not used on 
flat Sea Service locks. 
PINS. Iron wire cut to suitable length, used to pass 
through LOOPS on the BARREL, PIPES, TRIGGER, 
TRIGGER GUARD and BUTTPLATE tangs, to retain them 
in the STOCK. 
PIPES (Rammer). Sections of tubular cast brass, usually of 
a barrel shape with collars at each end, used to 
hold the RAMMER in position in the STOCK below the 
FORE-END. Secured by a PIN passing through a LOOP 
cast onto the upper surface. See TAILPIPE and 
TRUMPET PIPE. 
PISTOL. A handgun. Manufactured in pairs for the Ordnance 
and classified by them in two broad categories, 
Land Service and Sea Service, of which there was 
only one type in each class until the mid-1750s 
when specialized variations began to appear for 
the new as well as the older branches of the ser- 
vices. During the first half of the Eighteenth 
Century it appears that most pistols were made on 
a regimental basis to the order of their colonels. 
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PISTOL BORE. . 56 calibre, or 28 to the lb. See BORE. 
PRIMING. A small amount of powder (about a dram or 27ý2 
grains, or less, was poured from the paper CAR- 
TRIDGE in the PAN as the first operation after 
biting the cartridge open. Until the 1740s there 
is some evidence in contemporary training manuals 
that some regiments may have carried separate 
flasks containing special smaller grained priming 
powder. 
R. 
RAMMER (Ramrod). A long tapering thin rod of ash, later 
steel, used to seat the ball and wadding of the 
paper CARTRIDGE securely in the BREECH of the 
BARREL, i. e., to load the weapon. Infantry muskets 
were produced with steel rammers from 1749, but 
pistols, most carbines, and Sea Service arms con- 
tinued to use wooden rammers until various dates 
some of which extend beyond our period. 
RIBS & RINGS. The Ordnance term for a sling bar and ring 
as used on some dragoon muskets and carbines and 
cavalry carbines throughout our period, in place 
of the sling swivels used for most infantry arms. 
This flexible sliding ring arrangement mounted on 
the lef t side of the STOCK opposite the LOCK 
allowed the arm to be attached loosely to the 
body of the trooper by a shoulder sling while 
retaining. sufficient maneuvrability to use the 
weapon in combat and still manage his horse. 
Prior to the 1740s ordinary muskets, usually with 
shortened barrels, were 'ribb'd & ring'd' for 
dragoon use. One end of the arm was usually sup- 
ported in a leather 'bucket' attached to the 
saddle, when not in use. 
RIFLE. A longarm, the interior of whose BARREL. is cut with 
a series of spiral grooves to impart a rotating 
motion to the projectile in its passage down the 
barrel, in order to give it greater accuracy at 
much increased distances. First purchased for the 
British army in 1746, but not used in combat until 
1755, but only in very limited numbers. Continued 
use during the American War, but not regularly 
issued until 1800. Breech loading rifles were pur- 
chased in 1762,1764 and 1776, but saw very little 
service. 
S. 
SEAR. An L-shaped bar connecting the TRIGGER with the 
TUMBLER on the inside of the LOCKPLATE, and held 
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in position by the sear-screw to the rear of the 
tumbler. The front, or nose, of the sear fits into 
the notches, or bents, cut into the tumbler and is 
held in place by the pressure of the SEAR-SPRING. 
When the TRIGGER is pressed, its blade bears 
against the tip of the sear, pushing the nose out 
of the tumbler notch and downwards away from it, 
releasing the tumbler to act against the pressure 
from the MAINSPRING. 
SEAR-SPRING. A small V-spring mounted horizontally on the 
inside of the LOCKPLATE above the SEAR and bear- 
ing on it. See SEAR. 
SIDENAILS. Ordnance term for the screws which hold the 
LOCK in the STOCK. . 
SIDEPIECE (SIDEPLATE). An ornamental plate let into the 
STOCK opposite the LOCK to strengthen the wood at 
that point and to. protect the wood from damage by 
screwing the SIDENAILS too far into the LOCK. 
SIGHT. Although always referred to by this term, the 
small rectangular block dovetailed and brazed to 
barrel about two inches from the MUZZLE was pri- 
marily intended to serve as a fixing point for the 
socket BAYONET. Arms not intended for. bayonets, 
such as PISTOLS, often had no sights, although 
some CARBINES had conventional blade-pattern. 
sights. No rear sights were fitted to regulation 
smoothbore arms during our period, although many 
are found with grooves filed across the BREECH to 
act as a rear sight, which appear to be contempo- 
rary with the use of the arm. 
SLING. A two-piece buff-leather strap used to carry a 
longarm. They were fixed to the SLING SWIVELS by 
lacing, and could be adjusted for length with a 
brass buckle.. 
SLING SWIVELS. Iron wire loops fastened by screws to the 
front of the TRIGGER GUARD bow, and through the 
upper part of the FORE-END on MUSKETS and some 
CARBINES. See RIBS & RINGS. 
SMALLWORK. Ironware consisting of the TRIGGER, PINS and 
SLING SWIVELS, and some screws not supplied by 
contractors for specific parts, e. g. BUTTPLATE 
screws. 
STOCK. A shaped and carved slab of wood, English walnut 
heartwood throughout most of our period, into 
which the BARREL, LOCK, FURNITURE and SMALLWORK 
were inletted to form a firearm. 
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STOCK TIP. See NOSE CAP. 
SWELL. The bulge in the FORE-END 
TAILPIPE is inlet, formed 
and steadier purchase for 
ing. Until the 1750s this 
and pronounced, but after 
and less pronounced. 
T. 
at the point where the 
to give the hand better 
aiming or bayonet fight- 
was virtually circular 
that date it became oval 
TAILPIPE. The lowermost of the several RAMMER PIPES, lo- 
cated where the external rammer channel enters 
the lower part of the FORE-END, which serves to 
guide the rammer into the hole and avoid damage 
to the STOCK at this point. -Cast with an orna- 
mental FINIAL let into the SWELL of the fore- 
end to strengthen it. On arms fitted with steel 
rammers, a flat spring is rivetted into the pipe 
to hold the rod in position. Omitted on Sea Ser- 
vice arms. 
TANG. Projections from such pieces as the BREECHPLUG, - BUTTCAPI BUTTPLATE and TRIGGER GUARD, generally 
designed to strengthen and to help secure the part 
to the STOCK. They often terminate in ornamental 
FINIALS. 
TEARDROP. The shape of the HAMMER-SPRING FINIAL from 1778, 
and also of the termination of the LOCK and SIDE- 
PIECE FLATS. of Land Service arms from 1756. 
THREADS. The Ordnance term for the double lines of border 
engraving found on the LOCKPLATE, COCK, top JAW, 
and HAMMER of the LOCK. It was dropped from the 
top jaw and hammer in 1778. 
THUMB PIECE (ESCUTCHEON). An ornamentally outlined plate 
let into the top of the GRIP on most Land Service 
arms during our period, intended to carry regimen- 
tal information engraved on it which was not 
already engraved on the top of the BARREL or the 
BUTTPLATE TANG. This was usually the company and 
rack number of the-individual soldier, 
TOUCH HOLE (Vent). The small hole drilled or punched 
through the right side of the BREECH of the BARREL 
through which the flame from the ignited PRIMING 
in the PAN passed to ignite the main propellant 
charge in the barrel. 
TREFOIL. The three-lobed decorative motif used on HAMMER- 
SPRING FINIALS for Land Service LOCKS until 1778, 
when it was superceded by the simpler TEARDROP 
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shape. 
TRIGGER. The device which actuates the firing mechanism. 
A broad flat iron blade with a lower extension 
flattened at right angles to the blade for pres- 
sing with the finger. Hinged at its upper forward 
corner by a PIN through the STOCK, located towards 
the rear of the LOCK, to enable tcr upper rear part 
of the blade to bear upon the SEAR bar when pres- 
sed by the finger. When the trigger is pressed the 
nose of the SEAR is pushed out of the TUMBLER 
notch, releasing the tumbler to be acted upon by 
the MAINSPRING, which forces it downwards and 
backwards. The COCK, which is secured to the ex- 
ternal square of the tumbler, falls forward and 
FLINT in its JAWS strikes the face of the HAMMER 
forcing it away from the PAN and allowing the 
sparks created by the contact to ignite the PRI- 
MING in the pan. Part of the SMALLWORK. 
TRIGGER GUARD. Part of the FURNITURE, whether of forged 
iron or cast brass, formed as a rough semicircle, 
with projections at each side called TANGS for 
fastening to the STOCK. The semicircular part is 
intended to protect the TRIGGER from accidental 
contact, while the lower tang serves also to 
strengthen the GRIP area of the stock. On longarms 
fitted for SLING SWIVELS the lower sling swivel 
screw usually passes through a thickened area at 
the base of the forward junction of the guard bow 
with the front tang. 
TRIGGER PLATE. A flat brass plate with a slot in it, 
through which the TRIGGER passes, and for which it 
acts as a support and to prevent the trigger from 
becoming woodbound. It also serves as a baseplate 
into which the barrel tang screw is anchored. Sea 
Service arms and the Light Dragoon pistol do not 
have this refinement: a small iron square inlet 
ahead of the trigger serves the purpose. 
TRUMPET PIPE. The uppermost of the RAMMER PIPES introduced 
in conjunction with the steel RAMMER as a guide 
and support for it. It is approximately double the 
length of the old barrel-shaped pipe which it re- 
places, tapers from front to rear, and is flared 
at the mouth for easier entry of the rod. Secured 
by two PINS. 
TUMBLER. The central part of the LOCK mechanism which has 
the COCK fastened to its external extremity (the 
square) by the Tumbler Screw, and which transmits 
the action of the shooter through the TRIGGER and 
SEAR to cause the lock to function. Its internal 
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section has notches (bents) filed into it, in 
which the nose of the SEAR engages to hold it 
either in a safety position (half cock) or the 
firing position (full cock). Its forward part, (the 
toe) is borne upon by the MAINSPRING, which 
causes it to revolve when released by the action 
of the trigger on the sear. 
vo 
VENT. See TOUCH HOLE. 
w. 
WALL PIECE (WALLPIECE). A very large musket with a 54" 
heavy- weight barrel, often fitted with a 
heavy iron swivel resembling a rowlock through 
the lower part of the FORE-END. Throughout our 
period the bore size was about . 98, intended to 
use a ball of 6ý to the lb. They were intended 
for long range firing against artillery. batteries 
or troop concentrations from fortress walls, and 
were most popular with colonial garrisons. There 
were only a few hundred made during our period, 
mostly during the first half of the century. 
Ct /M, ý hy 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION: THE PRE-GEORGIAN YFARS, TO 1714. 
Although the origins of the Board of Ordnance may be 
traced as far back as the Privy Wardrobe during the reign 
of Edward 1, the association of the Tower of London as the 
base for a fixed storehouse for the royal military small- 
arms with a distinct administrative organization to 
oversee those stores dates from the years of John Fleet's 
keepership of the Privy Wardrobe, 1323-44. His successor, 
Robert Mildenhall, was the first person to receive a Royal 
Patent for the 'keeping the king's Wardrobe within the 
Tower of London. ' Henry Snaith's accounts from June, 
1360, are the first continuous record of small-arms being 
kept as a regular part of the stores in the Tower, and 
there was by this time a small regular staff to attend to 
the repair and maintenance of these arms. However, even as 
late as the 1450s the Tower had not yet been established 
as the largest single government storehouse for arms; by a 
Royal Warrant of 30 Henry VI the Ordnance establishment 
was granted that part of the Tower precincts encompassed 
by Tower Wharf, from Traitor's Gate to St. Catherine's 
Gate, along with the buildings in that area. 
' Since that 
time, the buildings used by the Ordnance within the Tower 
have varied, but the use of the Tower Wharf area remained 
constant. 
The number of officials increased gradually, and 
their titles gradually clarified, but the first patent 
issued for --a Master of the Ordnance has not yet been 
located. The earliest association of the term 'ordnance' 
with an official in charge thereof occurs in 1414, but it 
was not until the second'quarter of the Fifteenth Century 
that a definite split away from the Privy Wardrobe took 
place. There was a Master of the Ordnance from 1461, and 
by the beginning oi the Tudor period an Ordnance 
establishment becomes more clearly defined. By the middle 
of the Sixteenth Century something approaching the later 
Board structure had emerged. In 1544 the Lieutenant of the 
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Ordnance took over as the functioning head of the office, 
in company with a surveyor who appears in the late 1530s. 2 
The earliest instructions defining and guiding the 
actions of the officers of the Ordnance which have 
survived, appeared early in the reign of Elizabeth I, and 
much of the administrative structure which becomes 
familiar during the Seventeenth Century developed from the 
1560s onwards. 
3 The structure and operations of the 
Office under the Royalists has been studied by Dr Ian 
RoY4, but the Commonwealth period of the Ordnance's 
history has not yet been dealt with as such. Tomlinson's 
study brings the organizational history of the Ordnance to 
the point where the present work begins. 
***** ill- 
The entire organization of the Board of Ordnance was 
reformed and redefined by a lengthy set of instructions 
5 issued in July, 1683, with amendments in 1686. These 
formed the basis upon which the Board was to function 
until its abolition in 1855. Since they cover the entire 
period of this study, an examination of their chief points 
is in order. 
The operation of the Office was under the overall 
cognizance of a Master General of the Ordnance, appointed 
by Royal Warrant, and under him the Principal Officers of 
the Ordnance, also appointed by Warrant, and all 
considered as political positions. The Principal Officers 
included the Lieutenant General of the Ordnance, the 
Surveyor General, a Clerk of the Ordnance, Keeper of 
Stores [usually referred to as the Storekeeper or 
Principal Storekeeper], and a Clerk of the Deliveries. 
The Master General was usually one of the great 
officers of State, a nobleman, and during our period 
usually a high-ranking army officer (e. g. Marlborough, 
Cadogan, Argyll, the third Duke of Marlborough, Ligonier, 
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Granby, Townshend, Cornwallis and Moira of the sixteen MGOs 
1714-1818). Some of the Masters General took a personal 
interest in the post, but the evidence of their influence, 
with the notable exception of the third Duke of Richmond 
(1782-95) is slight. Townshend and Richmond are the only 
Masters General for whom there is evidence of a direct 
interest in small arms improvements. Because they were 
often absent on military service, much of their 
administrative work fell to the Lieutenant General to 
oversee, and their direct influence on the everyday 
running of the Office was limited to brief periods. 
The Lieutenant General was the effective operational 
head of the Board of Ordnance, whose duties included the 
overseeing of the trains of artillery in the Tower and 
various out stations, and the training of the various 
artillery and engineering personnel which came under the 
overall control of the Ordnance, in addition to working 
with the Board to arrive at decisions regarding the 
maintenance and replacement of all the various types of 
military equipment for which the Office was responsible. 
He had also to supervise and oversee all of the inferior 
officers and departments of the Office, and to keep the 
Master General informed about their performance. Eight of 
the twelve Lieutenants General were high-ranking military 
officers. 
The man who seems to have been most involved in the 
decision making processes regarding small arms supply was 
the Surveyor General. He had overall responsibility for 
all Stores of which the Storekeeper was in charge. He had 
to possess a working knowledge of all the various Stores 
in which the Office dealt, and to keep the several under 
officers as well as the various suppliers up to their 
individual responsibilities, and to ensure that all record 
keeping was correctly carried out. He also superintended 
the receiving of Stores, and the allowing of the bills 
received for them, and the keeping track of their 
maintenance, numbers and ultimate disposition. The upkeep 
of buildings of all sorts, arrangements for materials and 
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workmen to repair them were the responsibility of the 
Surveyor General. Sir Charles Frederick occupied this post 
for thirty-two of the most interesting years of our period 
(1750-82) and his influence, particularly in 
administrative organization, is frequently apparent. The 
only other individual to serve as Surveyor for any 
comparable length of time was John Armstrong (1722-42) but 
lack of the Minutes for almost the whole of this period 
prevent the assessment of his influence. 
The Clerk of the Ordnance was really the head book- 
keeper of the Office, with responsibility not only for 
books bu t correspondence and the certification of various 
accounts. This department had charge of accounting for the 
receipt of all Stores, and for keeping records of their 
arrival, issue, and return into Store. He had also to 
prepare the wages lists and process the bills from 
contractors and other suppliers to the Office, and he 
acted as a control on the Treasurer's and Storekeeper's 
accounts. The destruction of almost all of the accounts 
of this department by official 'weeding' in the 1830s has 
deprived the modern historian of a vast amount of useful 
and illuminating detail. A d. ozen individuals, most of them 
aristocrats or noblemen, filled this office during our 
period. 
The Principal Storekeeper was in charge of 
-all 
the 
Stores which came into, were kept in, issued from, and 
returned to, the Tower of London, including all of the 
small-arms. This involved the keeping of various records 
and accounts of receipts, issues and returns, and the 
taking oi inventories of what was in Store, its condition 
and value, which were known as 'Remains. ' He was enjoined 
to receive no goods which had not been inspected and 
approved, or for which there was no written authority, and 
likewise to issue no Stores without full written 
authority, and to accept the return of no issued goods 
which had not been first re-examined (surveyed) and passed 
by the Surveyor's office. He was held financially 
responsible to the Board for most of his transactions. 
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Once again the destruction of the Issue Books kept by this 
department have deprived us of much uniquely important 
information. 
The Clerk of the Deliveries acted as a secretary and 
book-keeper for the Storekeeper, being responsible for 
the preparation of the detailed lists, based on a Royal or 
Board Warrant, which the Storekeeper used to issue 
equipment, known as 'Proportions. ' His records and 
accounts were a check on the Storekeeper's. Several of the 
seventeen Clerks of the Deliveries progressed upwards in 
the chain of command, notably Charles Frederick, Andrew 
Wilkinson and Henry Strachey. 
The Treasurer of the Ordnance was required to give 
security for the 'faithful discharge' of his office, and 
acted as a middleman between the Exchequer (or Lords 
Commissioners of H. M. Treasury), and the Board, requesting 
from the Treasury all moneys required for the operation of 
the Office, and preparing all of the vo. luminous paperwork 
which this involved. His actual functioning in the payment 
of bills appears to have been confined to cash 
transactions, which were a tiny minority of the Office's 
financial operations, debentures paid 'in the course of 
the Office' being the usual means of reluctantly parting 
with money. His position was not considered as 
suffi. ciently important for him to be one of the Principal 
Officers of the Office. 
As a group, the Principal Officers were required to 
live in or near the Tower of London, and to meet at a 
designated office at. least twice a week. They were to keep 
the supply of military equipment up to a certain standard, 
and to deal on the basis of 'best Stuff, best cheape', 
i. e. the best quality goods for the cheapest price, in 
maintaining the King's Stores. They were to guard against 
any attempts at monopolistic practices on the part of 
contractors, and were forbidden to accept gratuities or to 
sell clerk's places for their own benefit. 
Each of the above officers headed a small department 
of clerks and assistants who exercised more or less 
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influence and power according to the personality of the 
head of the office. As the years progressed the size of 
most of the department increased slightly, but permanent 
increases were far fewer than those made during temporary 
crises such as wars. Considering the responsibilities 
which it had for the defense of the nation, the Board's 
position in the governmental hierarchy was not high, 
primarily because the Office dealt largely with 
artificers, and craftsmen, and not with other ministers of 
state and foreign dignitaries. 
Amongst the 'under ministers' who carried out the 
instructions of the Principal Officers, several relate to 
the area of small arms supply. 
The Keeper of the Small Guns, later known as the 
Small Gun Office, had to give security for the performance 
of his duties, and was to keep all small-arms and their 
accoutrements in good order with the help of a Furbisher 
and his assistants. He was forbidden to receive any guns 
which had not been first surveyed, proofed, and marked. 
The Messenger, apart from acting as a carrier of 
correspondence, delivered Warrants to the tradesmen and 
contractors, and visited them in order to encourage the 
timely completion of their work for the Office. He also 
made cash payments, what would now be called 'petty cash 
amounts' to various tradesmen including gunmakers. An 
important part of his work was to, ascertain the market 
price of all the different articles purchased by the 
Office, and to inform the Board in order to facilitate 
their bargaining with the contractors. The Messenger also 
acted as a police officer for the Office, making arrests 
and arranging custody of those being held for the Board's 
attention. The Messenger was the chief contact between the 
Office and the civilian commercial community, and his 
widespread tasks must have formed what was perhaps the 
most onerous and yet responsible function within the 
Ordnance organization. 
Although they operated entirely within the private 
sector of the economy, the tradesmen and artificers were 
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included in the structural organization of the Office for 
which the King laid down regulations. They were instructed 
to deliver only substantial quality work at reasonable 
prices, and to avoid the use of any poor quality 
materials. They were warned that being made an artificer 
to the Office did not imply the right to deliver shoddy 
goods, nor to a monopoly of supply. The Board retained 
completely its right to operate in a free and open market 
and to obtain its supplies from where-ever it chose at the 
best terms it could negotiate. Contractors were to hand in 
a bill for their work within ten days of delivery, and 
this bill would be allowed within another ten days, and a 
Debenture for payment issued within a month of the final 
delivery of the goods or services. They were also 
forbidden to purchase any decayed or unserviceable Stores 
of the type they supplied to the Office, and were told 
that no such goods would be sold to any clerk or other 
Office employee, but that all such would be offered at 
open vendue. 
One category of under ministers which exerted far 
greater influence than their position in the hierarchy or 
annual wage would suggest was the Furbishers, or as they 
were later called, the Master Furbishers. During our 
period there were five of these men, all gunmakers in 
their own right. They knew not only the skills and methods 
of the gun trade from whom the Office artificers were 
drawn, but in some cases at least, the desiderata of 
various forms of small-arms, in the form of a personal 
opinion if nothing stronger. Although most of the evidence 
is indirect, they appear to have influenced the design of 
military small arms, or to have put forward colleagues in 
the trade who did. The continuance of several of these men 
to operate privately in one aspect or another of the gun 
trade occasionally caused problems, but in general their 
technical expertise and value to the Office seem to have 
earned them no more than a reprimand and warning not to 
repeat the offense. The most apparent infringement was the 
spending of too much time in the inspection of arms for 
I 
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one or more of the great chartered companies, such as the 
East India Company or the Hudson's Bay Company, or in 
giving that work priority over the less well-paid King's 
work. This private work was normally tolerated so long as 
it did not impinge upon the Office's work. 
****** 
Apart from the administrative streamlining and 
clarification of the functions of Office officials brought 
about by the Instructions of 1683/6, the most important 
innovation in the operation of the Office during the 
period immediately preceding the focal era of this study 
was the introduction of the Birmingham gun trade to a 
significant share in the overall process of small-arms 
supply. This originated as the result of the greatly 
increased demands for small-arms created by the abrupt 
change in England's commitments to maintaining a European 
'balance of power'. This new emphasis on, and involvement 
in, continental affairs came with the arrival of the Dutch 
Stadtholder, William of Orange, as English co-head of 
state in 1688. Operations in Ireland to guard against a 
Jacobite attack in rear, increases in the standing army in 
Britain to support the new rulers against domestic 
Jacobites, as well as contingents sent to the continent in 
aid of the anti-French alliance, called for greater 
quantities of arms than had heretofore been required of 
the workforce controlled by the Office. 
Birmingham was a manufacturing village as early as 
the reign of Edward III, but the production of firearms in 
the area appears not to pre-date the Seventeenth Century. 
Its location in the centre of an area rich in coal and 
iron deposits, with ready access to timber and charcoal 
and a good if seasonal water supply for the operating of 
grinding and boring mills made it natural that such trades 
as nailmaking and ironwares manufacture should develop. In 
speaking of 'Birmingham' throughout the period under 
review, it should be taken as meaning the town of 
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Birmingham itself but including also the so-called 'Black 
Country' towns of Darlaston, Wednesbury, West Bromwich and 
Wolverhampton, which formed an integral part of 'the 
Birmingham gun trade. ' During the Civil Wars, the 
Parliamentarian armies received some of their small-arms 
from Birmingham manufacturers, (thereby incurring the 
displeasure of Prince Rupert in 1643), 
6 and by the late 
1670s a number of Birmingham gunmakers have been 
identified. But there is no doubt that the development of 
gunmaking as a separate trade developed largely as the 
result of efforts made by the M. P. Sir Richard Newdigate 
Bt. of Arbury during 1688. 
The details of Newdigate's lobbying have not 
survived, but on 10 January 1689 the Board sent him two 
flintlock muskets as patterns, and asked him to sound out 
the Birmingham gunmakers on the supplying of complete guns 
7 
as well as separate supplies of barrels and -locks. The 
results satisfied the Board, and a contract ensued, the 
details of which are unknown, apart from one payment of 
fl, 016.18.6. made in July, 1690.8 A further contract was 
signed in 1693 between the Board and five named Birmingham 
gunsmiths 'on behalf of themselves and the rest of the 
gunmakers of Birmingham' for the delivery of muskets at 
the rate of 200 per month for one year, at the rate of 
17/- per musket. 
9 
One of the chief advantages to the Office of using 
the Birmingham trade to the utmost of its ability was that 
the town of Birmingham and its manufacturers were under no 
such corporate limitations and controls as hindered the 
London trade. The Birmingham trade could be expanded 
without limitations being imposed by a mediaeval-style 
guild structure such as limited the London trade. The 
Worshipful Company of Gunmakers, though a very recent 
arrival on the guild scene (1638), were very jealous of 
their monopoly rights in the supplying and proving of gun 
barrels, and as soon as. it became clear that the 
Birmingham trade was able to fill a need on the part of 
Government, they began agitation to destroy this 
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alternative source, despite the fact that they were 
themselves unable to fulfil the need. While there were 
sound reasons for a control to be exercised over the 
production of gun barrels, to avoid accidents from bad 
materials and cheap but unsafe methods of manufacture, 
these strictures did not apply to Ordnance work as it was 
always subjected to proofs and inspection considered fully 
adequate by the Board. Petitions and complaints to the 
Board about shoddy work, invasions of their charter, and 
depression of their trade, are the only documentary 
evidence of this agitation by the Gunmakers Company, but 
it is clear that other intimidatory practices were used to 
protect their privileges, This situation forms the 
background of one of the major reasons for the increasing 
efforts of the Office to concentrate the production of 
military small-arms as much within its own direct control 
as possible. The precedent for such central control was by 
no means of recent origin: as early as 1572 a bill was 
read in the House of Commons which proposed various 
features of standardization including a common. size for 
the bore of the musket, and that any aspiring gunmaker 
should first submit a proof piece which would have to be 
examined against a bore gauge supplied by the Master of 
the Ordnance, and otherwise approved of. 10 
Efforts to suppress the Birmingham trade proved 
unsuccessful, and the West Midlands area rapidly developed 
a civilian as well as a military gun trade. By about 1700 
the area was a recognised source for locks and barrels for 
both civilian and military gun trades. The Ordnance began 
to rely on Birmingham for its supplies of gunlocks, 
barrels, and iron furniture, because they were cheaper and 
of no worse quality than those obtained in London, while 
the casting of brass furniture and the assembling of guns 
tended to remain in the hands of the London trade. But the 
transition to this system of dual supply centres was not 
fully achieved until the 1720s. During the years from the 
early 1690s until 1716-17, the Birmingham trade continued 
to supply not only barrels, locks and furnituret but 
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complete weapons as well. On 
throughout the Eighteenth Century 
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The injection of the Birmingham trade was the first 
of several changes in the structure of the arms 
manufacturing processes of the Board of Ordnance in 
recognition of the greater responsibilities for national 
defense thrust upon It by the accession of a European- 
oriented monarch. The stresses of the long years of the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) brought further 
changes and, ultimately, the emergence of a system which 
differed markedly from that in use in 1688. The surviving 
documents do notmake it clear whether this evolution was 
planned as such well in advance of its achievement, but 
the very ad hoc nature of governmental operation at the 
time makes this forethought unlikely. Response was to 
immediate situations, solutions were for particular 
problems. 
41 The procedure used to procure a supply of arms prior 
to the 1720s was based upon the application of the Board 
of Ordnance to a group of gunmakers within, and controlled 
by, the Gunmakers' Company of London. Often the spokesman 
for the group was the current Master of the Company, and 
he was always amongst the group which subsequently 
supplied arms to the Ordnance. A quantity of arms to be 
supplied was stated by the Board, and a costed 
specification was produced for the makers to estimate 
their price. Sometimes this resulted in a counter-pattern 
from the Company when the Board expected too much for 
their suggested price. Once the pattern and its price had 
been agreed upon, the total -number was divided up amongst 
the members of the Company most able, or considered most 
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worthy by the Company, to complete the work. No one who 
was not approved of by the Company could put his name 
forward to become an 'artificer to the Office', and so 
long as he remained in the good graces of the Company's 
hierarchy, he would be protected against complaints by the 
Board about bad workmanship or tardy deliveries. 
, 
The 
number of gunmakers to be provided for was large, and it 
is not unusual during this period for as many as 150 
different makers to be employed in the completion of one 
Ordnance contract; each maker received only a small 
percentage of the total, usually less than 100 arms each. 
Pistols, carbines and musketoons were allotted either to 
those who specialized in them, or to those it was felt by 
the Company could deal best with them. Where the number of 
guns was relatively small, only the 'chosep' makers within 
the Company would be put forward. Almost one-third of the 
total number of gunmakers who worked for the Office were 
employed during this period, and not after. Under these 
conditions, quality control by the Ordnance was extremely 
difficult: time consuming, expensive, and impossible of 
careful enforcement. Since weapons were supplied as 
complete units, there was less opportunity for inspecting 
components in the course of construction, to ensure the 
use of good quality materials and workmanship. There was 
no 'in house' inspection until the completed arm was ready 
for taking into Store. Because there were a great many 
mouths to feed, much use was made of repairing and re- 
furbishing old arms, (what might now be called 'busy work' 
often undertaken just to keep the gunmakers occupied), 
and this work was put out to those gunmakers who were best 
at delivering in their work on time and of good quality. 
The majority of Sea Service muskets were obtained through 
this device. Decisions about the design details appear to 
have been worked out at meetings of Company and Board 
officials, although the Ordnance did lay down the basics 
such as barrel length, bore size, stock material and 
important features of the lock. The Board would submit to 
the Company a written specification, and the Company would 
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reply with a pattern gun with a price attached for the 
number required. Price v. workmanship and finish was a 
area for open and full negotiation at the beginning of 
every new contract. 'Open contracts' were much used, 
whereby the Board would agree with the Company a certain 
basic requirement as to numbers, price, pattern and 
delivery time, and then any maker who felt he could fulfil 
these requirements would sign on. Details were necessarily 
loosely defined. If an insufficient number of gunmakers 
came forward to sign on for their share of the contract as 
arranged, then the Board would have to re-think its terms, 
and usually raise the price or alter the terms of 
delivery, or even simplify some point of design to reduce 
the work while not lowering the price. There was never 
any guarantee that the Board would obtain the number of 
guns it needed in the time and of the uniform quality 
required. Default of contract could never be effectively 
punished because there was (until Birmingham appeared) no 
alternative source (except foreign purchase, which was not 
considered satisfactory for first-line weapons). When the 
weapons were completed and delivered to the Tower for 
inspection, they were inspected and proved by members of 
the Gunmaker's Company hired by the Board. A rota of 
certain makers assisted the Board's two paid Proof Masters 
in this crucial stage of the procurement process. This 
self-inspection was yet another undesirable feature 
avoided when using the Birmingham trade, since inspectors 
from the Board went to the maker's premises and inspected 
the barrels and locks and muskets on the spot before they 
were shipped to the Tower. This practice continued 
throughout our period, and during major wars there were 
resident viewers from the Board, with. assistants, in 
Birmingham. 
Prior to the expansion of England's international 
responsibilities consequent upon the accession of William 
& Mary, the need for arms had been filled by the London 
trade, with occasional purchases in the Netherlands to 
make up shortages. Once the need for arms developed beyond 
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this insular requirement, the extant London trade was 
inadequate and Parliament was unwilling to see additional 
trade put into the hands of foreigners. The Birmingham 
trade provided an alternative and additional source, but 
the focal point of the procurement procedure remained the 
Gunmakers' Company and its members, acting, as it saw fit, 
in concert with the Board of Ordnance. The great, and 
over-riding problem was, that there were not enough 
sufficiently skilled gunmakers who could manufacture to 
the standards set by the Board. They were sometimes 
forced to rely on makers who had previously been 
unsatisfactory in their performance, simply because there 
were none to replace them. As the Eighteenth Century 
progressed, it is surprising to note that ever fewer 
London gunmakers were considered by the Ordnance 
sufficiently skilful to work to a pattern for a quantity 
of guns. This may have been one of the chief reasons for 
the final re-organization of the system in 1804, in which 
only a tiny proportion of the London trade was involved. 
Despite the re-organization of the relationship 
between the Gunmaker's Company and the Ordnance during the 
early Eighteenth Century, and the greatly increased 
uniformity and quality which this produced in the arms 
made for the Ordnance, the question of quantity, 
especially quantity at short notice, was never solved 
within the framework of the English gun trade either 
during our period or subsequently. Since use of firearms 
for military purposes had developed in the early Sixteenth 
Century, buying arms abroad had always been necessary, and 
in the absence of an adequate gun trade during the entire 
reign of Henry VIII, he was obliged to obtain small-arms 
on the Continent. As the size and abilities of the 
English trade increased over the next several centuries7 
foreign purchases became smaller and more periodical, but 
throughout our period they could be counted on at the 
beginning of every war. The arms came from the Low 
Countries, and early descriptions are sufficiently vague 
to obscure whether this means the modern, post-1830 
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Netherlands, or Belgium. Flanders was already well-known 
for its armaments industry, and Liege was on its way to a 
worldwide market by the 
, 
middle of the Seventeenth Century. 
It seems most likely that the pre-1700 purchases may have 
come, as did the 1715 purchase, from Dutch arsenalsq many 
as second-hand arms, but after 1715 and for the next 
century, the documents indicate that Lie'ge was where the 
arms were manufactured. 
" 
********** 
The ignition system of all the small arms covered by 
this study was known as týe flintlock. The similar term 
'Firelock' was used in military parlance to refer to the 
whole arm otherwise known as the infantry musket. The 
mechanism, known as the lock, is located at the breech end 
of the barrel, and is mounted on a case-hardened iron 
plate inserted into the right side of the stock (see 
facing Plate 1). This metal plate, called the lockplate, 
held the various parts required to ignite the priming 
powder which lay in the pan immediately against the 
barrel. Of the external parts, the cock held between its 
upper and lower jaFs a specially shaped flintstone; when 
the trigger was pulled the cock was released under heavy 
pressure from the mainspring and was impelled forward 
against the tempered steel face of the hammer. The hammer, 
an L-shaped piece combining a striking face for the flint 
and a cover for the priming pan, and itself held in either 
open or closed position by the feather-spring, was forced 
back by the flint in the falling cock, and as the flint 
scraped tiny particles of incandescant steel from the face 
of the hammer, these fell into. the priming powder in the 
pan as this was exposed by the opening hammer. The flash 
from the ignited powder in the pan passed through a hole 
punched or drilled into the right side of the barrel 
immediately adja ý_ent to the pan, and ignited the main 
propellant charge in the barrel. 
Although the flintlock represented a vast improvement 
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over earlier firearm ignition syatems) yet it contained 
several features which required skilled workmanship to 
make it effective and reliable. The hardening and 
tempering of the face of the hammer was critical to the 
striking of hot sparks by the flint. The balance of 
tension between the mainspring and the feather spring was 
critical to the rapid and correct interaction between the 
cock and the hammer: if one spring was out of balance with 
the other the hammer might not open sufficiently for the 
sparks to reach the priming powder, or the cock would drop 
down the face of the hammer without striking adequate 
sparks; flints might also be smashed against the hammer if 
the mainspring were too strong. The close-fitting of the 
pan-cover section of the hammer against the top surface of 
the pan was essential to prevent ingress of rain, but no 
amount of clever work could prevent moisture entering over 
a period of time. The dimensions of the flint affected 
the operation of the lock: if the flint were too short it 
would fail to push the hammer back sufficiently to open 
the pan. If it were too long, it would smash its leading 
edge against the pan and break when used for the first 
time, and otherwise would not allow the hammer to be fully 
closed on the pan, admitting moisture. The quality of 
flints was also critical to the reliable performance of 
the lock, and until the centre of the flint supply was 
moved from Kent to Suffolk early in the 1790s, many 
regiments spent their own funds in supplying their troops 
with good quality flints, since those from the Ordnance 
were reckoned of such poor quality. The Board attempted to 
sidestep this problem during the first half of the century 
by the importation of French flints, but this supply was 
irregular and insufficient. A normal musket flint was 
officially expected to last from five to fifteen uses. 
Ammunition during the entire period of this study was 
made up in the form of paper cartridges, a device whose 
first military introduction is generally credited to King 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden during the Thirty Years' War. 
A sheet of cartridge paper was cut to a prescribed form 
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and partially rolled around a wooden former; 
a cast lead ball was then placed at one end of the 
partially formed tube, and the rest of the paper rolled 
around the former, so that a layer of paper separated the 
ball from the cavity for the powder. The ball end of the 
tube was then tied with strong twine. The former was then 
withdrawn and the opposite end of the now empty tube 
received a pre-measured charge of gunpowder from a tin 
charger issued in musket, carbine and pistol sizes. That 
end of the tube was then closed by twisting the paper. 
While cartridge paper, ball, wooden formers and twine were 
issued by the Ordnance, the ammunition was made up by the 
services. The Guards regiments stationed in the Tower of 
London, manufactured the basic supply, for. issue by the 
Ordnance, and soldiers chosen from each company of each 
regiment, either for their skill in cartridge-making or 
simply their manual dexterity, gathered in groups by 
Commanding Officers in the field, made up supplies of 
cartridges from components issued by the local Royal 
Artillery stores. 
To use the paper cartridge, whether in longarms or 
handguns, the usual process was to bring the cock of the 
lock to the half-cock position, which gave clear access to 
the priming pan. Then the cartridge was removed from the 
cartouche box, and the twisted tail of the cartridge was 
torn off with the teeth, exposing the powder charge. 
Enough of this was poured into the pan to serve as a 
priming charge, and the hammer was closed on the pan. The 
remainder of the cartridge was then placed in the muzzle 
of the barrel, and the powder poured down while the body 
of the cartridge was pushed into the barrel, ball 
uppermost, still wrapped in its paper. The ramrod was then 
used to seat the ball and paper on top of the propellant 
charge in the breech of the barrel. This basic method was 
reduced to a numbered manual exercise by the armed forces. 
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PEACE AND WAR, 1713 - 1740. 
The general European peace brought about by the 
treaties of 1713 marked the beginning of an era of 
expansion and improvement in the manufacture of military 
small arms throughout Western Europe. The strains placed 
on all aspects of small arms supply by the long wars of 
Louis XIV had demonstrated the need for closer 
governmental control and supervision of the entire arms 
making- Drocess. and for the iMDrovement and 
standardization ot weaponry so tar as this concept was 
then understood. In practical terms this meant the 
setting up, or expansion, of national armouries, and the 
adoption of specific national patterns or models to guide 
the manufacture of a set number of weapons. These 
practices were brought to the highest degree of 
development during the first half of the Eighteenth 
Century in France 1, Prussia 2, Russia 3 and Spain 
4, 
with 
France undoubtedly setting the pattern for the other 
states. Austria, Naples and Piedmont-Savoy followed the 
general pattern but more slowly and with less apparent 
5 
success. 
In Great Britain the new era made less impact, partly 
because the landed gentry who most affected the operation 
of government were not of a military nature, and were most 
unwilling to spend any more money on what they saw as 
military paraphernalia. Parliament would, as a result, 
grant no funds for the setting up of a national armoury, 
indeed no evidence exists that the suggestion was ever 
mooted. An English national armoury did not appear until 
another century had passed and several large-scale wars 
had driven home the lesson that the private sector could 
not, and on occasion would not, supply an adequate number 
of acceptable quality uniform pattern military arms to 
meet the national requirements. 
What did take place in Britain, or more accurately 
England, with the return of peace, was a tightening up of 
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control over the manufacturing processes by the officials 
of the Board of Ordnance, and an adjustment of the 
relationship between the Board and its suppliers. The 
framework laid down by the Instructions of 1683/6 was not 
altered, but the duties of several Board officials were 
expanded, more in practice than by regulations. As with 
so much of the Board's administrative activities, it is 
possible to study their development or lack of it only by 
noticing results, and not from precise announcements of 
new policy or practice. 
Under the existing system the supply of small arms 
for the armed forces of Great Britain was in the hands of 
the civilian gun trade, primarily in London, with the 
Birmingham district acting primarily as a supplier of 
components such as barrels, locks, and iron furniture, 
with a small number of complete arms. The Government was 
just another customer, with about as much control over 
what they bought as any large customer might expect to 
exert. Unfortunately they were not always the largest 
customer, nor frequently a quick-paying one, and had often 
to compete with the large chartered trading companies who 
formed an increasingly important part of the nation's 
economic strength. This factor, along with the contempt in 
which land forces were held in England, generally left the 
Government in a weak position when arms were needed, 
especially at the outbreak of a war. Every contract made 
by the Board was preceded by the conventional marketplace 
haggling over article v. price, and' the results appear to 
have been a compromise. Military small arms made in the 
decades preceding the re-organization are of conspicuously 
lower quality design and finish than those which followed 
it. If no compromise could be reached, or the quantity of 
arms required could not be furnished in time by the local 
trade for a variety of reasons (e. g. too low a price 
offered for any of the components, with the East India 
Company offering them a shilling more per piece), then the 
Board's only recourse was to foreign purchase. 
Foreign purchase would produce adequate numbers of 
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arms for a cheap price, but they would be of relatively 
low quality compared with the domestic product. Parliament 
was naturally in favour of supporting home industry, and 
the complaints and petitions of the Gunmaker's Company and 
its backers often placed the government in an awkward 
position. Therefore the expedient of foreign purchase was 
resorted to only in real emergencies such as the outbreak 
of a major conflict, which in our period means 1715 (the 
Scottish uprising), 1740-1 (the War of Jenkin's Ear)2 1756 
and 1759 (the Seven Year's War), 1778-81 (the worldwide 
part of the American War) and 1793-1802 (the French 
Rev'olutionary wars during which Liege was lost as a supply 
centre in 1795). 
Throughout our period the chief competitors of the 
Board in the arms market were the African slave trade, and 
the East India Company, as well as the Hudson's Bay 
Company and the Royal African Company and its successor. 
Of these the slave trade and the East India Company took 
up the largest part of the gunmakers and thus posed the 
greatest threat to the timely acquisition of suitable arms 
by the Board. Both the company and the trade dealt in arms 
of lesser quality and simpler design than were demanded by 
Government. They required less skilled workmanship, and 
were paid for with acceptable promptness as a 
straightforward commercial transaction. As far as the 
Company's requirements were concerned, these were 
fulfilled within a regular calendar, the 'shipping 
season, ' so that the gun workers had ample time to 
complete the work. For what they were, the guns demanded 
were paid for at a higher rate than was offered by the 
Board. There was more profit to be made from slave guns, 
and the simple design was in constant and growing demand, 
and more men were capable of building them than the more 
complicated and comparatively highly finished arms 
demanded by the Board. Shoddy materials could be passed 
off in the trade at a good profit, but bad work and/or 
poor quality materials on Government work was^ liable to 
produce repercussions if it was detected by the inspectors 
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who were, even before the re-organization2 much more in 
evidence than any from the trade. So long as barrels 
passed proof, the London Gunmaker's Company gave its 
members little trouble in their commercial pursuits. 
Apart from the higher quality in workmanship and 
finish insisted upon by the Board, there was the question 
of uniformity in design. This was a stumbling block for a 
majority of the trade, and even towards the end of the 
Century the Board commented that only a small proportion 
of the London trade were capable of making arms 
6 
sufficiently close to a fixed pattern for Government use, 
Political requirements, such as treaties promising 
military aid, and military emergencies, often created 
demands on the trade which they were unable or unwilling 
to meet. The agreement with Portugal for assistance 
including arms in 1704, and the loss of 4000 arms at 
Aimanza in 1707, are but two examples which created much 
friction. 7 Payment by the Board was a tortuous and time- 
consuming process in which the workmen often waited months 
or years to be paid, and this was one of the areas which 
got worse, rather than better as the century progressed, 
though it must be said chiefly in wartime conditions. 
All of these factors combined to create a situation 
which required remedy. The new system which begins to 
appear between 1710 and 1715, was intended to place the 
Ordnance in a commanding position at the centre of the 
supply operation, where all facets and every stage of the 
manufacturing process from the procurement of raw 
materials to the receipt of the finished product could be 
effectively controlled and supervised. The increased 
participation of the Board's own employees in the 
inspection processes would eliminate many existing weak 
points where the manufacturers inspected their own 
products, and such inspections would ensure both the 
quality and the uniformity of the component and its 
workmanship. An increase (though slight) in prices and 
more carefully written contracts with strict penalties for 
late deliveries would tend towards the timely arrival of 
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components. Issue of the required components by the Board 
should ensure timely receipt of all the necessary pieces 
by the appropriate workmen in sufficient time to complete 
the work to the Board's schedule. For this purpose the 
Tower of London would become not only the chief 
storehouse, but the receiving and distribution centre for 
components as well as the finished products. 
The new system did not come into being overnight, but 
was gradually implemented over a period of some two 
decades. This appears to have been due to a variety of 
factors. Firstly, the Board did not, indeed could not, 
alter the fact that arms were needed only occasionally, 
especially in relative peacetime conditions; there could 
be no constant activity of arms manufacture during which 
to work out the details of the new regime. It was 
necessary to work within the limitations of Parliamentary 
funding, which, in peacetime, was never adequate. The 
decision-makers do not seem to have been possessed of a 
sense of urgency, being content to let various parts of 
the new approach be implemented as circumstances allowed; 
they may, indeed, have had no choice. Predictably, there 
was obstruction from the trade, especially from the 
Gunmaker's Company, whose influence and control would be 
(designedly) greatly curtailed and reduced by the new 
system. The workmen who would be affected by the altered 
conditions would need time and experience to consider how 
far they were willing to adapt their processes and 
techniques to the new requirements. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the Board's efforts 
towards the centralization of control and the 
establishment of greater uniformity in production was the 
structure of the guntrade itself. During the latter half 
of the Seventeenth Century, and for the next hundred and 
fifty years the strong trend within the trade was towards 
specialization of labour. The many skills involved in the 
manufacture of a firearm were separated, so that each 
major division such as barrel making, lock making and 
stocking were further sub-divided, with each process being 
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considered as a separate trade. The term 'gunmaker' 
referred only the man or firm which initiated the 
processes which brough't together in the end a complete 
arm, chiefly by paying for the work to be done by a force 
of workmen which he had selected; he was, in short, not so 
much a tradesman as an entrepreneur. In 1747, the London 
trade was described as being divided into no less than 
twenty-one different branches, which for clarity are 
listed in column form: 
Barrel: Forger; Filer; Polisher; Loopmaker (4) 
Breech: Forger (1) 
Lock: Forger; Filer; Polisher; Hardener (4) 
Trigger and Nail: Forger; Filer (2) 
Stock: Maker (1) 
Furniture: Forger or Founder; Filer & Cutter (2) 
Tip & Pipe Maker (1) 
Side Piece and Thumb-Piece Repairer & Polisher (1) 
Engraver (1) 
Bluer (1) 
Stick [ramrod] maker (1) 
Flint Maker 1 
(1) 
Mounter or Screwer Together (1), 
As will be shown presently, part of the process 
adopted by the Ordnance in its rationalization programme, 
amalgamated several of the above, at least in Ordnance 
terms, and obtained more than one service from a single 
contractor (however many sub-contractors he may have 
employed). 
Before going into the details of the operation of the 
new system of supply, the actual processes involved in the 
manufacture of small arms must be examined in order better 
to understand how the changes would affect them and to 
appreciate the value and relevance of these changes. 
****** 
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The several small arms which the Board required may 
be broadly classified as MUSKETS, CARBINES and PISTOLS. 
Bayonets for the first two categories were also required 
for most types. In the first and third of the these 
categories there were important sub-divisions for Land 
Service (the army) and Sea Service (the navy). Ancillary 
arms were occasionally required in reduced numbers. These 
include the RIFLE which first appeared as a production 
item rather than an outside purchase in 1762, the WALL 
PIECE which was an enlarged musket intended for long range 
firing from fortifications, and the naval MUSKETOON 
(usually called a blunderbuss in civilian parlance) which 
was a short, heavily built carbine in which the muzzle of 
the barrel actually or apparently flared for easier 
loading when the user was in motion (as in a ship or 
boat). All of these arms were produced by the same 
gunsmithing techniques, except that the rifle required the 
cutting of spiral grooves on the inner surface of the 
bore. Each was composed of the same basic component parts: 
barrel, lockg stock, furniture or mounts, and smallwork 
(trigger, sling swivels or ribs & rings, iron-wire pins, 
and screws - called nails in Ordnance parlance). 
The gun barrel was made of iron. The barrel forger 
obtained the raw material in bar or flat form, and using 
fire, hammer and, anvil reduced the piece to the correct 
length and thickness. Then, using a central core-piece of 
appropriate diameter known as a mandrel, he beat the strip 
around the mandrel and longitudinally welded it, forming a 
tube open at both ends. The barrel borer then smooth- 
reamed the inner surface, or bore, of the barrel, and 
usually fine-bored it as well. The breechplug was then 
threaded into the breech of the barrel, closing that end 
of the tube. The touch-hole or vent was then either 
drilled or punched on the right side of the breech. The 
barrel grinder reduced the outside diameter and shape to 
the correct thickness and taper, and the final stage of 
the work was. completed by the barrel filer, who gave the 
outside its breech rings and 
final finish, and fitted the 
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barrel loops on the underside, and the sight which also 
acted as a fixing stud for the socket bayonet, near the 
muzzle, so that the barrel was considered 'fit for 
stocking. ' 
The manufacture of a gun lock was an even more 
specialized industry, and required very considerable skill 
and experience during the flintlock era to achieve a 
correct balance of tension between the feather-spring and 
mainspring, and the temper of the face of the hammer. The 
lock forger who began the process at the anvil, used a 
mould or 'jigger', like a die, cut out in the shape of the 
lockplate with its pan. Into this die a billet of red-hot 
iron was beaten. When it had cooled the billet was knocked 
out, and the excess metal around the edges was trimmed 
off. Most of the other large parts such as the cock, 
hammer, tumbler, bridle, and sear were formed in similar 
moulds. The three springs, main- sear- and feather- were a 
separate speciality, and were fitted by the lock filer who 
finish-shaped and assembled the various parts. The lock 
polisher polished and fine-fitted all the components and 
the lock was now ready for engraving and then hardening of 
the lockplate and hammer. The holes for the sidenails were 
drilled and tapped prior to the hardening process. 9 
Throughout our period the stocks of British military 
small arms were made with English walnut, normally of the 
superior heartwood only. During the post-1804 period when 
demand reached unprecedented heights and time was more 
than usually lacking, both heart and sapwoods were 
officially accepted for some patterns and grades of arms. 
Prior to 1715 some Sea Service muskets had been stocked 
with beech, but this does not appear again during the 
Eighteenth Century. Walnut was procured as plank by the 
running foot, or as stock blanks already rough-sawn to the 
basic outline and thickness. Once the basic outline had 
been achieved by sawing, the next stage was to inlet the 
barrel, and then the lock. The ramrod groove was next cut 
and bored, and then the buttplate was fitted. After this 
the remainder of the furniture was inletted and the final 
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shaping and sanding of the stock was done. The wood was 
finished with linseed oil. The Ordnance method of carrying 
out these procedures differed markedly from the civilian, 
and is discussed below (see page 65). 
Until the early 1740s a certain, difficult to 
determine, percentage of British troops carried iron- 
mounted muskets. Their period of greatest manufacture was 
between 1718 and 1730, but after that cast brass achieved 
a predominance which was to continue for the rest of our 
period. As might be expected, the founding (or forging in 
the case of iron) of gun furniture was an integral part of 
other founding work, and the firms concerned were general 
founders rather than a particular branch of the gun trade. 
The patterns would be furnished variously by the founder 
or the customer, and once-a mould had been made it became 
public property, even in the case of Ordnance patterns* 
Conventional casting techniques, . using sand moulds, were 
also used for gun furniture, which consisted of the 
buttplate, sideplate, trigger guard, trigger plate, thumb- 
piece or escutcheon (at the wrist, grip or small), and 
ramrod pipes. From the 1750s the stock tip or fore-end cap 
was added. Separate firms were employed to supply the 
brass tips for wooden ramrods, since they were made up 
from sheet brass brazed together. While the majority of 
the furniture made for the Ordnance was of virgin brass, a 
fair minority was cast from old furniture which the 
Ordnance sold back to the founders for re-casting into new 
furniture. Normally this re-cast furniture, being more 
brittle than virgin brass, was reserved for Sea Service 
and second-line arms, but detailed evidence of use is 
lacking. Gun furniture was normally supplied to the 
Ordnance in the finish-filed state for Land Service arms, 
and in the rough cast state for Sea Service arms. 
Smallwork consisted of the trigger, iron wire for 
cutting to length as barrel and furniture fastening pins, 
and for the trigger pivot, sling swivels (or side ribs and 
rings for mounted service carbines), and screws for metal 
and wood. The trigger was forged with a mould in a similar 
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manner to the lock parts, although the civilian trade 
rarely resorted to this refinementý preferring the cheaper 
method of forging on the anvil and filing to shape. 
Threads for woodscrews were usually cut on a lathe, while 
those for metal screws were cut by hand in steel screw- 
plates. 
Wooden rammers (ramrods), which formed the universal 
method of loading all pistols until the last few years of 
our period, most carbines until the 1770s, Sea Service 
muskets until the late 1780s, and most other muskets until 
the 1750s, were made for the Ordnance from ash, ground to 
the correct diameter and taper. 
The manufacture of bayonets and iron (or steel) 
ramrods involved the forging and welding of both iron and 
steel into the finished product. The socket and shoulder 
of the bayonet were forged of iron, and hand-filed to an 
internal gauge-diameter. They were hand-fitted to 
individual muskets at the time of issue from the Tower, by 
the Tower's internal workforce. The blade of steel, which 
had first been forged and then ground to shape, was welded 
to the upper area of the angled shoulder of the socket. 
During the era of the plug-bayonet the blades (being 
separate and mounted in turned wooden handles) were 
supplied to the Ordnance by the London cutler's trade, but 
with the introduction of the socket bayonet the entirely 
metal production passed into the hands of the Ordnance 
furbishers and latterly conventional contractors. Between 
1724 and 1739 a small number of regiments in Ireland and 
the Guards Regiments carried iron mounted muskets fitted 
with iron rammers; these were supplied by conventional 
contractors. The Board credited William Grice of 
Birmingham with the introduction (to them) of the steel 
rammer, but no firm date is attributable. 10 From 1748 the 
steel rammer was in theory adopted for all infantry 
muskets, but it took more than a quarter of a century for 
all of the wooden rammered muskets to be called in or 
converted. The steel rammer was composed of an iron head, 
so as not to damage the iron barrels in loading, which was 
'Lopp 
so 
scarf-welded to a steel body for spring and resiliency. 
In the civilian guntrade the 'mounter or screwer 
together' referred to in the 1747 list above was as close 
as one could get to the modern conception of a 'gunmaker. ' 
This firm brought together all of the components described 
and, using the pre-formed stock, put them all together. He 
did not, as a general rule, actually work on any part of 
the weapon except the shaping and finishing of the stock. 
Even such matters as the bluing of the barrel were left to 
other specialists. As time went on, even this trade was 
sub-divided into 'Gun Finisher' as well as 'Screwer 
Together, 'so that the concept of a single gunmaker 
producing an entire weapon became even more incorrect. 
Within the Ordnance organization, the firms who 'made' the 
guns must be considered as the 'Rough Stockers' and the 
'Setters Up', who are described below. 
11 
***** -11, - 
Having reviewed the general manufacturing processes 
involved in the production of small arms in the Eighteenth 
Century as applied by the civilian guntrade, we can now 
turn to a consideration of the specific system brought 
into being by the Board of Ordnance in the years from 
about 1710 to about 1730, by which they hoped to achieve a 
more certain and timely supply of a cheaper and better 
quality product than had heretofore been available. 
In . the 
Spring of 1710 Richard Wooldridge succeeded 
Henry Crips as the Small Gun Office's chief Furbisher 
(the title was officially made Master Furbisher in 1718) 
in the Tower. Subsequent occurrences suggest that this 
proved to be a major step towards the introduction of a 
more systematicq uniform and efficient production of small 
arms. Wooldridgeg a gunmaker in his own right, first 
appears in the Ordnance records in the Spring of 1704 as 
an assistant to the View and Proof. He died in 1745, 
having served the longest of any Master Furbisher in the 
history of the Ordnance, and having probably been one of 
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the key people, like George Lovell in the Nineteenth 
Century, responsible for very greatly improving both the 
operation of the Ordnance and its product. Unfortunately 
the administrative records of the Board are missing 
between 1708 and 1715, and are very patchy until 1748, so 
that many features or activities which might otherwise be 
firmly attributable to Wooldridge must remain 
conjectural. 
12 
The last large-scale production of muskets prior to 
1714 occurred during 1710, in the course of which some 
7250 muskets were produced for the Board by seventy-seven 
contractors. These were complete arms, at a cost of 20/- 
eqch There were, in addition, some 2700 musket barrels and 
786 carbine barrels produced. 
13 In the course of 1711 some 
1700 musket locks were delivered in, while some 6300 
musket and carbine lQcks were engraved, and almost 3000 
barrels which had burst in proof were 'pieced and 
repaired' for Sea Service by one contractor, and 1750 new 
musket barrels were received. The only production was the 
'cleaning, locking and stocking' of muskets for Sea 
Service, which was 'busy work' carried out by the usual 
wide spectrum of contractors, each with a small quantity 
to work on. 
14 During 1712 1600 barrels for Sea Service 
had their 'heats taken, bor'd & breech'd' (see Glossary), 
the programme of cleaning, locking and stocking muskets 
continued on a much reduced scale, a few more locks were 
engraved and another 1000 barrels were 'piec'd and 
repair'd', and 300 new musket barrels were received. 15 No 
signficant recorded activity at all took place during 
1713, save for a small batch of muskets, locks and barrels 
for the Irish service contracted for in August. 16 The 
years 1711 through 1713 may be seen as years of gathering 
and preparation. How much of it was conscious planning for 
a future production programme does not emerge from the 
scant surviving non-financial evidence. 
In mid-1714 activity commenced which was not to 
slacken off until 1721. It began with a Warrant of 13 July 
for an issue of barrels to have their 'heats taken2 bor'd 
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and breech't' for 1/- each; during the course of the year 
fifty-six contractors delivered in 5002 barrels, and under 
seven subsequent warrants of February and March 1715, a 
further 10,860 barrels came in. Ordinarily this type of 
barrel was relegated for the use of Sea Service muskets, 
but nowhere in the records is this fact mentioned in 
respect of these 15,862 barrels. It would appear that they 
were used up in the production of at least two of the 
succeeding patterns of musket which were fabricated during 
the next eight years. 
17 
On 15 September 1714 comes the first real indication 
that a new era is dawning, when a contract for 4000 
of'H. M. Land service Musquet barrels' are to be 'stock'd 
and sett up with his Majestyls Locks and brasswork 
according to pattern' at 8/9 each. Here is the first 
indication that the Ordnance is no longer calling for the 
production of complete arms, but is contracting for the 
assembling of arms from parts which will be supplied by 
the Ordnance. Forty-nine contractors took part in this 
production, of whom only nineteen received allotments of 
more than 100 arms. 
18 The old system was not yet dead, but 
the first significant change had been made. 
Early in 1715 new contracts are made. On 11 January 
4000 sets of brass musket furniture are contracted for, 
'according to Pattern', half each from Mathew Bagley and 
William Burgin. On 1 February 4000 'New Land barrels with 
brass heelplates Tricker Guards and sideplates and Bridle 
Locks To have the heats taken, bored and breeched' along 
with 8000 ordinary muskets, presumably all taken from 
store, and suggesting a change in the form of the breech 
of the barrel. Then, on 8 February 'Contracts are to be 
let to make up the number of Musquets in Store to 40,000, 
and for Pairs of Pistols. to equal the number of Carbines, 
plus 2000 pair of Sea Service Pistols, ' while on the same 
day Elias Cole received a contract to deliver 500 musket 
barrels by 31 March, and 1500 every three months 
thereafter until a total of 10,000 had been reached, all 
made 'to the Pattern'. 
19 He had completed this work by 
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early 1717.20 
On 15 March a further tightening up of the system 
took place when the Board ordered 
That for the future all small arms that shall want 
Stocking, Locking or both be not soe repaired in any 
of the Out Ports, but quarterly or half-yearly (as 
shall be most proper) sent up to the Tower. And let- 
ters writ to the Storekeepers at Portsmouth, 
Plymouth, Chatham and Sheerness to send up the 
repairable Small Arms accordingly. 21 
By this step the major re-working of arms was no 
longer to be done by Office armourers at the naval 
outports, but rather by the Tower workforce under the 
close supervision of Office inspectors. This would dnsure 
a uniform examination of the arms, and a uniform method 
and quality of work in carrying out the refurbishment. It 
also spelled the end of the large 'busy work' contracts 
previously let to the London trade, substituting the Tower 
workforce. 
Anticipating the new workload to be assumed within 
the Tower precincts, in March, 1715, the old Proof House 
next to the White Tower was taken down and a larger 
facility installed on 'Tower Wharfe', and in mid-April 
advertisements were placed in the Gazette and Daily 
Courant announcing the selling off of unserviceable 
stores, including small arms, at the Tower- this to make 
space for the influx of new arms. 22 
Amidst all the efforts at reorganization it is clear 
that the design of new arms was by no means settled; on 8 
February Wooldridge had delivered to the Master General a 
Land Musket of the Old Pattern, as well as a new one 'as 
proposed' using bands instead of pins to secure the 
barrel. Then, on 14 April a contract was let to set up 
1300 muskets 'with bridle locks'; on June 14 Richard 
Wooldridge was paid for several brass stock patterns for 
muskets, suggesting that a change had been made to the 
design since the contract of 15 September 1714; this 
possibility is supported by the Board's increased price 
offer, from 8/9 to 10/4 for the same*type of work. 
23 
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The picture becomes even more confused when, on 13 
September 1715 the Board contracts for muskets at 22/ each 
and pairs of (new pattern) pistols for 27/- the pair. 
However, these are completed with His Majesty's barrels 
and locks, for which deductions from the total prices are 
made, amounting to 6/6 per barrel, 3/9 for soft 
(unhardened) unengraved locks or 4/1 for soft engraved 
locks. It seems probable, though the evidence is not 
conclusive, that these varying price allowances refer to 
differing methods of accounting and book-keeping, and that 
the same pattern of musket may be referred to during this 
interim period. Twenty-three contractors delivered in 3500 
muskets on this contract during 1716, of which 1760 were 
furnished by only six of the contractors. 
24 
At this point the efforts of the Board are rudely 
interrupted by the Scottish Uprising now known as 'The 
Fifteen', which erupted in September, and was not 
suppressed until the following February. Despite recent 
production the Board felt impelled to resort to the import 
of additional arms, and 20,000 muskets were bought from 
the Dutch arsenal at Delft, of which 10,000 were to go to 
the Tower and 10,000 to Ireland. These were not newly made 
arms to an English pattern, but old Dutch arms- in their 
stores. These were the last arms of a ready-made' nature 
to be purchased by the Board until the loss of Liege and 
the enormous demands from the mid-1790s. These arms proved 
of such bad quality and condition that the Irish Board 
refused to receive their allotment, and they appear to 
have been partially sold to the East India Company and the 
remainder broken up and the barrels Used, after proofing, 
in future Ordnance production. 
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Despite these alarums and excursions, the Board 
persevered with its rationalization programme, and on 20 
March 1716 further important steps forward were taken when 
An open Contract is to be made for the Gunmakers 
providing Stocks for Land Service Musquts & setting 
up the sameý according to pattern wth Iron work. 
Another [contract] for Stocks, & setting up 
Carbin's according to pattern with Iron work. 
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And proportions for delivering to them from Time 
to Time, the Number of Barrls & Locks wth Iron worke, 
for the said Musqts & Carbines, they shall so Con- 
tract to sett up. 26 
This is the first surviving precise reference to the 
issuing of components from the King's Stores, even though 
there is a clear inference in the contract of 15 September 
1714. This is also the beginning of the 'Iron Age' in 
Ordnance production, characterised by the use of iron 
furniture (and some iron rammers as well) on both Land and 
Sea Service muskets; carbines, despite the above 
reference, are always described as having brass furniture 
during this period. 
Although ThoTas Hollier, lessee of the Board's 
Armoury Mills at Lewisham, Kent, contracted for 5000 sets 
of ironwork for muskets, to the pattern, on 17 April, the 
year 1716 saw little evidence of progress towards new 
manufacturing contracts, and not until late 1717 did the 
build up of components begin which was to lead on to 
muskets being delivered into store from 1718 to 1721.27 In 
July Wooldridge was sent to Birmingham to order f urther 
ironwork, and to 'shew ye workmen ye way to fitt Locks to 
the Mould. 928 This is the first reference to the 
standardization of lock manufacture by the Ordnance, and 
it accounts for the great improvement in the uniformity 
and quality of Ordnance locks from this period onwards. 
William Caslon, of printing and type-font fame, replaced 
William Cookes as chief engraver to the Office, although 
Cookes continues as a supplier of barrels and locks. 
29 In 
the course of the year Elias Coles delivered 4222 barrels 
at 6/9 each, and John Vaughan 648 locks 'according to ye 
new Pattern' at 4/6 each, but it was chiefly a time for 
completing the contracts of 1714 and 1715, and of re- 
working Sea Service arms. Problems over control in the 
manufacturing process were by no means entirely solved; 
in November, 1717, the Storekeeper Thomas Gardiner, and 
Wooldridge reported that many of the stocks supplied by 
the gunmakers had shrunk away from the buttplates- 
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indicating insufficient seasoning. The Board ordered the 
Stockers to repair the defects at their own cost, or risk 
not being employed again by the Office. Interestingly, as 
showing how matters were done at the time, and as an 
indication of the Tower workforce's activities, those 
stocks charged to the gunmaker William Sowerby (some 300) 
were repaired by the Small Gun Office workers, although 
Sowerby paid their wages for doing the work. 30 The working 
out of cost-effectiveness was also still in flux, as 
Gardiner reported that Wooldridge had cut 2/6 off the cost 
of stocking and setting up a pair of Land Service pistolsý 
and the Boardl that this be passed on in the next contract 
with the Gunmakers. 
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Implementation of the new system made another major 
stride forward early in 1718. On 21 March it was 
Ordered That those of the Gunmaking Trade, who 
have behaved themselves well, be enter'd upon the 
Books of the Office, according to their Standing, 
being first recommended by Certificate from the 
Officers of the Small Gun Office, and Approved of by 
the Board. That the Assistant Viewers, shall be 
appointed, out of the eldest & best of these workmen, 
as the Board shall approve2 & shall be allowed 2s 6d 
pr them for so many days as they shall be employed 
therein, or in making patternsq or other Extra Work. 
That for the Encouragement of those, who have served 
longest & are best Qualified in the Gunmaking Trade, 
an allowance be made to 20 of them, of 12d a Day for 
the Holy Days2 mentioned in the margin. [21 days] 
And whereas 'tis, represented, that the procuring 
Double Security7 proves difficult to many of them- 
Order'd for the future, that Single Security shall be 
sufficient, the Officers of the Small Gun Office, 
taking care they are well recommended. 
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Here we have further control factors in the new 
system encapsulated in a single neat order. From now. on, 
contractors will be chosen by officers of the Small Gun 
Office from a selected list of the best-behaved and most 
skilled mený and the officers have the responsibility of 
making certain that the list contains only well-qualified 
people. Bounties and the easing of bond requirements are 
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made liable to Office approval, and are based (at least in 
theory) on experience and skill. 
As might be expected from such a limitation on their 
time-enshrined privileges, abuse from the gunmakers was 
not long in making its appearance. In August, 1718, a list 
of the Board's abuses was circulated, and articles 
attacking the Ordnance appeared in one or two anti- 
Government London newspapers. The Board was moved to reply 
in September that, of the charges made 
... the Chief and Greatest Part are old Storey's, but 
it now appears, the whole Malice is Turn'd upon the 
Masr Furbisher, whose Integrity & Application in 
business has brought up the Office work to a higher 
Standard than ever, and the Detecting of Ill perfor- 
mances of ye work, has provoked the Company of Gun- 
makers to encourage this Rabble when at the same Time 
theyll do nothing for the'Service effectually... 33 
The Board asked for the author of the charges to 
prove them, and name the persons making them. Just for 
good measure, and in a timely way, Wooldridge was accused 
of being a Jacobite! His value to the Ordnance is clearly 
seen in the nature of these complaints. 
It was just at this point in time that production of 
the 'Pattern of the 10,000', the iron-mounted muskets, was 
to be put seriously in motion, and the Board having 
submitted its pattern arms, the Company sent in bids of 
26/- for Land Service muskets and 24/- for Sea Service 
musekts. The Board responded by refusing to pay such high 
prices, and the gunmakers replied by offering to make 
others to a lower price. The Board told them they had 
tried that before and then had refused to make any guns to 
the agreement. The Master of the Company, acting as 
spokesman, said they could not do the work for even a 
half-penny less than 26/-, and the Board asked whether any 
features could be omitted from the pattern which would 
bring the price down to 24/- for the Land Service. The 
Master said certain frills could be eliminated, and 
0 
promised to submit patterns which they could make for 24/- 
for the Land Service and 20/ for the Sea Service. 
Th(ý pe 
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must have been a considerable increase in decorative 
features over the previous 22/- arms to warrant a 4/- 
price increase, but what the Company offered in return on 
7 October disgusted the Board. 
When compared with the Board's patterns, the butts of 
the stocks were formed by eye, rather than to gauges; the 
trigger plate was replaced by a simple square nut (as was 
usual on trade arms and Sea Service arms); the sideplate 
was flat rather than rounded in cross-section, and of very 
plain design, and let deeper into the wood thereby 
weakening it; the trigger guard was flat instead of being 
hollow cast, and thus much weaker; there was no tailpipe 
at all, and no sling swivels were provided; the lock 
mortise was largely cut away rather than fitted to the 
shape of the internal parts, greatly weakening the stock; 
and the barrels were not fine bored. The Company reckoned 
that the work jef t out amounted to 2/6, but they still 
wanted 24/- for the arm. There were further shortcomings 
on the cheaper Sea Service muskets which included no 
fastening at all for the barrel tang screw, no wood left 
in the lock mortise, a scanty breechplug tang which was of 
half-length and did not have the support of the sidenail 
passing through it, a much shortened buttplate comb 
lacking a tang, and no fine boring of the barrels. The 
Board compared the Company's patterns with one of the 
20,000 Dutch muskets recently purchased, and concluded 
that they would stick to their own patterns and let those 
who wished to contract for them. Six gunmakers signed on 
to complete 1350 arms. Although the details are not 
recorded, it appears that some form of compromise was 
reached, for ten days after what must have been a very 
s. tormY meeting, the Board agreed to pay in ready money 
rather than by debentures in the course of the Office, 
'... in consideration of the prices being 
advanced since., 34 
It looked as though a difficult situation had been 
circumvented by compromise, but apparent sudden disaster 
reduced the problem to an academic level: on 21 October it 
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was 'discovered' that there was a deficit of E59,287.12.11 
in the Board's available funds from the last Parliamentary 
grant, which 'put a stop to all Contracts and Warrants for 
Great Ordnance, small arms ... &c. s35 Unfortunately there 
is a gap in the Minutes from the end of 1718 until the 
beginning of 1720, so it cannot be determined from the 
surviving records just how this crisis was sorted out, but 
the Bill Books and Treasurer's Ledgers do clearly 
indicate that despite the apparent absence of funds, 
production not only did not cease, it actually began to 
take on serious proportions from this time. The Dutch arms 
imported in 1715-16 were to be proved and surveyed to 
discover which could be made good (by the Small Gun Office 
workers) for Land or Sea Service, to have their barrels 
re-worked, or classed as unserviceable and broken up. 
Tower arms returned by the regiments would be repaired by 
the trade and used for Sea Service. Thirty-three 
contractors signed on, and had 2591 Land Service, 965 Sea 
Service muskets and 850 pair of pistols distributed to 
them on the basis of their past services, especially 
during the recent rebellion. 
36 
Warrants and contracts made during 1716 and 1717 for 
components began to produce results from late 1717. 
Unfortunately, this is one of the few periods within the 
scope of this study when there is not a discernible break 
in production; it is therefore not always possible to 
clearly identify the relevance of each of the contracts 
made during this period., Thomas Hollier completed the 
first batch of 5000 sets of iron furniture for Land 
Service muskets by October, 1717, and produced a total of 
9400 sets by the end of December, 1718, as well as 3000 
sets of ironwork for Sea Service muskets 
in 1717 and 1718. 
Six contractors furnished almost 6900 musket 
locks, and 
Elias Cole was responsible for all but 100 of 6352 musket 
barrels. John Thompson supplied some 399500 wooden 
rammers. 
37 
Between the Spring of 1718 and the Summer of 1720 the 
first large-scale application of 
the newly organized 
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production system took place. During this time sixty-five 
contractors, contributing in various ways, produced for 
the Ordnance a total of 25,300 small arms. Of this number 
9960 were the New Pattern iron mounted Land Service 
musket, our 'Pattern 1718'; 3480 were New Pattern iron 
mounted Sea Service muskets; 3466 were conventional brass 
mounted Sea Service muskets, and 200 were Extraordinary 
Sea Service muskets. There were also 1196 carbines mostly 
of a New Pattern, and 7000 pistols (3500 pairs) for Land 
Service. 38 
To produce this impressive total of arms covering at 
least eight different patterns, the newly devised division 
of labour came into play. Certain areas made more use of 
it than others; the most important weapon, the infantry 
musket, gained the major benefitsq while lesser weapons, 
particuarly those for the Sea Service, continued to be 
made in closer conformity to the old system. In 
fabricating the 'Pattern 1718' muskets, the rough stocking 
operation was carried out by twelve contractors; the 
setting up was performed by-forty-two contractors, of whom 
only seven also rough-stocked part of their production. In 
each of the seven cases this dual contribution was carried 
out very early in the production period and discontinued 
thereafter in favour of setting up only. The iron mounted 
Sea Service muskets were rough stocked by twelve 
contractors (all of whom also worked on the Pattern 
1718s), and were set up by thirteen firms also from those 
who were working on the Land Service muskets. Turning to 
the other arms produced during this trial period, we find 
that the brass mounted Sea Service muskets, were 'Stocked 
and set up' by fourteen contractors, of whom five did not 
participate in any other contracts at this time. These 
arms were thus rough stocked and set up by the same 
contractor, and in addition they supplied all of -the 
furniture except the buttplate which, along with the 
barrels and locks, came from the King's Stores. Two of 
these five also produced the Extraordinary Sea Service 
muskets. A similar system combining rough stocking and 
61 
setting up was applied to the majority of the carbinesq 
but the furniture was entirely supplied by the Ordnance. 
Pairs of pistols were dealt with by six contractors who 
performed the rough stocking operation and then the 
setting up of the pistols; a warrant for all the pistols 
was issued on 27 January 1719, and it called for both 
operations being carried out by the same contractor. 39 
During this period the fragmentary evidence which has 
survived suggests that Richard Wooldridge was continuing 
to strive for increased efficiency and cheaper production 
within the Ordance framework. In April, 1720, he reported 
that he can have carbine locks made for 3/7ý, and pistol 
locks for 7/2 the pair, all 'to fitt moulds'; apart from 
introducing far greater standardisation in these two 
patterns, this represented a reduction in cost of 5d per 
pair of pistol locks. His efforts seemed to find favour 
with others besides his employers, and the Royal African 
Company asked him to view their arms, 'in order to bring 
the Gunmakers into a better method of working', which 
request the Ordnance approved. 
40 The activities of the 
Small Gun Office workers were also being expanded at this 
time, and in January, 1721, they were ordered to make 500 
carbine locks, as well as to clean and repair 3,729 of the 
Dutch muskets, as part of their coming year's work. 
Unfortunately this is one of only a tiny number of 
references to the technical activities of the Tower work 
force during our periodo 
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Production of the 'Pattern of the Ten Thousand' arms 
and associated secondary arms came to an end during the 
summer of 1721. Most of these arms have not yet been 
identified in modern collections so that there is little 
which can be said about any possible technical 
improvements over the arms made during the reign of Queen 
Anne. It is clear that a more elaborate barrel and a 
single-bridle lock which had to pass a 'go no-go' gauge 
were used in its production, and that the use of gauges to 
govern the uniformity of the major components were in 
general use to guide production. What had induced the 
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Ordnance to use iron for musket furniture does not appear 
in the records, but it continues to be used for muskets to 
be issued to the Guards regiments, being manufactured as 
late as 1735, and last issued in 1739. It may have been 
introduced as an encouragement to the Black Country 
industry, in an attempt to rely less upon London-based 
manufacturers. As a general article, however, iron 
furniture was abandoned after the Pattern 1718, and 
thereafter brass was used for all small arms furniture for 
the remainder of our period. The last of the iron-mounted 
arms were probably used up or replaced during the War of 
the Austrian Succession. 
What may be considered as the final stage in the 
basic establishment of the new Ordnance-centred 
manufacturing system for small arms fool place during 
1722. This involved a pattern arm approved not only by the 
Master General, but by the King himselt, and the 
incorporation of the bayonet as an integral part of a 
'stand of arms. ' Geo'rge I's personal interest in the 
military establishment was, and is, well known, and this 
step represents a significant example of this active and 
detailed interest. The monarch's desire to standardize as 
well as improve the quality of the army's equipment is 
seen in the final praragraph of the following instruction, 
but it was to be many years before this aspect of the new 
programme was capable of being enforced. On 28 July 
The Master Genl signified his Majesty's orders to 
provide 2000 Small Arms with Bayonets according to 
the Pattern his Lordship delivered to the Surveyor 
Genl, which was approved of by his Majesty; and by Mr 
Wooldridge produced to the Board. 
And that all Collonells who have any new Arms made 
shall be obliged to make them according to the said 
Pattern, and proved and viewed by the proper Officers 
of the Ordnance. 
42 
Note that colonels 'who have any new Arms made' are 
to conform to the King's Pattern and have them proved by 
the Ordnance; there is no suggestion that the colonels 
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must have Ordnance-made muskets. The colonels still have 
the option of having arms made themselves, but are now 
ordered to have them made to the single accepted pattern. 
Presumably this would not have affected minor savings or 
ornamentation to the colonel's taste, but the basic design 
should be followed. In any event, it appears to have been 
some time before the ruling was able to be fully enforced, 
in fact it seems reasonable to conclude that only the 
pressures exerted by the War of Jenkins' Ear and Austrian 
Succession finally bought the colonels of line regiments 
to comply. 
In October Wooldridge was ordered by the Board to 
immediately sett in hand the 2000 Arms lately 
ordered to be made according to the Pattern sealed by 
his Majesty. ... And that Contracts be made with 
proper persons for providing the said Number of 
Barrlls and Locks, and for Stocking and Setting up 
the same. 
That a bill be allow'd and a Debenture made out to 
Lewis Barber Gunsmith for 127.18.0. for Brass and 
Iron Work Musquets with Bayonets made for patterns 
for his Majestyq according to the Directions of the 
Right Honble the Master General. 
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Lewis Barber may thus be identified as the craftsman 
who produced the pattern arms from which the King's 
Pattern was chosen, but how much influence he, or 
Wooldridge2 or the Master General, may have exerted upon 
the designs, and the one chosen, is not known. The muskets 
produced by Barber were described as twelve 
'long Iron 
work Musqts with Bayonets' at 30/- each, six 
'short Brass 
work Musqts with Bayonets' at 28/- each, and one 
'long 
Iron work Musqt with Bayonet' at 30/-. 
44 Judging purely 
from arms subsequently manufactured, the King chose one of 
the brass mounted muskets, but with a long, that is 46- 
inch as opposed to a short 42-inch, barrel. The most 
puzzling feature of this episode which 
in theory put the 
finishing touches to the new system of manufacture, is 
that there is no evidence of the 2000 arms mentioned 
actually being produced. There 
is no record of musket 
production, or even of components 
contracts, between 1722 
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and June, 1726. 
During 1723 a number of deliveries of complete 
muskets with bayonets, as well as carbines and pairs of 
pistols were paid for by the Ordnance on behalf of several 
regiments. They would presumably have passed the King's 
Proof at the Tower prior to being issued. The cost of the 
muskets was much less than the 28/- to 30/- suggested by 
the pattern arms, and if several surviving examples of 
muskets by these makers apparently made during these years 
may be taken as typical, they do not conform to a single 
pattern, and are found with either brass or iron 
furniture. But it must be admitted that there are too few 
examples known from this period to draw any firm 
conclusions. 
The first of these deliveries came from Joseph Farmer 
of Birmingham, 190 muskets complete with bayonets for 24/- 
each. The next was from James Freeman of London, for a 
further 190 muskets and bayonets also at 24/- each, for 
Maj. Gen. Sabine's regiment. The next two orders were for 
a variety of arms to be distributed amongst several 
regiments: Lewis Barber delivered 480 muskets and bayonets 
at 24/- each, 27 carbines at 21/- each, and 507 pairs of 
pistols at. 26/- the pair, along with cartridge boxes and 
24 drums, for issue to the regiments of Brigadier Gore, 
Col. Kerr, Lord Carpenter, Col. Campbell and the Duke of 
Bolton; Joseph Clarkson of London delivered 240 muskets 
and bayonets, with cartridge boxes, 240 pairs of pistols 
and 12 drums, at the same prices charged by Barber, for 
the use of the Earl of Stair's and Col. Churchill's 
45 regiments. 
Three smaller orders with no ultimate destinations 
specified followed early in 1724, two for 24 carbines and 
24 pairs of pistols each, from Richard Sinckler and Thomas 
Phillips, and a final delivery in 1725 from Lewis Barber 
for 9 carbines and 9 pairs of pistols. This represents the 
entire small arms business of the Ordnance during these 
years as recorded in their Small Arms Books. 
46 Since 
there are no minutes or other correspondence for this 
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period, no explanation for this virtual vacuum in 
product-ion can be documented. 
From its presumed origins sometime in the 1710-14 
period through a gradual application of its various 
stagesq a new procedure for the production of military 
small arms has been introduced by the cessation of 
production in 1721. In 1727 the system was to be brought 
into operation from a 'cold start', but before dealing 
with this next period of production- perhaps the most 
orderly and comprehensible to ochr during our period- we 
will first examine the system itself as an administrative 
structure. Plate 1 gives a graphic representation of the 
procedures involvedg and their sequence. 
****** 
It has already been shown that in altering . the 
methods by which small arms were manufactured for and 
supplied to the Board of Ordnance, the Board itself 
initiated the changes, and put itself at the centre of the 
entire complex of procedures to be followed, asserting its 
influence from the beginning to the end of the process, 
with frequent checks and inspections throughout. It seems 
reasonable, therefore, given this new and positive 
position of the Board, . and for both clarity and 
convenience of reference, to call this new system the 
'Ordnance System' to differentiate it from the previous 
looser system which had no real centre of influence, but 
was rather a shared initiative between the Ordnance, the 
Gunmakers' Company and the Birmingham trade. 
The stimulus for initiating military small arms 
production might come from one of two main sources, the 
armed forces or the Board itself, or from a third though 
l, ess important source, another department of Government. 
In the case of the armed forces the initiative would be in 
the form of a request for arms for a regiment which was 
newly raised, or for an augmentation to an existing 
regiment, or for one whose weapons were worn 
out in 
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service, lost or irrepairably damaged in combat. The small 
arms complement for the Establishment of a given ship 
might also require replacement after long service or loss. 
A government department, such as the Board of Trade, or a 
Secretary of State, might require weapons to be furnished 
to an ally; or to a colony for its defense, independent of 
any arms which might be required by regiments stationed 
there. The Board's own officials might find as the result 
of an inspection of the stores that the numbers of a 
particular type of weapon were below an acceptable level 
and require new production to meet the level. The numbers 
and types of arms in store always varied widely due to 
incoming arms from regiments or paid-off ships, captured 
enemy small arms of all sorts, and the disposal at public 
vendue of old I stores no 
longer considered serviceable. 
Once a request for arms had been accepted by the 
Board the first step was to determine whether the 
necessary components were already available in store for 
the manufacture of the required arms. If they were, then 
warrants were issued to the 'standing gunmakers' to rough 
stock and set up the specified number, along with the 
required wood, and other components. If they were not, 
then the process was more complicated. 
Assuming that there were no components for a given 
type of arm already in store, the clerks to the 
Storekeeper would write letters to the standing 
contractors for the various components (barrel makers, 
lock makers, brass founders, ramrod and bayonet makers, 
smallwork makers, rough stockers and setters up) to ask in 
what time and at what price they would agree to deliver 
the required number of pieces. There was an official Price 
Book kept by the Board in which the prices agreed by each 
contractor were entered, and such was the attitude in the 
18th Century thatq once agreed, a price did not 
automatically increase with the next contract. A new 
pattern object, requiring new moulds and gauges, would 
usually bring a slight increase in price, but this might 
even be lowered after initial costs had been covered. The 
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contractors. would reply to the Board's enquiries and any 
differences would normally be quickly adjusted to mutual 
satisfaction. Warrants would then be made out Lo each 
contractor for a proportion of the required amount, with 
delivery variously specified at anything from six weeks to 
six months. 
The manufacturing processes described on pages 
29-33 would then be carried out by the contractors j, sub- 
, st the trade as necessary* 
The details of contract in,, --:, amona 
how each contrActor operated have not survived, and must 
be inferr--d from the Board's infrequent references to 
them, or from the results* Some contractors had difficulty 
in obtaining the required number of workmen for their 
allotmentsp especially if the chartered trading companies 
were -issuinz contracts for arms, or 
if it had been some 
years since Ordnance work had been carried out* This 
usually called for a rise in the price allowed by the 
Board for the affected componentp with resultant delays 
while the amount was settled. 
Gun barrels would be 'viewed' or inspected at the 
maker's premises by Ordnance Viewers who at times of 
lengthy contracts due to a warý(and from 1755 onwards) 
were usually resident in Birmingham. The view consisted of 
examining the bore from end to end with a rod-gauge; 
checking the spacing and placement of the loops on the 
underside, and of the sight at the muzzle, and also to see 
that they -vere properly brazed on; and the size of the 
muzzle was verified with a socket gauge for the fitting of 
the bayonet. 47 If they passed this inspectiong they 
would be marked, and then sent to the Tower for proof. On 
average about 10% of barrels failed to pass the View and 
were rejected, During our period the Tower proof for 
muskets used a . 751" lead ball, 
(. 693" fo: servir-e)i for 
carbines . 650" 
(., t)15 for service), and for pistols . 55""' 
(. 517" for service)p with approximately double the service 
charge for a proof charge. 
48 After proof the barrels were 
left to lie for two daysp to allow any flaws to be made 
obvious by rusting* If on examination no flaws were 
found, 
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the breech was then stamped with the King's proof markt a 
pair of crossed sceptres beneath a crown, and with the 
view mark, a crowned GR with a Broad Arrow beneath. This 
second mark also doubled as a Government ownership mark 
for barrels. The barrels were then thoroughly cleaned and 
burnished, and if found entirely satisfactory a final 
viewer's mark of a crown over a number was stamped on the 
top of the breechplug tang. 
49 The barrels were then taken 
into store to await issue to the rough stockers. 
The manufacture of gunlocks for the Ordnance is more 
difficult to describe with certainty, because two distinct 
systems were employed throughout much of our period. In 
one the locks were supplied in a fully complete and 
finished state, with the lockplates engraved and hardened, 
while in the other the makers sent the locks to the Tower 
in the 'soft state' to be engraved, and then either 
hardened by the lockmakers in the Tower, or returned to 
the contractor for hardening. In 1756 the shape of the 
lockplate was simplified and the internal parts subjected 
to much closer gauging in the course of manufacture. 
Until 1764 the name of the lock contractor was engraved 
across the tail of the lockplate along with the date the 
lock was manufactured. After 1764 all locks were engraved 
TOWER in this position. However, many locks are found 
today with TOWER as well as a-pre-1764 date, and these are 
thought to have originated as locks sent in the soft state 
to the Tower and engraved and hardened there. The 
contractor's name or initials would still be stamped on 
the inside of the lockplate. What determined which system 
was to be used for a particular contract is not clear from 
the records. The locks would be inspected prior to 
despatching from the contractor, to see that each part fit 
the gauge, that the springs worked well together, that 
the face of the hammer was properly steeled and would then 
be marked with the inspector's crowned numeral on the 
inside of the lockplate, and struck by the inspector with 
a crowned Broad Arrow on the outside of the lockplate 
below the pan, as a sign of acceptance and Government 
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ownership. 50 
After their general introduction for infantry use in 1748, the steel ramrod was subjected to a rigorous 
inspection by fixing it in a stand on the ground and 
bending it in various directionsp to see if it would 
return each time to a perfectly straight line. It was then 
dropped from a height upon an anvil, head-first, and if 
the metal rang properly it was considered sound, and was 
struck with the inspector's crowned numeral below the 
head. 51 The Ordnance were not responsible for the 
threading of the tip to take a worm and ball-drawer; this 
was considered a regimental responsibility, even though 
rammers were engraved prior to issue by the Ordnance at 
the head with the regimental company and rack numbers 0 
52 
Judging from surviving specimens, the majority of rods 
were not threaded, and reliance was presumably placed on 
regimental armourers for internal barrel work. 
Socket bayonets came into general use after 1722, and 
their production was confined to a very limited number of 
makers until 1778 when the Birmingham trade took over 
their production. Thomas Hollier, lessee of the Armoury 
Mills, Lewisham, Kent, enjoyed a virtual monopoly of 
bayonet production between 1727 and his death in 1754. 
During this time he supplied some 227,000 bayonets for 
Land and Sea Service muskets, and carbines. From 1727 to 
1730 William Huggins supplied a further 21,000 musket 
bayonets. From 1754 until 1778 bayonet production was in 
the hands of William & Edward Loxham. Bayonet scabbards 
were a separate item supplied by the accoutrement makers, 
Peter & James Esdaile throughout our period. At the 
conclusion of its manufacture the bayonet was subjected to 
several tests by way of inspection. The first involved 
gauging to see that the socket was of the correct 
diameter, and that the length of blade and its width at 
the shoulders were to size. It was then checked for the 
temper of the blade by attempts to bend itq and then 
struck at the neck on an anvil to test the welding and 
strength at this vital point. If all these 
tests were 
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passed the usual crowned numeral was struck into the base 
of the blade just above the neck, and the bayonet was 
ready for. shipment to the Tower. Final fitting of the 
bayonet to a particular barrel was carried out either by 
the setters up, or by the Small Gun Office workforce, 
depending on the circumstance s at the time. If the piece 
were intended for issue to a specific unit, then the unit 
designation and a rack and gun number would be engraved by 
the Office engravers on the socket of the bayonet, to 
match the markings on the barrel and escutcheon of the 
arm. 
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Brasswork, to judge from examination -of surviving 
examples, was inspected, but no details of the types of 
examination have survived. Land Pattern furniture would 
have been gauged for size and shape, although Sea Service 
furniture was filed to shape at the time of setting up. 
There may also have been a test for brittleness for 
furniture cast from virgin brass. 
Each of the above components was supplied by 
contractors in different branches of the guntrade, located 
primarily in the Birmingham area. Finished and inspected 
components would be sent by road and/or canal (a journey 
of about nine day's duration) into store at the Tower. 
After 1804, when the assembling of complete arms by the 
Birmingham trade again became a part of the system, 
Ordnance storehouses and resident inspectors eliminated 
this journey for the components destined for assembly in 
Birmingham. 
On reaching the Tower the Storekeeper's clerks 
accounted for the various items arriving and they were 
then distributed into the appropriate bins, or made ready 
for immediate shipment to the contractors for the next 
stages of production, the woodworkers. 
In the civilian guntrade the operations of rough 
stocking and setting up were considered as one, but in the 
interests of detailed inspection at both stages of 
manufacture, the Ordnance divided it into two distinct 
operations performed by different firms. From 1729 until 
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1769 rough stocking2 as well as the supplying of most of 
the walnut stock wood2 was handled by the firm of Richard 
Waller, who was joined by his son James in 1755. In 1769 
the Wallers, over their strong objections, were joined as 
rough stockers by Joseph Loder, replacing the elder Waller 
who had just died . 
54 To the Ordnance rough stocking meant 
the shaping of the stock blank to its finished outline2 
fitting the barrel and the lock into the stock2 and boring 
the ramrod channel. At this point the first inspection 
occurred, to see that lock and barrel were correctly 
seated and that the various cross-sections of the stock 
were to gauge. The wood itself was examined for soundness 
and lack of any cross-grain2 cracks or flaws. The barrel 
was removed and the bedding checked2 and the stock was 
struck a smart blow on the butt2 and let fall to the 
ground to see if it 'sounded' right. If these tests were 
passed the inspector struck his crowned numeral in the 
rammer channel beneath the loop for the sling swivel*55 
In theory2 and often in practice as well2 the rough 
stocked arms were now returned into store at the Tower 
before being issued to the Setters Up. 
The final operation in the Ordnance process was known 
to the Ordnance as Setting Up. This combined several 
operations as understood in the civilian gun trade2 which 
included the screwer together or assembler2 gun finisher, 
furniture polisher, gunstock finisherg stainer & 
varnisher. Under the tightly supervised Ordnance system 
this was divided up into several stages2 with inspections 
between each stage. In the first stage the rough stocked 
arm had the brass furniture fitted to it, along with sling 
swivels or ring-bar as appropriate2 and the holes drilled 
for the various pins which secured the furniture and 
trigger. At this point an inspection determined that the 
fitting was properly done and that the inletting of the 
brass and the drilling had created no splits or cracks in 
the stock. If the piece passed this inspection, a second 
crowned numera12 below the first one2 was struck in the 
ramrod channel. The piece was then returned 
to the workmen 
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who polished all of the brasswork, and final-finished the 
stock by smoothing it to lay the grain, stained and oiled 
the wood. A further examination to see that these 
operations were done properly was then carried out, and if 
successful a third crowned numeral was struck in the 
rammer channel, below the earlier two marks. The arm was 
now taken to the Finishing Viewer in its completed state, 
and several examinations were carried out by this 
inspector: first, the pins were inspected for fit and the 
inside of the lock and the lock mortice; the barrel was 
also removed to check the fit of the pins and the 
soldering of the loops. If these were satisfactory the 
Viewer stuck his crowned numeral in the stock just below 
the lower tang of the trigger guard. Then the entire arm 
was inspected overall, and if found correct a second 
crowned numeral was struck below the first one (the same 
number). 
56 The process known as 'filing fit for stocking' 
by which the outside dimensions of the barrels were 
reduced to their final configuration and measurements by 
draw-filing to a set of gauges, was usually performed by 
the setters up rather than -the rough stockers, as a 
separately billed process. Why a process so clearly 
related to the earlier and more basic process should have 
thus been separated from it is not clear, unless it was 
due to the fact that the rough stockers dealt primarily 
with wood, whereas the setters up were often skilled with 
both wood and metalwork, and presumably could work to 
finer tolerances. 
The arm was now complete, and ready for packing up 
and shipping to the Tower. Deliveries seem to have 
depended upon a number of factors including the urgency of 
demand from the Board, the amount of storage space 
available to the contractor, the distance from his 
workshops to the Tower, and the means of conveyance used. 
Judging from the dating of the bills, made out very soon 
after the arrival of the arms at the Tower, deliveries 
were generally monthly. When the arms arrived at the Tower 
they were received by the Storekeeper's clerks, and having 
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been noted down and a receipt issued, they were struck on 
the right side of the buttstock with the Storekeeper's 
stamp consisting, until the 1780s, of the Royal Cypher 
with a crown above it; beginning in 1786 a date was added 
below the cypher, but this date was not changed until the 
particular stamp was either broken or worn out. Dated 
Storekeeper's stamps cannot be used as a precise 
indication of when a piece was taken into store, except 
that the year shown will indicate a 'not before' date. 
The weapons were now completed and in their racks in 
the Tower of London, ready for distribution to the troops 
and ships of HM forces, or to garrisons at home and 
abroad, a process which is dealt with in Appendix 2. 
****** 
It was during the period of general inactivity that 
the Board made its first experiment with an article of 
great practical value to the effective use of the musket 
in combat: the steel rammer. Unfortunately the experiment 
was implemented partly through the Small Gun Office 
workforce and partly by the Irish Board of Ordnance at 
Dublin, so that what little we know of the operation must 
be pieced together. The timing of the several events is 
such that it is even possible that the steel rammer was to 
be a part of the two thousand arms specified in the orders 
of July and October, 1722p but there is no documentary 
evidence to substantiate this suggestion. 
The wooden rammer was cheapp easily made, fairly 
simple to replace2 and lightweightp all 
desirable features 
in a military arm. But it was also extremely fragilep and 
when clumsily or hastily usedp or with a powder-fouled 
barrel creating resistance and requiring undue pressure 
upon itp it would easily snap in two, 
leaving the soldier 
with no means of loading his weapon. 
It was also liable to 
swell during damp or wet weatherp and 
become impossible to 
withdraw from its pipes. Despite the 
fact that from 1707 a 
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tapering tubular collar replaced a plain nail as a cover 
57 for the head of the ramrod, it remained absolutely 
useless as a cleaning implement, removing a vital 
maintenance operation from the hands of the soldier. While 
these shortcomings could be tolerated where weapons were 
not frequently used, such as for cavalry and Sea Service, 
they were a severe handicap for the ordinary infantry 
soldier. Whether the idea of replacing wood with metal 
originated with some Irish officer, with someone at the 
Board in London, or was copied from Prussian experiments 
dating as far back as 1698, is not revealed in the 
records. Certainly the Prussian army, at the instance of 
Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, had adopted the heavy 
iron rammet in 1718, and during the mid-1720s it was being 
introduced into regimental service; it seems very likely 
that the inspiration for experimenting with it in Britain 
may well have stemmed from these developments. 
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Sometime before August, 1724, the workers of the 
Small Gun Office had converted about 1000 muskets of the 
'Pattern 1718' (or Pattern of the 10,000) from wooden 
rammers to use steel rammers. This had been accomplished 
by rivetting a small steel spring on the inside of the 
tailpipe to hold the new thinner rod in place, and by 
fixing (presumably by soldering) a thin thimble or collar 
of metal inside the mouth of the upper rammer pipe to 
prevent the rod from rattling too much. Someone at the 
Irish Board of Ordnance wrote to London to ask whether 
steel rods could be fitted to some of their muskets, and 
Richard Wolldridge replied on 4 August that they could be 
converted in the same manner as had already been done at 
the Tower. It appears that 680 muskets were intended for 
this conversion in Ireland. 59 
Apparently the steel rammer met with approbation in 
Ireland, for on 9 May 1726 a Royal Warrant was issued for 
sending 2000 muskets and bayonets with steel rammers to 
Ireland, at a cost of 32/- each, for the service of ten 
regiments 
60. By late 1726 there were a number of specific 
warrants for the issue of such arms to several regiments 
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on the Irish Establishment including Newton's, Disney's and 
Wetham's; early in 1727 there were further warrants for 
steel rammered muskets to Robert Murray's and Col. 
Duburgany's regiments. These warrants accounted for 1620 
of the 2000 mentioned in the warrant of 9 May. 61 Lacking 
further detailed evidence it must be assumed that these 
arms were English-made iron-mounted Pattern 1718 muskets 
converted to steel rammers and sent to Ireland. 
At the same time as the Irish Establishment was 
receiving steel rammered muskets, the Guards regiments in 
England were also being so equipped. It may well be that 
the intention was to use the Guards, with their normally 
undispersed stations and frequent drill, as the basis for 
the experiment with steel rammers, in England. Under a 
warrant of 31 July 1724 the 1st Foot Guards were to 
receive an entire new set of arms (1260 muskets) and this 
may have marked the beginning of their new equipmentt and 
also provide an explanation for the conversion of the 1000 
muskets to steel rammers referred to by Wolldridge in his 
letter of 4 August. By the augmentation of 15 September 
1727 a total of 256 men were to be added to all three 
Guards regiments, and they were to have steel rammered 
muskets, indicating that by that time the parent corps 
already had them. 62 The last recorded manufacture of iron 
mounted and steel rammered muskets occurred in 1735, when 
Richard Wooldridge set up 640 for an augmentation to the 
Foot Guards. The Guards appear to have lost their steel 
rammered iron mounted muskets during the 1739-41 general 
re-armament, and when they were re-issued with steel 
rammered muskets in 1749, they had the conventional brass 
mountings. The steel rammer was to remain a limited issue 
item until the time. of the Seven. Years' war, during which 
most infantry regiments and some militia regiments were 
equipped with it. 
Early in 1727 there were several large augmentations 
made to the dragoons and the troops in Ireland, as well as 
the raising of six independent companies for service in 
the Highlandsq and new arms for the garrison at 
Gibraltar. 
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These demands apparently could not be met from arms 
already in store, and the old system of taking complete 
arms from the gunmakers was resorted to. Some 9900 muskets 
and 2000 pairs of pistols were required. Orders for 
dragoon arms were dealt with by several gunmakers: Lewis 
Barber supplied 832 muskets & bayonets and 856 pairs of 
pistols; Joseph Clarkson supplied 416 muskets & bayonets 
and 427 pairs of pistols; Joseph Farmer furnished 207 
muskets & bayonets; James Freeman supplied 414 muskets & 
bayonets; and Richard Sinckler furnished 81 muskets with 
bayonets. These were all iron mounted arms, costing 26/6 
each complete; given that the subsequent pattern was 
priced at 32/6, we may conclude that they were of a 
different, perhaps a regimental, pattern. 
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The Board was about to enter upon another period of 
large-scale production, which had its beginnings in 
various components contracts made throughout 1727. Chief 
amongst these were furniture contracts. Thomas Hollier 
delivered in 3000 sets of iron musket furniture, while 
Mary Burgin supplied 2000 sets of brass musket furniture, 
and Peter Cooke furnished 3500 sets of brass rammer pipes 
and rammer tips. Also received into store during th e year 
were 3000 barrels from Elias Cole, another 1000 from 
Edward Cookes and 500 from Joseph Farmer. The only arms 
production to be recorded during 1727 was 1000 iron 
mounted muskets and 1000 brass mounted muskets set up at 
6/6 each by Charles Pickfatt, who was to loom large as a 
Setter Up for the next twenty-one years; s ince the charge 
for setting up the subsequent pattern was 8/6, we may 
assume that these were not of the same pattern as the 
large scale production which was to follow. 64 
Between January and August 17289 Richard Wooldridge 
was visiting the many contractors with pattern arms for 
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their inspection and guidance. From this it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the materials being assembled 
were fo 
'ra 
new and definitive design of musket, and with 
the benefit of hindsight in studying the pr. oduction which 
was to follOwy it seems justifiable to identify this new 
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pattern arm as the King's Pattern of 1728. its most 
distinctive features were the style of its brass 
furniture, the shape of the stock, and the design of the 
barrel. The Pattern 1728 musket was fitted 
with a . 76 calibre 46-inch round iron barrel with 
ornamental turning at the breech, secured to the fore-end 
by three double barrel loops and the screw for the upper 
sling swivel. The double loops served also as bases for 
the pins which secured the rammer pipes, but they were 
more costly than the single variety and were discontinued 
in the early 1730s. The foresight is an iron rectangle 
measuring about 1/4" x 1/8" brazed about two inches from 
the muzzle, which acts primarily as a stud for fixing the 
bayonet. The lock was of the single-bridle variety, 
representing a considerable improvement over the Pattern 
of the 10,000 (Pattern 1718) design, with a rounded 
surface to the lockplate and cock. The lockplate measures 
6 7/8" x1 3/16", 'and the rear portion of the plate angles 
downwards in what is usually described as a'banana' 
outline. The finial of the feather-spring is a trefoil 
pattern. The lock is fitted with a long sear spring, and 
only the sear screw comes through the lockplate at the 
tail. The comb of the cock is broad and when viewed from 
the side, very thin and curled forward at its tip. The top 
jaw, viewed from above, is nearly circular in form, and is 
engraved with the two narrow lines also found on the edges 
of the lockplate, cock and back of the vertical section of 
the hammer. Forward of the cock the lockplate is engraved 
with the Royal Cypher, a crown over GR, and the name of 
the lock contractor or TOWER and the date of lock 
production are engraved across the tail of the plate. 
Most of the brass furniture would remain unchanged in its 
design for the production life of the Long Land Pattern 
musket, but on this first production type the trigger 
guard is of a design which was to last only until the 
early 1740s, when it was replaced with a simplert more 
robust pattern. The upper or front finial is very 
ornamentalý and the two terminals of the guard 
bow are 
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pinched-in and very thin, in imitation of current fowling 
piece furniture. The base for the lower sling swivel screw 
is very slight. The tang of the buttplate tapers gradually 
as it progresses up the comb of the butt, in three steps, 
terminating in a tapered section with a ball at its tip. 
The sideplate is countersunk for the two sidenails (lock 
screws) and is well rounded in contour, with a tail 
extending to the rear of the rear sidenail. The thumbpiece 
inlaid on the top of the wrist or small of the butt, is 
held in position by a screw passing through the stock from 
the lower tang of the trigger guard. The oil finished 
walnut stock terminates at its upper end without any form 
of reinforce or cap, and the fore-end is very thin, light 
and weak throughout its length. The butt is very thick in 
cross-section, and the handrail portion along the sides is 
shaped to leave a curved upper section to the high comb of 
the butt, the top of which is fairly broad and well 
rounded. The flat areas into which the lock and sideplate 
are inletted, terminate at front and rear with raised 
elliptical aprons, and there is another such apron 
surrounding the barrel tang. The tapering ash ramrod which 
is capped with a tapering brass collar, is held in 
position by three short brass barrel-shaped pipes and a 
tailpipe with a long ornamental finial. Just where the 
tailpipe finial is inlet into the fore-end of the stock 
there is a bulbous swelling to improve the grip of the 
hand at this point. The overall length of the arm is just 
under sixty-two inches, and its weight about ten pounds 
twelve ounces. The bayonet has a triangular blade about 
seventeen inches long and 1 5/16" wide at its shoulder, 
and a tubular socket about four inches long, with an zig- 
zag slot in which the foresight is anchored in fixing the 
bayonet. The blade and socket are connected by a curved 
elbow, the base of which, where it joins the socket, is 
formed with a raised apron. The bayonet weighs just over a 
pound. The weight of the arm complete with its bayonet is 
therefore just under twelve pounds. 
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During . 1728 and 
1729 components continued to flow 
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into the King's Stores at the Tower, and there was some 
se ting up of arms2 as well as deliveries of complete arms 
under previous contracts. Thus we find that Thomas Hollier 
delivered in 19,550 sets of brasswork for muskets and 1168 
sets of ironwork for muskets; as well as 500 sets of 
carbine brasswork and sets for 500 pairs of pistols. Elias 
Cole delivered in 9726 musket barrels and 500 carbine and 
500 pairs of pistol barrels, as well as 1050 musket locks. 
Edward Cookes delivered in 1600 musket barrels and 2500 
musket locks. Joseph Farmer delivered 4400 musket barrels 
and 1500 musket locks. John Vaughan delivered 2000 musket 
locks, and John Farlow an additional 600. By the end of 
1729 there are 15,726 barrels and 7650 locks and 19,550 
sets of brasswork ready for assembling into the Pattern 
1728 musket. 67 During 1728 a further 3600 Land Muskets 
with brass furniture were set up at 6/6 each by seven of 
the 'old' gunmakers, and 500 with steel rammers at 7/6 
each by Thomas Green. of complete arms, 208 muskets & 
bayonets were delivered by Richard Sinckler at 26/6 each, 
along with 21312 pairs of pistols at 26/- the pair2 and 
Joseph Clarkson supplied 416 muskets & bayonets and 427 
pairs of pistols at the same prices. The only assembling 
of arms during 1729 was the rough stocking of 2846 muskets 
by Richard Waller at 2/4 each and the setting up of 500 
iron mounted muskets by Charles Pickfatt at 6/6 each. 68 
In 1730 production of the King's Pattern 1728 musket 
commences, and a pattern of production emerges which is to 
remain unaltered until 1742) although a number of new 
components contractors appear during this period. 
Basically production is in the hands of three contractors: 
Richard Waller rough stocks2 and then Lewis Barber and 
Charles Pickfatt set up the arms. Each setter up delivered 
on average 250 muskets per month until the Spring of 1737 
when a break occurs for the production of some Sea Service 
arms; when Land Service production is resumed in the 
autumn of 1738, monthly deliveries increase to 400 
muskets. From the Spring of 1730 when setting up begins2 
until Spring of 1737, Waller delivered 372350 rough 
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stocked muskets, and the two setters up delivered a total 
of 25,371 Pattern 1728 muskets, with Barber exceeding 
Pickfatt's deliveries by 2751 arms. During this same 
period Waller delivered 500 rough stocked carbines and 
6500 pairs of pistols, and the two setters up delivered a 
total of 500 carbines, 3450 pairs of Land Service pistols, 
and 500 pairs of Sea Service pistols. 
69 
During this same period several new firms appeared as 
components contractors. Edward Jordan of Birmingham 
appears in March, 1733 as a supplier of barrels and locks, 
and within a few years replaces both Cole (whose last 
delivery was in May, 1734) and Cookes (who disappears 
after September, 1737); in August, 1736, John Smith 
received his first warrant as a supplier of locks, and 
William Clarke appears from October, 1739 to July, 1742 
as a contractor for barrels and locks. 
By the mid-1730s relations with Spain were becoming 
increasingly fraught, due to the smuggling operations of 
English merchants in the Spanish Caribbean and the 
increasingly sharp retaliations of Spanish guarda costas. 
There had been no recorded delivery of Sea Service arms 
since the Spring of 1721, until, in September, 1734, 
Hollier delivered 1700 sets of Sea Service musket 
furniture and 2788 Sea Service bayonets. It was not until 
November, 1737, that Waller rough stocked the initial 1000 
Sea Service muskets9 followed by a further 4178 by July, 
1738, along with 497 musketoons. Between June, 1737 and 
March, 1738, Hollier delivered in a further 
, 
5972 sets of 
Sea Service furniture as well as sets for 1000 pairs of 
Sea. Service pistols. The setting up of Sea Service arms 
began in March, 1738 and was largely completed by March, 
1739ý by which time Barber and Pickfatt had delivered in 
2900 muskets, 600 muskets with Dutch barrels and locks for 
Sea Service, and 336 musketoons. From these figures one 
must assume that the King's Stores were already quite well 
supplied with Sea Service arms. In July and August of 1740 





There had been no pistol production since a mere 500 
pairs had been set up by Pickfatt in May, 1731. This may 
be at least partially accounted for by the longer service 
life of seldom-used pistols, and by the fact that most of 
the cavalry and dragoon regiments which carried them were 
stationed in Ireland and had their arms made for them 
privately, or by the Irish Board of Ordnance. At this 
period there was only one type of Land Service pistol 
carried by mounted troops, with a 12-inch barrel, and 
brass furniture. Waller delivered into store 7000 pairs of 
rough stocked pistols between December, 1735 and December, 
1738, and Hollier sent in sets of furniture for 6600 pairs 
of pistols during 1735. During 1736 and 1737, Barber and 
Pickett set up 3450 pairs. 71 It is likely that these are 
the last of the old style of pistol on which the buttcap 
was shaped approximately like a plain semi-hemisphere, and 
that the pistols produced from the Spring of 1740 were 
fitted with a new, more elaborate buttcap described as 
'long ear'd buttcaps', i. e. with long tapering tangs 
running up each side of the grip giving greater strength. 
By the late 1730s commercial interests and the 
political Opposition were pushing for a showdown with 
Spain, the one in hopes of additional trade, and the other 
looking to topple the Walpole Government which was 
committed to peaceful gains. George II and his ministers 
had been quietly and gradually increasing the size of the 
army during the 1730s by occasional and small 
augmentations, and these, along with colonial garrison 
issues, had eaten well into the stores of the Pattern 1718 
muskets as well as older, Dutch, and reworked arms 0 
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After the completion of the rather small quantity of Sea 
Service arms, production of Land Service arms was resumed 
at about the time of the declaration of war against Spain 
in September, 1739. A contract was made, with deliveries 
to commence in September, for delivering 1000 arms per 
month. 73 From this time until the end of 1741y when a 
number of new contractors were taken on to increase the 
output, Waller supplied 21,452 rough stocked muskets, as 
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well as 2347 described as 'part of the Pattn of the 
10,000, balance with Dutch barrels', 413 wall pieces, and 
1000 carbines and 1738 pairs of Land Service pistols which 
had been completed in 1737-8; Barber and Pickfatt between 
them delivered in 9590 muskets, (well under half those 
ready for setting up), 600 carbines, 200 wallpiecesý and 
600 pairs of carbine-bore Land Service pistols. 
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Although the war continued for several years to be a 
naval one, it was considered necessary to bring the Jand 
forces to a state of wartime readiness, on the assumption 
that sooner or later France would come in. That the state 
of the armaments was clearly less than satisfactory was 
the theme of many complaints from regimental commanding 
officers during late 1739, and as a result of these many 
complaints an Ordnance inspection team of two competent 
gunmakers was sent to the various garrison towns around 
the country to inspect the arms of the regiments. The 
survey revealed that even within a single regiment there 
were apt to be several different styles of musket and/or 
pistol in the hands of the troops, and that most of them 
had been in issue since the late 'teens or early 1720s. 
The arms of several regiments dated from 1707-15, and many 
were not by Ordnance contractors. Four regiments of 
dragoons carried 'mu-Squets with brass furniture, round 
double bridle locks, Sea Pattern, made at the Tower 1737- 
8, deliver'd at the last Augmentation', a puzzling 
description at best! The majority had, plain- bridleless- 
locks, and five carried Pattern of the 10,000 arms. Almost 
all were in bad or even unserviceable condition. 
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result was a virtual re-arming of the British army during 
1740-1 (see Appendix 2), which wiped out. the stores of the 
Pattern 1728 and brought about a renewed production of 
Land Service muskets which incorporated a number of 
technical and minor design improvements over the Pattern 
1728, creating a design which, with a few additional 
improvements in subsequent years, served the British line 
infantry for the next half century. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WAR AND PEACE, 1740 - 1755. 
Despite the fact that the years from 1722 to 1739 had 
involved no serious commitment of British forcesq despite 
the fact that Ordnance production seems to have proceeded 
entirely according to the wishes of the Board, yet the 
pressures created by the military build-up following the 
outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in the autumn of 1739 
soon demonstrated that the Ordnance System was not 
adequate. While it may have been cold comfort to those in 
charge at the time, it is clear that much of this failure 
was due to the general attitude of both officialdom and 
the tax-paying public towards the functions of government. 
The terms ad hoc and 'pragmatic'sum up this attitude; 
'long term planning' was a concept unheard of in the 
Eighteenth Century, and while administrative structures 
were established and rules laid down for their operation, 
there still remained the basic approach to all situations 
which might arise: take it as it comes and deal with it 
according to the circumstances at the time. It would have 
been unthinkable to increase the charges to Government by 
increasing the monthly intake of small arms before a war 
actually broke out; augmentations and garrisons had been 
dealt with piecemeal as their requirements became known, 
and production had proceeded at a pace which kept the 
King's Store up to the level established by the ruling of 
February, 1715; in fact a'State' of January, 1739, showed 
more than 42,000 muskets of the King's Pattern then in 
store. 
' But, when the widespread replacement of arms was 
found necessary by the inspection carried out during 1740, 
on top of the decision of Parliament to raise ten 
regiments of marines rather than allow the more costly 
alternative of an augmentation of the regular army, the 
Ordnance was not entirely prepared. Of the 42,000 arms in 
store in January, 1739, some 28,000 had been issued by 
March of the following year, distributed mostly amongst 
twenty-five regiments, 1 ... his Majesty having declared his 
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Intention that the Three Regiments of Foot Guards, and all 
the Marching Regiments of Foot and Dragoons should be 
entirely new Armed ... 
#2 and to five companies of Invalids, 
the Royal Artillery, six of the marine regiments, and to 
Ireland, America, Edinburgh and Minorca, as well as to the 
expedition to the West Indies. 3 
The attitude of the Ordnance is clearly reflected in 
a reply which they made in May, 1740, to some enquiries by 
the Master General regarding forthcoming production and 
the present state of supplies, and about the effectiveness 
of the contract of September, 1739, calling for deliveries 
of one thousand arms per month. By the date of this letter 
the arms in store were at a low point, and new components 
and arms had not yet begun to arrive in numbers. The 
feeling which emanates from this letter is barely one of 
concern, rather a desire to fully explain the situation 
and reassure the MGO that all is well: 
That where many persons are employed in such a 
manner, that Sickness, or any other accident happen- 
ing to one might retard and hinder the other, we do 
not pretend to determine what quantitys may be de- 
pended on, or at what times, lest it should turn out 
contrary to expectation, but we cannot suppose that 
less than 3000 will be compleated by Michaelmas next, 
unless the want of Water should obstruct the same. 
Your Grace no doubt will recollect what an Inter- 
ruption all sorts of business met with from the 
severity of the late Frost, how long it continued, 
and what damage was done to Mill Work & Engines of 
all kinds, which required time to repair & make good 
the same; notwithstanding which the Barrels, Locks, 
and other materials mentioned in the Inclosed 
account, have been made and delivered into Store 
since September last, and your Grace will be pleased 
to observe that We pever allow less than 5 or 6 
Months and generally more for the Stocks to Season, 
before we Issue them to be sett up, that is, before 
they are Compleated. ... . 1. - 
0 
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AN Account of Barrels, Locks & other materials provi- 
ded and delivered into Store for making Land and Sea 
Service Musquets to the King's Pattern since Septem- 
ber 1739 - Land Service: 
Barrels 1130 
Locks 2668 
Rough Stocks 6000 




Barrels, Locks, Stocks & all materials 3000 
of which 2500 are Stocked and of them- 
668 are set up4 
Not only do the Board express no alarm, but undertake 
to explain to the MGO týat they would not expect to be 
able to be explicit about future deliveries; having made 
their contract, they are now comfortably awaiting the 
results of it, and they wish to sidestep commitment to 
avoid possible future disappointment. They calm the MGOs 
mind with reminders of deliveries made in spite of damage 
to watermills and stoppages during the bad winter, and 
seek to further aýsure him by reminding him of the 
frailties which can overcome all human beings in the 
course of their labours. 
Someone, however, seems to have been concerned about 
the supply of small arms, and informed the King, who 
ordered that a supply be obtained 'from Holland ... to be 
made to the English Pattern which was accordingly sent... 5 
and in June, 1740, appears the first evidence of 
negotiations for a supply of arms from Liege to supplement 
the domestic production. Robert Trevor, H. M. Envoy 
Extraordinary at The Hague replied to a letter from the 
Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, informing him 
of the number of arms which may be obtained in 'some of 
the Towns of Flanders' and advises the Duke to send a 
tproper Person ... with a Pattern of Arms, and fully 
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instructed upon the several Points mentioned in Mr. 
Trevor's Letter.,, 6 There were several contracts which 
all appear to have been handled through a M. de la Faille 
of Li4ge, the first in November, 1740, and the last in 
October, 1745, resulting in the acquisition by the 
Ordnance of 46,000 muskets & bayonets and 18,000 musket 
barrels, all of these save 10,000 muskets & bayonets, 
contracted for in 1740 and 1741.7 These arms were made 
to an English pattern, at an equivalent cost of between 
18/1k and 18/7 each at a time when the English product was 
costing the Board 32/6. To date none of the arms made in 
Liýge under these 1740s contracts have been identified, 
Although obtained with relative rapidity and with only a 
few technical difficulties, these arms were to prove an 
affront to many of the troops to whom they were issued, 
and most of them went ultimately to second-line and 
colonial forces, 
Foreign purchases could be used to alleviate 
temporary shortages in domestic deliveries, but it was 
upon the home trade that the chief reliance remained, It 
would appear to have been fortuitous timing, but the 
outbreak of the war coincided with the exhaustion of the 
components production and assembly programme which had 
been in progress since the late 1720s. One of the results 
of this clearing out of the components bins was that the 
design of several arms was modernised, and in the course 
of the next eight years several new weapons make their 
first appearance. There was a break in the rough stocking 
and setting up of Land Service arms between the Spring of 
1737 and the Autumn of 1739, during which time, as 
discussed on page 80, Sea Service arms were produced. This 
break applied also to the components contractors. William 
Clarke's- first Land Service barrels, on a warrant of 
October, 1739, were not delivered until February, 1741; 
Hollier delivered one final batch of 2280 sets of brass 
musket furniture in December, 1738, and then no more until 
December, 1739; Edward Jordan's first deliveries of locks 
and barrels on a warrant of September, 1739y occur 
in late 
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March of 1740; after 1732, Joseph Farmer's next delivery 
of lock and barrels is not until May, 1741; John Smith's 
first Land Service locks appear in January, 1741; and 
Vaughan's first delivery of Land Service musket locks 
after July, 1737, is exactly three years later. 
8 After an 
examination of muskets made on either side of this 
production gap, it is clear that before ordering new 
components for a resumption of production, the Ordnance 
took the opportunity to make a number of changes to the 
design of the components, and as with the gap which 
occurred in the mid- to late 1720s, this presents a 
justifiable opportunity to clarify the situation by 
assigning a model designation to the muskets produced to 
the new design. In accordance with the Ordnance tradition, 
established in the Nineteenth Century, we use the date the 
new design was ordered into production at the component 
stage, not the date on which the arms were first issued 
for service. The musket which was produced between 1740 
and 1748 is therefore designated as the 'Pattern 1739. ' 
This is based on the fact that Hollier's first furniture 
delivery occured late in December, 1739 (he was billed on 
the 31st) and that Waller delivered in his first rough 
stocked muskets clearly not of the old pattern in January, 
1740, while Barber and Pickfatt did not deliver any set up 
Land Service muskets until Aug. -Sept. 1740. The double 
bridle lock, one of the main design features of the new 
pattern, first appears in the Spring of 1740.9 
The two. changes most noticeable between the Pattern 
1728 and the Pattern 1739 muskets are the lock and the 
trigger guard. -The double bridle lock appears in the Bill 
Books for the first time in March, 1740, although single 
bridle locks have been noted on muskets otherwise of the 
new pattern with dates as late as 1742 (see below). On 
this new design there is an extension forward on the outer 
edge of the pan (called the pan bridle) through which the 
pivot screw for the hammer passes, giving support to the 
more efficient and smoother movement of the hammer, and 
strength to that exposed part of the lock. The trigger 
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guard is made altogether heavier and simpler in design; 
the guard bow is now thicker in section and broad at each 
terminal, with a good thickening where the screw for the 
lower sling swivel passes through it, and an inward curl 
at its rear terminal for added protection against 
crushing. The finials are heavier and much simplified in 
outline. Apart from these two major changes, the stock 
carving was somewhat simplified by the elimination of the 
elliptical aprons at the front of lock and sideplate 
flats; those at the rear remained. 10 
Production of the Pattern 1739 musket may be 
considered to have commenced with the delivery by Richard 
Waller of 2233 rough stocked muskets in January, 1740; 
these were followed during the year by a further 4819. 
Waller's total output of Land Service rough stocked 
muskets between January, 1740 and December, 1748 amounted 
to 109,284 not including some 4000 delivered in 
September, 1747 with single bridle locks, and various 
special patterns discussed below. Most of these late 
production single-bridle locks were probably the 1562 of 
this type turned in by Jordan & Farmer in July 1742, on a 
warrant of May of that year, probably for some special 
purpose lower-priced arm, (marine muskets? ) and will be 
dated 1742. Beginning in the autumn of 1740 Barber and 
Pickfatt set . up a total of 
2800, of which 400 (in 
December) are described as having double bridle locks. 
There is little doubt, therefore, that some Pattern 1739 
muskets will be found with single-bridle locks. Their total 
output of Land Service muskets set up between August, 1740 
and September, 1748, amounted to (Barber 32,823, Pickfatt 
30ý238) 63,061. It is thus clear that, despite the 
Ordnance taking on additional setters up, these two 'old' 
contrgctors performed the majority of the work during the 
War of the Austrian Succession * 
11 
This was not apparent to the Board at the time, and 
by the end of 1741 the number of rough stocked muskets 
delivered into store amounted to 21,452, while the number 
set up by Barber and Pickfatt was a mere 
11,2009 just over 
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half those waiting to be assembled. The Board apparently 
thought this was not good enough, and in June, 1742, 
issued its first warrant to a new setter up, William 
Birkell. A new contractor for locks and barrels, John 
Willet, received his first warrant in November, and during 
1743 a further four setters up were taken on: Peter Gandon 
(March), Hewit Gluvias (July, who only delivered , 
250 
arms), Edward Sale (March) and Nathaniel Trevey (May). 
These men, along with John Hirst, whose first warrant is 
dated in October, 1745, were to set up several thousands 
of arms by the end of the war, and Hirst was to become a 
major participant in Ordnance operations from the 
commencement of the next war in 1756. Three other 
contractors were taken on during this war, John Taylor as 
a setter up, John Wood for locks, and Tippin & Edge for 
complete arms, locks and barrels, but their contributions 
were miniscule. gjgggýjg). 
12 These 'new' setters 
up contributed a total of 33,726 muskets, bringing the 
production of the Pattern 170 musket by the Ordnance 
System during the war to 96,287. In addition to this 
number a further 15,002 complete muskets and bayonets 
were delivered by the firms of Jordan & Farmer, Jordan, 
and Farmer, bringing total production to 111,289.13 
Although this represents the main stream of Ordnance 
production for the period, small arms production was 
considerably expanded during the war to meet new needs 
created by Britain's increasing commitment to the 
Continental war@ 
The first category of arms to be modernised after the 
musket was the Land Service pistol. Because of the great 
rarity of Ordnance-made pistols prior to this period (as 
compared with those made to regimental patterns), it is 
difficult to establish with certainty the precise 
introduction date of the new design, but the earliest 
dated examples of this new type which have thus far been 
noted are dated 1738, and this is probably related to the 
order for 250 pairs of locks and barrels delivered in by 
Edward Jordan in October of that year. In June 1738, and 
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again exactly one year later2 Hollier delivered sets of 
furniture for 1000 pairs of Land Service pistols, while 
John Vaughan had supplied an additional 650 pairs of locks 
between August, 1736 and February 1739. Barber set up 300 
pairs of carbine-bore pistols in February, 1740, and 
Pickfatt's delivery of the same number occurred in 
April. 14 Apart from the increase in bore size the new 
pistols were fitted with double bridle locks and are 
designed to conform to the stock carving found on the 
Pattern 1739 muskets around the lock and sideplate flats 
and the barrel tang; they are also more elaborate in 
their furniture, with the 'long ear'd buttcaps' giving not 
only additional -strength to the grip, but a more elegant 
appearance in imitation of current French design. The 
pommel of the buttcaps was reinforced and made heavier by 
a raised apron around its central portion, making it a 
more effective club. The sideplate and trigger guard 
finials are reduced-scale versions of the design used on 
the Pattern 1739 musket. The need for pistols, and for the 
carbines which generally accompanied them, accelerated 
sharply after Britain's entry into the war against France 
in 1744, and manufacture of pistols increased sharply over 
the next two years. Components were delivered in during 
1741-2, and Waller rough stocked 1700 pairs of carbine 
bored pistols and 2500 of pistol bore between June, 1742, 
and September, 1743. A further 3500 pairs were delivered 
by July, 1745. These were set up largely by the 'new' 
contractors from 1744 to 1746. Unfortunately the records 
do not always specify which bore size is being delivered, 
and although a total production figure is obtainable, a 
breakdown by calibre is not. Thus we find that Waller 
turned in a total of rough stocked pairs of pistols 
between 1740 and 1748 amounting to 9438, of which 5312 
pairs were set up by nine contractors with Pickfatt 
accounting for 2300 pairs. Hollier delivered in sets of 
Land Service pistol furniture for 8398 pairs. Of barrels, 
930 pairs can be accounted for as carbine bore, a further 
8063k as pistol bore and 1516 with bore unspecififed2 
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giving a total of 10,509k pairs of Land Service pistol 
barrels. The contractor whose name is most likely to be 
found engraved on the tail of the lockplates for this 
production period is Edward Jordan, who was responsible 
for supplying 2807 of the 8715 pairs delivered between 
1740 and 1748; Jordan was followed, in order of 
significance, by Vaughan (1925), Willet (1350), Tipping & 
Edge (1000, probably signed only 'Edge'), Farmer (866), 
Smith (600) and Clarke (167)., In addition to his supply of 
locks alone, James Farmer delivered 1000 pairs of Land 
pistols in late 1747 and early 1748; these will have his 
'IF' barrel mark as well as internal lock marking and the 
external signature. Locks bearing the signature 'Jordan & 
Farmer' will be part of that partnership's delivery of 
1500 pairs of complete Land Service pistols at 11.13.0. 
the pair, delivered in 1745-6.15 
Seventeen forty-four was a year of particular 
interest in the Ordnance's history, for the first of 
several distinctive new arms was added to the production 
series. This was the 'Short Land Musket with Wooden Rammer 
for Dragoons. ' Until this time, and presumably for some 
years to come, dragoons carried. conventional muskets, or 
carbines, a large percentage of them made to regimental 
designs, some of - 
them at least having barrels of about 42 
inches. When, in early 1726, eight regiments of dragoons 
then stationed in Great Britain needed arms for an 
augmentation, the Board received instructions to . 
issue 
'out of His Majesty's. Stores' the required number of arms 
'agreeably to the Several Patterns, that shall be 
exhibited to Them by the respective Collonels of the said 
Regiments, ' a clear indication of the non-standard. nature 
of dragoon carbine and pistol design at this time. 
However, in 1744 the situation was regularised and a 
distinct pattern established. They were fitted with double 
bridle locks, and had 42-inch barrels of musket bore, all 
other features conforming to the infantry musket which was 
now termed, to distinguish it from this new arm, the 'Long 
Land Pattern-' James Farmer delivered the first 750 42- 
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inch barrels in October, 1743, and a further 2990 during 
1747; Waller delivered 1954 rough stocked arms of the new 
dragoon pattern in June, 1744, on a warrant of January of 
that year, and a further 3000 in May, 1747. Of this number 
a total* of 6533 were set up between 1744 and 1749, of 
which only 1619 were delivered during 1744, and no more 
came in until 1747. This would seem to suggest that the 
dragoons fought most of the War of the Austrian Succession 
with their older pattern arms. 
16 
Another new arm which first appeared in quantity at 
this time was a New Pattern carbine. Unfortunately, there 
are no details in the records as to what was new about the' 
pattern, and no examples of carbines dating from this 
period have been reported to date. The problem is further 
compounded by the fact that no carbines dating from the 
period between 1711 and the 1750s have been reported, so 
that we do not know what the predecessors of the New 
Pattern looked like either. From an order for rammers of 
1716 we do know that the barrel length of the carbine was 
37 inches, a length that was to be retained for cavalry 
carbines until the variants for light troops began to 
appear in the late 1750s. 17 Ordnance carbine production 
was very limited prior to the 1740s; we know that two 
types, a brass mounted and a New Pattern, (there is no 
suggestion that iron mounts were used for carbines), were 
made during the production period of the Pattern 1718 
musket, 150 of the brass mounted type and 1046 of the New 
Pattern being set up prior to 1721. In 1730 Waller had 
rough stocked 500 carbines, which were set up by Pickfatt 
in the following year, with 147 carbines being newly rough 
stocked, repaired and set up in 1732, the latter obviously 
not representing an entirely new product. Not until 1738 
was there any new carbine production; in the course of 
that year Waller rough stocked 1077 of which 600 were set 
up by Barber and Pickfatt (half each) in 1739; Hollier 
sent in 2300 sets of carbine furniture in 1738 and 1739, 
and then no more until 4727 sets arrived in 1742-4, of 
which more than half did not appear before Augustq 1743. 
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Other components did not begin to arrive in store until 
December, 1741, and no significant amounts arrived until 
1743, suggesting that with the war being as yet almost 
totally naval in nature, carbines were not a high priority 
in the build up of the land forces. Since we do not know 
what the weapon itself looked like, it is difficult to fix 
upon which of the components may have reflected aspects of 
the new design; however, it would appear that, after a 
small initial production of the 'New Pattern' carbine 
(probably introduced to conform with the modernised design 
of the pistols with which they were generally issued), the 
re-equipping of the line infantry took precedence for the 
next few years. Certainly serious carbine production did 
not get under way until 1743. Pickfatt delivered 500 
carbines in October, 1743 to a warrant of April, 1742, but 
there were only a further 350 delivered in the course of 
1744 by five setters up, of whom Barber and Pickfatt with 
100 each were the most important. During 1745 the bulk of 
the production was carried out, with 3398 carbines being 
delivered, with an additional 1500 complete arms from 
Jordan & Farmer, making a total delivery for 1745 of 4898. 
A further 225 came in during 1746, and Joseph Farmer 
delivered another 1000 complete carbines late in 1747. It 
wQuld appear that a planned production of 5000 new 
carbines, projected in 1738, was achieved by 1746, and 
that this programme was supplemented by 2500 complete 
arms from Birmingham, which were first warranted in the 
Spring of 1745. There was no further carbine production 
until preparations began for the next contest with 
France. 18 
On 23 July 1745 Prince Charles Edward, son and heir 
of 'James III of England and VIII of Scotland' landed on 
British soil, and on 19 August he raised his standard at 
Glenfinnan. Although there had been rumblings, and even 
some overt warnings of such an attempt to re-establish the 
Stuarts on the British throne the eventitself came as a 
thunderclap to the Britisb Establishment, and the Ordnance 
was in no way excepted. In 174Q Britain's land forces 
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consisted of about 9000 cavalry (the Blues, four troops of 
Horse Guards, four troops of Horse Grenadier Guards, four 
regiments of Horse and ten regiments of Dragoons) and 
21,600 ipfantry, (three regiments of Guards and thirty 
line battalions) many of whom had been re-armed during 
1740-1.19 The land war with France had finally evolved 
from expectation to fact; a British contingent of some 
16,000 men (twenty-one battalions) had joined the forces 
of Hanover as auxiliary troops to the Austrians late in 
1742, and these had been new-armed prior to their 
departure. 20 On 29 March, 1744, the state of war between 
Great Britain and France became official, by which time 
the British troops in Flanders amounted to some 22,000 
men. 
21 In July there was an augmentation of the twenty-one 
battalions then in Flanders amounting to two companies of 
three serjeants, three corporals and seventy men each, 
which meant another outflow of 3066 muskets from the 
King's Stores, in addition to the constant drain for 
replacements and smaller individual augmentations. 22 There 
had been an invasion scare at the end of 1743, but this 
had not lasted long enough to have any effect on Ordnance 
activity, and although production of small arms was 
proceeding smoothly by 1745, the output was not geared to 
deal with both foreign campaigning and internal rebellion. 
There were only 3850 regular army stationed in 
Scotland at the time of Charles Edwardý 
, 
s' landing, and one 
of the earliest reactions to the crisis by the London 
government was to commission Lord Loudoun to raise a 
regiment of loyal Highlanders consisting of 988 men armed 
'with the Shortest Musquets of a Carbine Bore. with 
Bayonets., 23 The Ordnance reaction to this was entirely 
typical: having no such arms available, it purchased the 
entire quantity required, 950, for 30/- each complete with 
bayonet, from James Barber, who delivered - them in 
September, 1745, to a warrant of 28 June. 
24 These arms 
had a very active and varied career, Loudoun's men having 
lost many of them by shipwreck, and only one example is 
known to have ' survived. A 'State' of small arms in 
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Scotland, Berwick and Carlisle on I January 1745, revealed 
a total of 8782 of which 6646 were in Edinburgh Castle *25 
A further 5000 stand were ordered distributed between the 
castles at Edinburgh, Stirling and Inverness on 1 August, 
although it is unlikely that they had reached their 
desýtnations by the time Edinburgh fell to the rebels on 
17 September. 26 At about the same time another 5000 stand 
were ordered sent to the troops in Flanders, and a further 
2000 stand along with 200 wallpieces to the fortress of 
Louisburg in Canada. 27 By September it had been discovered 
that the county militias could not be financed for a long 
enough period to meet the present crisis, and could 
neither be raised nor equipped in what was considered the 
necessary time; this factor, coupled with the fall of 
Edinburgh and the rebels' defeat of Crown forces at 
Prestonpans, decided the Government to allow the county 
nobility and" gentry to raise units at their own cost, who 
would be armed by the Government; in adqition, the 
critical garrison towns in northern England were to be re- 
inforced. 28 
By the end of September arms were being dispatched to 
the town authorities at Carlisle (300), Newcastle (1000), 
Hull (3000) and Chester (1000); and the Duke of Kingston's 
Horse had been sent 400 muskets & bayonets, 200 pairs of 
pistols and 200 horseman's swords, along with 500 arms for 
the mayor of Nottingham to distribute. Although thirteen 
of the regiments which were now being raised, representing 
some 9500 muskets, would subsequently be disbanded and 
their arms called in, in June, 1746, for the moment their 
creation caused a tremendous drain on the Ordnance's 
resources. The arms distributed from late September, 1745 
until Februaryq 1746, in aid of suppressing 'the Forty- 
five', amounted to some 25,500 muskets, 504 carbines and 
716 pairs of pistols. 
29 And these arms represented only a 
part of the demands being made; at the end of November the 
Board informed the Master General: 
... we have issued, and have orders to issue very 
near Forty Seven Thousand Musquetts with Bayonetts 
out of his Majesty's Stores since the beginning of 
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August last, and that at this time no more remain in in Store than Twenty One Thousand four hundred and 
thirteen. 
They also mentioned that the workmen were being paid 
in ready money rather than by the usual method of 
debentures in the course of the Office, and that unless 
they shortly received the 10,000 arms bought lately in 
Holland, they would be unable to meet a request for 20,000 
arms from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 30 It was, 
altogether, a most impressive effort, given the primitive 
communications and transportation systems of the time, and 
the personal nature of both government and finance. 
Unfortunately we have no way of knowing just what sorts of 
arms were sent around the country during the emergency; 
some of them will have come from the seizures of arms in 
the possession of Catholics in England, while others may 
have been foreign arms from captured prizes, and still 
others may have been from amongst the old arms remaining 
in the King's Stores; it is at least questionable that a 
majority of those issued to non-regular recipients will 
have been 'of the King's Pattern. ' 
The exigencies of war created several types of arms 
not normally encountered in the Ordnance programme. Apart 
from a small group of regimental-pattern arms produced by 
Lewis, and later his son James, Barber, all of these 
aberrant arms may be classed as special purpose weapons. -, 
The regimental arms of the Barbers include 229 muskets and 
bayonets at 30/- each, for Lord Crawford's regiment, which 
were delivered as complete arms in May, 1740.31 Crawford's 
was the 43rd Foot, shortly to become the 42nd Royal 
Highland Regiment, the 'Black Watch. ' Although none of 
these arms has yet been identified, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that they will be of lighter and shorter 
dimensions than the conventional Pattern 1728 musket of 
the day, and it is perhaps significant to note that they 
are described as 'muskets' and not 'carbines, ' and may 
have served at least in some respects as a pattern for the 
second group of Highland arms supplied by Barber junior to 
Lord Loudoun's regiment in 1745. The next group of Barber 
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arms are 84 pairs of pistols delivered as complete arms in 
August, 1745 for 'late Churchill's' dragoons, presumed to 
be the 10th Dragoons (Hussars). Barber's final 
contribution was made between 1746 and early 1748, during 
which period he delivered 488 carbines for the Duke of 
Cumberland's Dragoons; of this number 390 were delivered 
in November and December of 1746, with a further thirty in 
October, 1747 to replace losses at the battle of Val, and 
a final sixty-eight in March, 1748.32 The records suggest 
that the pattern for this carbine may have been devised by 
the Ordnance, rather than by Barber, and that -the Duke 
himself may have taken some active part. On 3 March 1746 
Thomas Hatcher, who had taken over as Master Furbisher on 
the death of Richard Wooldridge the previous year, 
travelled to Kingston-upon-Thames with pattern arms to 
show to the Duke. Fortunately the design was subsequently 
adopted for wider use, and continued from the mid-1750s as 
carbines for the Horse Grenadier Guards or 'Blues'. Its 
distinguishing features include a flat-surfaced lockplate 
and cock, a broad flat sideplate, a steel rammer and 
'shell' carving around the barrel tang, with better 
quality wood and finishing throughout. 
33 
. 
Turning to the special purpose arms which were 
produced on the Ordnance system during or shortly before 
the war, we find that most were made for Sea Service, and 
that all types remain unidentified at this writing. The 
earliest of this group were known. as 'Musquets with Dutch 
barrels and locks' . In 
1738 Waller had rough stocked 1000 
muskets with Dutch barrels and locks, for which Hollier 
had supplied 1000 sets of furniture, and of which Barber 
and Pickfatt had each set up 300, but these could not have 
been related to the arms purchased in 1740-1, and must 
have derived from the parts in store from earlier 
purchases. In December, 1746, there were 5881 of these 
'Land Musquets with Dutch barrels and Flat locks' in store 
at the Tower. 
34 A second, much larger category was 
described as 'old muskets returned into store from 
regiments and garrisons' most of which, if the 
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interpretation of the figures is correct, do not seem to 
have been completely finished. Beginning in February, 
1742, and continuing until March, 17452 Waller rough 
stocked 16,718 muskets of this general description, plus a 
further 4735 specifically on Sea Service account, while 
from March, 1743, until September, 1746, Hollier supplied 
18,963 sets of flat brass furniture for them. Five 
contractors (Smithý Farmer, Jordan, Vaughan and Willet in 
descending order of numbers supplied) furnished 8954 'flat 
plain locks' costing 4/6 each between June, 1744, and 
September, 1748, of which 5444 were in store by September, 
1746. All of these strange and ill-defined arms, were 
set up by seven contractors between September and December 
1746, at a cost of 5/10 each, but the total number set up 
amounted to only 7000 of those rough stocked by Waller. 
One additional group of 400 set up by Pickfatt in April, 
1744, at the much greater cost of 9/8 each, must have 
differed in some important characteristic, but like the 
others it remains unidentified. Although there is no 
specific reference to their ultimate destination, it is 
probable that these arms ended up in the hands of the 
Invalid companies, dockyard battalions and other garrison 
troops. Given that they were re-stocked and fitted with 
new furniture, as well as locks in most cases, it would 
seems that these 'old, returned' muskets were actually new 
arms using old barrels and some old locks, rather than 
simply re-worked old arms. None can be identified as being 
in store in the December, 1746 inventory. 
The two remaining categories of special purpose arms 
produced by the Ordnance are both of late-war vintage. The 
first of these was a musket specifically designed for the 
Marines. Thomas Hatcher showed a pattern to the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty in July, 1747, but Waller 
did not carry out the rough stocking of 3381 of these arms 
until the Spring of 1748, and the total of 3380 Marine 
muskets were not set up by the eight contractors until 
the period May to December of that year; it-is, therefore, 
most unlikely that any were issued during the War of the 
103 
Austrian Succession. The records shows that these muskets 
had flat locks (perhaps these were the 3000 plain flat 
locks turned into store between June, 1747, and 
September, 1748, after the last of the 'old muskets' had 
been completed), and that the setting up cost 5/10, the 
same as that for the 'old muskets. ' This similarity does 
suggest that the Marine musket may have been a somewhat 
better finished version of the 'old muskets', and that at 
least some of the 'old muskets' may have been issued to 
some of the Marine regiments. The final type of arm in 
this series was known as the Extraordinary musket2 a term 
which had been in use late in the 17th and early in the 
18th. Centuries for better quality Sea Service muskets. 
However, these one hundred muskets must have been quite 
distinctive. if their costs tell us anything. Rough stocked 
by Waller in March-June, 1747 at a cost of 8/- (the Land 
Service musket cost 4/2 if Waller used his own walnut or 
2/6 with the King's wood), fitted with 'Extraordinary 
musquet barrels' produced by Edward Jordan in September, 
1740, and with locks all delivered by John Smith in March, 
1747 at 10/- each (the Land Service musket lock costing 
6/6), and with special furniture by Hollier supplied by 
him in September, 1747, and set up in September, 1748 by 
Barber and Pickfatt (half each) at a cost of 9/- each 
(Land Service muskets costing 7/8), these must have been 
very superior arms in all respects. 
35 
The production of Sea Service arms during the war 
does not accurately reflect the very active nature of the 
war at sea, largely because so many 'auxiliary' types of 
arms, as discussed aboveg seem to have found their way 
into the Sea Service as a matter of Ordnance policy; it is 
also likely that many arms captured from French and 
Spanish ships may have been taken into service without 
the details surviving in the Ordnance or Admiralty 
records. Indeedq the entire early development of the Sea 
Service musket is clouded by a lack of, or vague, 
descriptions, and by the nature of the Board's policy in 
supply ling the Admiralty with small arms. These had 
104 
traditionally been a combination of a small number of new- 
production arms combined with a large number of re-worked 
Land Service weapons. A certain degree of revision in this 
practice took place at the beginning of our period, when 
it seems to have been the intention to completely re-equip 
the Sea Service with a standard pattern arm, but 
presumably for reasons of finance and inertia, plus the 
naval campaigning against Spain in the late 'teens, this 
programme was never fully carried out. The Board wrote in 
early 1719 that '... we shall in a little while be able to 
furnish the whole Fleet according to the New Regulation or 
Expedient, particularly as to changing the whole sett of 
small Armes including Pole Axes... ' and that '... the 
Numbers of Armes are considerably increased & much better 
(according to the New Regulation) than formerly..., 36 The 
'New Regulation' was undoubtedly the pattern of iron 
mounted Sea Service musket produced at the same period as 
the Pattern 1718 infantry musket, which has yet to be 
identified. While it is clear that Sea Service arms as 
produced by the System conformed to specific patterns, 
with characteristic stock, furniture and lock, it is 
equally clear that it was standard Ordnance policy to make 
use of repaired or re-worked second-hand barrels in making 
up such arms, a practice continued throughout our period. 
There were two distinct styles of Sea Service musket, a 
long and a short barrelled version, but they are rarely 
distinguished as such in the records; indeed, while the 
longer one with its 46-inch barrel was undoubtedly the 
original style, the differences in the lengths to which 
barrels were cut in order to render them serviceable may 
have rendered the shorter pattern, with a barrel of just 
over or under 36 inches, subject to considerable 
variations, even though all other features were 
standardised; some were produced with barrels of 40-42 
inch length, and it is unclear in which category. these 
were included. Unfortunately there are no examples of Sea 
Service muskets prior to the 1740s from which any 
conclusions might be drawn, and too few examples 
in the 
105 
1740-64 period for comparative study. Sometime before the 
1740s, perhaps at the time of the 1737-8 productiong a 
'Black Sea Service musket' (as opposed - to the Bright Sea 
Service musket) was introduced, on which the barrel was 
left in a roughly draw-filed state and finished with a 
blue-black colouring, presumably to render it less visible 
for use during night attacks. These Black Sea Service 
muskets were always of the shorter barrelled type, and were 
not fitted for bayonets prior to 1752, while the Bright 
Sea Service muskets were so fitted. 
37 Both Bright and 
Black Sea Service muskets shared a common form of flat- 
surfaced 'plain' lock (without either type of bridle), 
with a flat ring-necked cock, a flat topped hammer and a 
spear-point terminal to the hammer-spring finial; there 
was also a common style of heavy brass furniture which 
was a hold-over from the normal pattern of furniture used 
until the beginning of our period on Land as well aa Sea 
Service arms. This distinctive Sea Service furniture 
included a flat brass buttplate with a plain rounded 
tang, a flat-surfaced wavy outline sideplate taking, until 
1756, three sidenails to secure the lock, and a 
distinctive rounded trigger guard with- a bulbous circular- 
outline front finial; there was no thumbpiece, tailpipe or 
nose-cap, and the wooden rammer remained standard until 
the late 1780s. The design of the stock was more robust 
and simpler, lacking the raised carving on lock and 
sidepiece flats, and having much less of a handrail 
effect to the butt. Apart from the batch of Sea Service 
arms produced during the period of increasing tension 
prior to the outbreak of war in 1739, (see page 80 ) Waller 
rough stocked 5683 Sea Service muskets and 8206 pairs of 
Sea Service pistols during the war, but only a small 
proportion of these was set up: Barber produced 1000, and 
600 pairs of pistolsý Pickfatt 2290 and 1600 pairs of 
pistols, Richard Wilson delivered in 660 pairs of pistols, 
Nathaniel Trevey 150 pairs and Edward Sale 100 pairs, for 
a total production of 3290 muskets and 3110 pairs of 
pistols. Although Waller 
had rough stocked 479 musketoons 
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and Hollier had produced an equal amount of furniture for 
them in 1737-8, only 336 were set up in 1738 by Barber and 
Pickett (half each). 38 
Wallpieces, like musketoons, were a weapon of limited 
use and extended service life. During the war Waller rough 
stocked 813 at 5/- each; Hollier supplied furniture for 
800 as well as steel rammers for 700; Jordan supplied 300 
locks at 15/- each and 300 barrels at 29/- each; Jordan & 
Farmer supplied 100 each of barrels and locks; Barber and 
Pickfatt each set up 150, and James Farmer and Edward 
Jordan each supplied 100 complete wallpieces for 88/- 
each. 39 
Seventeen forty-six was the year in which the rifle 
made its first appearance in British service. The records 
do not reveal the source of motivation for the 
introduction of this innovative arm, but the influence of 
H. R. H. the Duke of Cumberland, and the experiences of he 
and his entourage on the Continent suggest that they may 
have acquired some views on the usefulness of the rifle 
from its use in the armies of Frederick II of Prussia, who 
had introduced its use during the present war. Frederick 
had armed the non-commissioned officers of grenadier 
regiments with a rifled arm in 1742, and had set up a 
rifle corps in 1744.40 The British, however, at first 
considered the rifle as useful protection for engineers, 
and . their earliest recorded 
intended use was for the 
expedition going to the relief of Louisbourg, commanded 
by General St. Clair in the Spring of 1746. Fifty rifled 
carbines are mentioned in the stores of the train of 
artillery which was to accompany the expedition. 41 This 
expedition was cancelled at the last moment, and was re- 
directed to the coast of France, where it is possible 
these rifled carbines may have seen service at L'Orient. 
The Board wrote to Thomas Armstrong, commander of the 
artillery train then at Portsmouth waiting to sail: 
'That they approve your buying One hundred Rounds 
of Ball for the Rifled Carbines, and desire you will 
order Mr. Parr to pay for them and for Fifty Small 
Bags to keep them in, the charge of which they-will 
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allow in your Disbursemts. 42 
The rif les themse-lves do not appear to have been 
manufactured by the Ordnance, and were probably purchased 
by an officer on some regimental account. Whether they 
were of English or Continental manufacture is unknown, but 
in view of future Ordnance activity in this area is does 
seem likely that they were bought on the Continent. A 
'State' of small arms in the Tower for December, 1746, 
shows only ten rifled carbines in store at that time, but 
by January, 1749, all sixty are in store where they remain 
until 1754; it may be significant that in 1752-4 they are 
referred to as being 'of sorts' suggesting that they may 
not have been all of one pattern 0 
43 In July, 1747, 
Admiral Boscowan's request for artillery stores for his 
expedition to India includes 'Rifled Carbines 50', but the 
Proportion drawn by the Ordnance in October for the 
supplies actually issued does not include the rifles. 44 
The preliminaries of peace were exchanged on 30 April 
1748, although the final treaty was not signed at Aix-la- 
Chapelle until 18 October of that year. Peace was in the 
air and there was no further pressure for arms production 
on the Ordnance; however, the Ordnance was apparently 
anxious to ensure a reasonable- supply of new arms 
components for future production while Parliamentary 
grants were still at a wartime-level, and in the course of 
1748 Waller delivered in 12,000 rough stocked muskets 
while other contractors delivered some 16,000 double 
bridle musket locks and 9000 musket barrels, very few of 
which were made use of for the next several years. In the 
course of the year the setters up delivered in all but 24 
of the 3380 Marine muskets, as well as 2900 Long Land 
Pattern muskets of the Pattern 1739 type, and 2955 Short 
Land Muskets with wood rammers. However, the major new 
development in Ordnance activity during 1748 resulted from 
the decision to introduce the steel rammer for all 
infantry muskets. Hollier's first warrant for steel 
rammers and retaining springs for the tailpipes was dated 
3 February 17489 and at the end of March he delivered 
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10,000 steel rammers, 13,000 springs and 650 feet of brass 
for bushing the upper ramrod pipe. Under 
this same warrant a further 3100 steel rammers already on 
hand were repaired and made fit for service, and at the 
end of the year a further 3000 rammers and springs were 
delivered. 45 
During the wartime years of 1739-48, the Ordnance 
System created some 115,500 muskets, 5000 carbines, 250 
wallpieces and 10,100 pairs of pistols. This quantity was 
produced by a single firm of rough stockers, ten setters 
up, one furniture supplier, five suppliers of locks and 
barrels, and three lockmakers. These numbers were 
supplemented by 46,000 complete muskets & bayonets from 
Liege and 15,000 more from four domestic contractors, as 
well as 3500 carbines, 300 wall pieces and 3500 pairs of 
pistols. 
46 
The Wars of 1739-48 were the first conflicts in which 
the Ordnance System was subjected to the types of strain 
which might be expected to occur in keeping Britain's 
armed forces supplied with small arms, and there had been 
the additional sudden demands created by the 'Forty-five' 
which came just at a time of setback for the regular armed 
forces on the Continent. The structure established during 
the late 1720s seems to have survived fairly well, 
although a number of additional contractors were added to 
it from 1742. Both foreign purchase and the acceptance of 
complete arms were resorted to as supplements to the 
regular supplies, but an examination of the performance of 
the Ordnance for our entire period suggests that perhaps 
these alternatives were, in fact, an accepted part of the 
overall operation of the system. At least until 1804 the 
Board, and presumably the government of the time backing 
it, were satisfied to operate the system as laid down in 
the 1720s, and were prepared to accept the occasional 
necessity for expedients such as foreign purchase and 
accepting complete arms, rather than attempt to operate a 
different system which might have been more cumbersome and 
certainly more expensive, and have lessened the Board's 
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degree of control over the processes of manufacture, for 
the very occasional benefits derived from an ability to 
greatly and suddenly expand the domestic supplies. They 
knew that there were only a certain number of craftsmen 
capable of doing the work in the manner required, and that 
a proportion of these men might well be occupied with 
commercial work at the time the Board wished to employ 
them; it would therefore be possible to expand the system 
only up to the level of additional suitable contractors 
available at the time required. Any other approach than 
entering into a free and open competition in the market 
place for the services of these men was held, by the 
social and business standards of the time, to be not only 
impractical, but also unwise. Such a concept, and the 
system it might have created, belong to the realm of 'long 
term planning' which was unknown to the men of our period. 
****** 
With the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle on 
18 October 17482 Europe entered a short period of what 
was, even then, appreciated as only an armed truce. 
Britain had emerged from the conflict largely on the debit 
side of the ledger, although this does not appear to have 
involved any fault of the Ordnance, who had both produced 
and made available sufficient numbers of the various 
patterns of arms required by the several branches of the 
armed forces. For the next seven years the activities of 
the Ordnance were concentrated in cleaning, repairing and 
modernising the arms returned into store by the forces, 
introducing the steel rammer on all infantry muskets, and 
regularising the administrative functioning of the Office. 
There was little new production of arms after the 
completion of outstanding contracts during 1749, until the 
deteriorating situation in Britain's North American 
colonies demanded attention from late 1754. 
During 1749 the setters up delivered in a mere 450 
Long Land Pattern muskets, along with 1189 Short Land 
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muskets, as well as 500 pairs Of Pistols and the balance 
of 24 Marine muskets. But new production of muskets fitted 
with steel rammers appears for the first time since 1735, 
and this time it is not directed solely towards the 
equipping of the three regiments of Guards. it is 
interesting to note, however, that amongst the muskets 
being returned from the troops in Flanders were 1000 Long 
Land with steel rammers, now in store at the Tower and 
ready to be cleaned, suggesting that either some of the 
Guards, or one of the Irish regiments had carried their 
earlier arms into combat. 
47 Thomas Hollier delivered 6200 
cast brass nosebands between the end of June and mid- 
December, 1749, and during the year 2237 Long Land muskets 
with steel rammers were completed by nine of the setters 
up; none of these have as yet been identified, so it is 
not known whether they incorporated any other 
modifications from the conventional Pattern 1739, apart 
from the rammer, nosecap, a modified upper rammer pipe and 
spring in the tailpipe. Hollier also repaired 10,000 
'new 
pattern' bayonets which he delivered in June, 1750, and 
this appears to indicate the introduction of a 
modification of the Pattern 1728 bayonet in which the zig- 
zag slot of the socket was bridged over and the bottom of 
the socket given a raised collar as a reinforce. A number 
of bayonets conforming to this description have been 
examined, and the brazing of the added collar is clearly 
visible. 
47 By June there were enough new production arms 
in store that the Board ordered no more to be set up. 
48 
Three thousand pounds of the Parliamentary grant to 
the Ordnance for 1749 of L177,147.15.10. was to be spent 
on cleaning and repairing small arms, and setting up new 
ones, but as noted above the latter activity was abandoned 
for the present. Much of 1749 seems to have been spent in 
collecting, transporting and sorting arms returned from 
the forces, either from disbanded regiments, or sent in as 
unserviceable or wanting repair. A programme was set up in 
which the arms were sorted into different categories 
depending on the amount and type of work required to 
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render them serviceable, and detailing who was to carry 
out the various types of work. Thus there were four 
categories of arms: 
1. Those which needed cleaning only,. where the stocks 
were in sound order, but the barrels wanted fresh 
smoothing, and the locks and brassworks need fresh 
polishing. These would be done by the daymen. 
2. Those which needed a greater amount of cleaning to 
render them serviceable. The stocks were scratched 
and bruised, and needed to be scraped, cleaned and 
re-stained and oiled; and the barrels having got 
rusty on the underside, they were to be newly draw- 
filed and smoothed; and the locks and brasswork 
were to be newly smoothed and polished, with the 
end result that this group, when completed, would 
be in no way inferior to new guns. The piecemen 
would deal with these. 
3. This group required repairing as well as cleaning. 
The stocks, barrels and locks to be done as with 
the last group, but will want new parts or repairs 
to them, new rammers, swivels, to complete them. 
Also to be done by the piecemen. 
4. The last group, whose stocks were broken or so 
badly damaged, were to be broken up and the parts 
returned into store to await re-stocking. 49 
The gunmakers would strip the guns, smooth and polish 
the brasswork, 'take out the names on the Barrels and new 
smooth the same' [that is, remove the regimental marks and 
re-polish the surface]9 fit new ramrods, pins and screws, 
swivelsq as required. and re-assemble the guns. The 
piecemen working on the barrels were to cut them off to 
the lengths requiredý dovetail and braze on new loops and 
sights as necessary$ bore them out perfectly clean, and 
polish t, hem up perfectly on the outside, and file up the 
breech, loops and sight so they were completely fit for 
stocking 'according to the Pattern', supplying their own 
filesq oil2borax and spelter. The men were to have the use 
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of a forge and coal for the brazing work) 'and the Mill 
for boring as usual. ' The locks were to be repaired by 
'regular bred Gun Lock Makers' amongst the Small Gun 
Office employees. 50 According to the Proofmaster, Thomas 
Hartwell, the new system of repairing had enabled the 
workforce to break up 10,491 arms, returning their parts 
to store, and to completely clean all the serviceable arms 
then in store (amounting to 117,443), many of them twice, 
including internal oiling which was rarely done, repaired 
and cleaned some 2500 returned arms, and cleaned and 
freshly oiled some 10,500 musket barrels, 17,000 musket 
locks, 27,000 bayonets, 6900 steel rammers, besides swords 
and cartridge boxes, saving the Office in the process 
almost E850 per year. 51 
The new broom which was doing most of the sweeping 
was Charles Frederick, who had been appointed Surveyor 
General of the Ordnance on 10 April 1750.52Frederick had 
been Clerk of the Deliveries and Comptroller of the-Royal 
Laboratory since April, 1746, and was to hold his present 
post as Surveyor General, as well as that of Comptroller, 
until the political upheavals at the close of Lord North's 
administration in May, 1782. Frederick was probably the 
most refined, intelligent and talented man to hold an 
Ordnance appointment during our period. A protege of the 
newly appointed Master General, John, second Duke of 
Montagu, Frederick had matriculated at New College, 
Oxford, and been admitted to the Middle Temple; he was 
elected a Fellow of the Royal Society (a distinction he 
shared with his mentor Montagu) in 1733, and was a member 
of the Society of Antiquaries from 1731 and its Director 
from 1736 until 1741. His skills as a draughtsman were 
well above those of the ordinary dilletante. Although the 
Office may have been functioning well enough as regards 
the supply of small arms, it was apparently not up to the 
exacting standards of the new Surveyoi General, whose 
analytical and tidy mind found a number of serious 
shortcomings in Office procedures, notably a lack of 
adequate, efficient record-keeping. His investigations 
lk 
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uncovered 'many unaccountable Irregularities with which 
the Small Gun Office hath heretofore abounded' and 'that 
great Iniquity was practised during Mr Wooldridge's Time, ' 
but from the surviving evidence, which is admittedly 
scant, it would appear that much of this was a different 
approach to procedures rather than downright dishonesty. 
Frederick was determined, however, that the Board 'would 
take some speedy and vigorous Measures as will prevent the 
like Abuses for the future., 53 By the following January 'A 
System and a Proposed Regulation for carrying on the 
Business for the Future in the Surveyor General's Branch' 
was submitted by the First Clerk, Jeffreson Miles. There 
had been 'new Regulations' issued from time to time in 
previous years, most recently in July, 1745, but it 
appears that they may not -have been too well observed. If 
in its detail it reflects the omissions of the earlier 
organization, then virtually all of what has survived in 
the records from this period and later is probably a 
result of this re-organization. The new Regulations called 
fQr a set of books to be kept specifically for the 
Surveyor General's office, with a staff of twenty-two 
clerks to run the system and keep the books. The books 
included a Register Book, a Ledger, a Warrant Book, and 
Entry Book of Returned Stores, an Estimate Book, copies of 
the Board's Minutes in their entirety as well as extracts 
for immediate use, books for specific references to the 
Surveyor General in the Board's deliberations and for 
references to the 
Engineers and Fortifications, a Report 
Book, A Letter Book for the Surveyor General's outgoing 
correspondence, four Proof Books for Powder, Guns, Small 
Arms and abstracts from these, an Experiments and 
Inventions Book, a book containing Abstracts of all 
Contracts, a Tonnage Book and a Price Book. Because it 
presents almost the only detailed overview of the 
functioning of the core of the Board's operations to have 
survived from our period, and because, at least for the 
duration of Frederick's tenure of office it seems to have 
been adhered to) the methods by which these several books 
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were kept is worth examining more closely. 
The Register Book was for the recording of all bills 
brought to the Office. When first presented the bearers 
were to be told to return in ten days' time when they 
would either be paid, or told why they were not to be 
paid. The bills, if accompanied by the correct vouchers, 
or correctly certified, would then be entered in the 
Register Book; the responsible clerk would compare the 
bills with the warrants and receipts for the goods, and 
would then annotate the Warrant Book with the exact date 
the Storekeeper acknowledged receipt of these particular 
stores,. and initial this entry. 
The bills, after being registered, were to be 
distributed amongst the clerks 'most at leisure' for 
processing. The method here was 'strictly to be observed 0, 
Two clerks were to work simultaneously and check each 
other at every stage, and to initial the bills when they 
have been checked against the Price Book and the other 
work completed; they were then to hand the bills to a 
third clerk who was to check that their work was correct* 
The third clerk then wrote out the total amount 'in words 
at length' 'in a large round hand', and then initial the 
work and pass it to the First Clerk for a further 
verification; the First Clerk then got the approval of the 
Surveyor General for the payment or 'allowing' of the 
bills, which were then returned to the relevant clerk who 
entered the date of allowance in the Register Book. At 
this stage the bills were distributed amongst the clerks 
'most at leisure' and they entered them 'verbatim' into 
the Bill Books. Once entered in the Bill Books and again 
endorsed by the clerk who has completed this procedure, 
the peripatetic bills are delivered to the First Clerk, 
who enters 
, 
the entire transaction in the Ledger 
'conformable to the present Method', endorses the bills on 
the back and places them in a press in his Closet to await 
their collection by the 'Proprietors or Agents of such 
Bills whenever they shall think fit to call for them. ' 
These proprietors were required to sign the Ledger with 
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the date on which they took away their bills. 
A list of all the Quarterly Bills, which included 
most of the salaried people in the Office, was to be 
entered quarterly in the Report Book kept in the Surveyor 
General's office. 
The Ledger, Bill Books and Register Book were to be 
examined and compared monthly to conform that all of the 
bills allowed during the previous month have been 
correctly entered, and endorsed by the examining clerks. 
The Warrant Book was to contain detailed information 
on every warrant for stores or repair work issued by the 
Office, recorded in eight columns containing (1) the date 
of the warrant, (2) name of the grantee and type of 
stores, (3) total amount of the stores, four spare columns 
for. entering dates and details of progress in supplying 
the stores, and (8) the column to be used by the clerk of 
the Register Book for noting the date acknowledged by the 
Storekeeper for receipt of the stores on this warrant. 
This book was to be verified and endorsed quarterly by the 
relevant clerks of the Surveyor's,. Storekeeper's and Clerk 
of the Ordnance's offices. 
The Entry Book of Returned Stores was to contain the 
information taken from the bills of lading for such 
stores, including the date of the bills, the name of the 
ship and master and place from which the stores come, the 
total amount, and a survey sorting the stores into 
Serviceable, Repairable, and Unserviceable. This book was 
also to be verified and endorsed quarterly by the same 
clerks as. dealt with the Warrant Book. 
An Estimate Book was to keep account of the annual 
Parliamentary Grants to the Board of Ordnance, with credit 
and debit columns for the ways in which this money had 
been paid outq in detail. 
After every Board meeting (usually twice a week 
during our period) a fair copy of the entire Minutes was 
to be taken from the original in the Clerk of the 
Ordnance's Officey for the particular use of the Surveyor 
General. Every six months these were to be indexed. A set 
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of Abstracts of such items as related directly to the 
business of the Surveyor General's officeýas to be made 
after each Board meeting, along with two other books 
containing all references in the Minutes to the Surveyor 
General, Engineers and Fortifications branches. These were 
to record the particulars of the references and the date 
on which the Surveyor General dealt with them. 
The Report Book was to record all reports, answers to 
references, or Propositions and Regulations of the 
Surveyor General or his First Clerk to the Board. 
The Letter Book recorded all correspondence dealing 
with Office business from the Surveyor General or his 
Frist Clerk by his order. 
Separate Proof Books for Powder, Guns and Small Arms 
were to be entered the day following the relevant proof. 
A Book of Experiments was to record all such 
experiments performed in the presence of the Surveyor 
General or to his order, as well as all new inventions and 
their supposed merit, to prevent impositions on the Board 
by subsequent claimants. All refractions of salt petre 
received from the East India Company were likewise to be 
set down in this book. 
An Abstract of Contracts Book recorded the relevant 
details of all contracts made with the Board including the 
name of the contractor, date of contract, date of 
commencement of the contract and its term of years, annual 
sums to be allowed, type of goods or services to be 
performed, and date of expiry. 
A Tonnage Book was to be kept for the recording of 
all such duties on every type of stores, to be approved by 
the Surveyor General. 
The Price Book, recording the prices agreed for all 
manner of stores, which acted as a guide for the agreeing 
of any future contracts for a particular type of storesy 
was to be kept up to date, but no additions or alterations 
were to be made without the 'Approbation and Sign manual 
of the Surveyor General. t 54 
While a number of the more general seriest such as 
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the Warrant Books, Minutes and Abstracts of Minutes, 
survive today, historians have suffered a major loss by 
the absence of such informative volumes as the Abstract of 
Contracts, Letter Books, Experiments & Inventions, 
Register, Small Arms Proof, and Entry Book of Returned 
Stores which are no longer within the Public Records. 
The surviving documents, all heavily endorsed, do 
suggest that the administrative system described above was 
implemented over an extended period, and that the network 
of cross-checking seems to have achieved the goals 
envisaged by Frederick; but of course it is impossible to 
judge from the nature of the surviving evidence just how 
closely the spirit, rather than the letter, of the 
guidelines wexte followed. Fortunately, as regards the 
production and supply of small arms, this degree of 
effectiveness does not appear to be relevant: delays 
encountered at various periods are generally attributable 
to external, rather than -internal, factors. 
-ý At about this time a new service was inaugurated by 
the Ordnance which tended towards increasing its own 
control over supply, and offered a service initially to 
the gunmakers who worked as contractors for the Ordnance, 
but subsequently to the gun trade both in and out of 
London. This came to be known as 'Tower private proof, ' 
and was simply a new provision allowing the private 
gunmaker to send his barrels to the King's Proof House on 
Tower Wharf and have them tested with the King's Proof, 
and so marked. Since the barrels so proved were not 
intended to become Crown property, a variant mark 
consisting of the Proof Mark only, the crown over crossed 
sceptres, being struck twice on the breech of the barrel, 
was used. A commencement date of 1751 for this service 
seems logical, since it is unlikely to have been 
introduced during the busy wartime years, and since an 
objection to it was lodged by the Gunmakers Company, who 
were never slow in complaining when their prerogatives 
were threatened, in October of that year. The Tower proof 
was cheaper than the Company's, and they complained of 
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loss of trade and undercutting by the Government, but a 
counter-petition by the gunmakers using the service 
claimed that the Company's rates for those who were not 
members of the Company were extravagantly high, and were 
in restraint of trade since this meant that they could 
only make lower priced guns if they omitted to have the 
barrels proved at all, which put the entire business into 
the hands of only three or four members of the Company. 
The Board approved the continuance of the private proof, 
and it appears to have continued into the early Nineteenth 
Century. 55 
Seventeen fifty saw the introduction of another in 
the increasing line of 'special service' carbines, this 
one for officers of the Royal Artillery. Although there is 
one reference in 1738 to the supplying of bayonets for the 
fusils of artillery officers stationed on Minorca 
56 it 
was not until 1750 that steps were taken to standardize 
the pattern and expand the issue. On 15 May forty-seven 
carbines are reported as having been repaired (i. e. 
modified from cavalry carbines) and fitted with bayonets 
for the Artillery, and by the end of the mq_. pth of the 
eighty-four reported finished, seventy-nine are to be 
engraved and issued. These may have been intended for the 
rank and file, for on the same day the Surveyor General 
was desired to fix on a pattern of carbine and bayonet for 
officers of the Royal Artillery, 'the Board intending to 
provide them for such of the Officers as shall Indent to 
keep them in good order and return them when called 
for., 57 On 22 June the Master Furbisher Thomas Hatcher 
received the Surveyor General's orders to make up carbines 
sufficient to equip the officers of five companies of 
artillery, and requested parts; he ultimately received 
sufficient for thirty-eight carbines. 58 In July a buff- 
leather cartridge box with white-metal buckles was sealedp 
and an order given for a like number as for the 'Fuzees 
lately given to the Officers of Artillery, 'although it was 
not until March, 1751 that Hatcher was ordered to have a 
pattern made up and submitted. 
59 In August2 1750, Hatcher 
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reported turning into store thirty-nine carbines with 
bayonets and buff-leather slings for officers of 
artillery, at a cost of 11.8.11k each. 
60 In October, 1751, 
Hatcher made a fuzee with a carbine barrel and bayonet to 
the order of the Lieutenant General of the Ordnance at a 
cost of fl. 8.3ý2- in materials, but it is not clear whether 
this was a personal weapon or an intended pattern; the 
former seems more likely since it was the Surveyor General 
for whom patterns were normally produced. 
6'At the end of 
1751-the non-standard nature of these artillery carbines 
was emphasized when a warrant for seven of them was 
requested so that Hatcher could fit them up, and in reply 
to a query whether it was necessary to keep a supply of 
these carbines, the reply was in the negative. 
62 The 
earliest carbines for the rank and file apparently lacked 
a nose-cap, as it. was noted in May, 1752, that the stocks 
of those belonging to Captain Chalmer's Company 'want 
capping with brass to make them uniform., 
63 By December of 
the same year the earlier decision about a supply of 
artillery carbines had apparently been reversed, and it 
was reported that 'a sufficient number' of carbines 
altered and fitted with bayonets for the artillery were 
now in store. 
64 Having got the stores up to the required 
nu mbers, in March, 1753, it was announced that in future 
Bombardiers of artillery would carry carbines and bayonets 
in lieu of halberds. 
65 Early in 1755, four companies of 
artillery were to be raised for the service of the East 
India Company, and were ordered to be outfitted with 600 
carbines with bayonets, and these had to be altered and 
the bayonets fitted. By the middle of the year after a 
survey, had been carried out on the carbines of the 
artillery it was decided that they were in bad condition 
because they were too lightly stocked at the hand and the 
fore-end, and further weakened by altering for bayonets, 
'being originally made for horse', and also lacked company 
markings and numbers. One hundred and thirty-nine new ones 
were ordered made to complete the numbers, indicating the 
first appearance of a purpose-built Artillery Carbine. 
66By 
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December Thomas Hartwell, the Modeller, had produced a 
stronger pattern of carbine for the artillery, and in 
July, 1756, it was ordered that such carbines be completed 
to a total of 630 exclusive of cadet's. 
67The 
origins and 
production of carbines for the artillery cadets at the 
Woolwich Academy (founded in 1741) are shrouded in 
vaguenessý largely due to the fact that until the time of 
the Seven Years War they appear to have been made in tiny 
numbers by the Small Gun Office workforce, and no specific 
details were set down in records which have survived. It 
may even be that none were actually produced until the war 
years, except that the mention of 'exclusive of cadet's' 
in the order of July, 1756, does suggest earlier, 
distinct, production. 
Peacetime conditions brought progress in another 
neglected area, that of the Sea Service. By an Order in 
Council of 26 March 1746 all muskets for ship's companies 
were to have bayonets, and be fitted with sling swivels, 
but given other priorities, little had been done towards 
implementing the order by the end of the war; is is true 
that in September, 1749,1000 Sea Service muskets were 
ordered to be cleaned, repaired and bayonetted, according 
to a pattern approved by the Surveyor General, but that 
was the only indication of activity in this sphere until 
early in 1752, when the Admiralty made enquiries as to why 
nothing appeared to have been done. The Board thought that 
the 1746 Order must have been in error, since previously 
all ships had been supplied partly with muskets having 
bayonets and bright barrels, and partly with black 
barrelled muskets without bayonets, and they wrote to the 
Admiralty to ask if a mistake had not been made, and 
noting that it would be very expensive to make the 
change. 68 Not so2 replied their Lordships, the Order in 
Council had been based upon a consultation with most of 
the flag officers of the fleet and the Commissioners of 
the Navy, who had specifically requested that in future 
all muskets supplied should have bayonets, and hoped that 
this would be the case. 
69 Accepting defeat, the Board 
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ordered, on 8 May, that all future Sea Service muskets 
should have bayonets, and on 30 June the Master Furbisher 
attended the Board and displayed a pattern Black Sea 
Service musket 'Bayonetted pursuant to the Surveyor 
General's directions'; a letter was to be written to the 
Lords of the Admiralty informing them that in future half 
a ship's allowance of muskets would be of this new type, 
'until the whole Complement can be furnish'd therewith. v70 
This suggests that ultimately the Black Sea Service musket 
with its bayonet was to entirely replace the Bright 
musket, but subsequent production clearly refutes this. 
The daymen were set to work altering Black Sea Service 
muskets for bayonets and swivels. Later in the year it was 
reported to the Board that there were upwards of 2000 
'Dutch and Trade Musquet Barrels' in store which 'have 
never been proved with the King's Proof', and which if 
proved, might then make up into 'very good Marine and Sea 
Service Musquet Barrels. ' They were ordered proved 0 
71 
The Admiralty now advised the Board that the Admiralty's 
Establishment of 1743 called for only twenty out of one 
hundred ship's muskets to be of the black barrelled type, 
and asked that this proportion might be confirmed, to 
which the Board agreed. 
72 By early 1754 the first of the 
new Black Sea Service arms were being sent to the Out 
Ports, with Chatham and Sheerness each receiving 500 
stand; it was then noted that most of the bayonets 
applied to both Black and Bright arms had flat blades for 
which there were no scabbards, and these had to be 
ordered. 
73 The use of old arms and old barrels continued 
to be a feature of Sea Service production. During 1755, 
when the maritime aspects of the next conflict with France 
began to emerge as North America and India came into focus 
as potential major battlegrounds, repair work on complete 
arms and the repair and re-proving of barrels for Sea 
Service increased. There were 1400 muskets & bayonets in 
store at Portsmouth made for the Marines 'in the late War' 
which 'had been ordered not to be issued for that &Exvice' 
and which might now be issued as Bright 
Sea Service arms, 
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with the word 'Marine' carefully omitted; this was 
approved, as was the re-proving and repairing of 602 Long 
and 268 Short rough-stocked muskets made up with old, 
thin, barrels with large vents, which were to be converted 
and set up for Sea Service; another 5000 old barrels in 
the Tower were to be repaired and re-proved on the same 
account. 
74 In October a State of the arms in store at the 
Towex showed that 1592 Marine muskets, 3500 Bright Sea 
Service muskets, 500 musketoons and 1325 pairs of pistols 
were required to bring the Sea Service stores up to the 
official requirement; by January, 17569 returns showed 
that, exclusive of those at the Out Ports, there were 3613 
Sea Service muskets in , the 
Tower with 5130 due on 
warrants, and 15t548 repairable arms in store, they were 
over the requirement of the 10,000 arms thought necessary 
to be kept in store. 
75 By dint of a large repair programme 
carried out on second-hand arms, along with a limited 
amount of new production, the Sea Service branch was held 
to be in satisfactory condition to face the coming 
conflict. 
Re-equipment of the infantry with the steel ramrod 
was proceeding apace, although it appears that at least 
some, and perhaps most, of this work was being carried out 
by regimental armourers as well as by the Small Gun Office 
workforce. In January, 1752, Sir Robert Manners, Colonel 
of the 36th Foot then at Gibraltar, informed the Board 
that his regiment already had 'iron rammers' and that he 
declined to accept the 275 new muskets with wooden rammers 
which had been issued to him from the Gibraltar stores. 
The Board ordered that he be sent muskets with iron 
rammers; 76 at the same time the Secretary at War, Henry 
Foxg informed the Secretary of State Lord Holdernesse that 
iron rammers were wanted in lieu of wooden ones for other 
regiments then serving as garrisons at Gibraltar and 
Minorca, including the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st 
Guardst the 1st battalions of the Coldstream Guards and 
the 3rd Guards, Col. Herbert's and the Earl of Ancram's 
regiments, a total of 3347 new rods. The Board ordered 
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that these rods be issued, along with 2000 springs for the 
tailpipes and ninety feet of cast brass for filling up 
(sleeving) the forepipes, and that they be fitted by the 
Established Armourers at those p aces. 
77 
On 30 June 1752, on orders from H. R. H. the Duke of 
Cumberland, the official size of the ball for muskets was 
altered from 14 to the lb. to 14ý2- to the lb. , and all 
musket ball in store was ordered to be re-cast to the new 
slightly smaller size. 
78 By decreasing the size of the 
ball and thereby increasing windage betwen the ball and 
the bore of the barrel, some accuracy was lost, but 
increased facility in loading a powder-fouled barrel was 
gained, a vital point in effective rapid volley firing. 
Although officially at peace with France, the 
encroachments of the French government in Canada into 
lands considered by London as belonging to George II did 
not cease with the treaty of 1748, and by 1752 their 
intentions became more overt and tension mounted as the 
colonial forces of both countries and their Indian allies 
confronted each other in an increasingly hostile 
atmosphere. The Five Nations (Six since the 1720s) of the 
Iroquois Confederacy had been enemies of the French since 
being ý attacked by Champlain in 1609, but had managed to 
establish a form of neutrality in 1701, acting as a 
balance to the territorial and political pretensions of 
both the French and the English, occupying as they did key 
territory in the western part of the province of New York, 
and with suzerainty over a much wider area extending 
westwards and southwards. 
79 Beginning in 1680s the London 
government had sought to maintain this Iroquois neutrality 
a policy of periodic meetings to air mutual grievances 
between the English colonists and the Indians, and the 
giving of presents to the tribes; from 1694 these presents 
had included firearms and ammunition furnished by the 
Board of Ordnance. The first gift authorized in January, 
1694, included 1200 Light Fuzees for presents to the 
Indians who will not carry heavy arms' at 12/6 each, 
80but 
by the time of the second gift in 1700, the amount had 
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been increased to 400, at which it was to remain until the 
final Ordnance-made gift of 1753. Until the present of 
1716 these guns had been supplied complete by the 
gunmakers, but in line with the new Ordnance System from 
that time they were set up by several gunmakers from 
barrels, locks and brasswork supplied to the Ordnance by 
their components contractors. The guns are described as 
'Fuzees 3'10" long [in the barrel], Beach stocks stained 
and varnished [or painted and spotted according to 
pattern] brass heel & side plates & thumbplates, round 
locks engraved with King's cypher and brass swage pipes'. 
They are further described as having 'East India' or 
'Carolina' bore size barrels, which from surviving 
examples of a slightly later period is believed to have 
been about . 58" calibre, taking a ball of 28 to the lb. 
81 
Presents of this nature, accompanied from at least 1708 by 
powder, lead and flints, are recorded in 1694,1700,1708ý 
17099 17169 1743, and 1753.82 Although none of these arms 
has been identified to date, the presence of the Royal 
Cypher on the lock and possibly the buttplate tang, thumb 
piece or sideplate, should serve to distinguish. them from 
the contemporary fowling piece, along with the small size 
of the bore. The parts order for the last Ordnance-made 
group in 1753 includes '20 Best Northwest 4 foot 0 in 
Barrels, 83 for the twenty higher grade guns in the order 
of 400, the earliest recorded reference to a term which 
was, by the turn of the century, to become synonymous with 
the term trade gun as intended for North American Indians. 
The 'Northwest Gun' was to remain in commercial production 
into the Twentieth Century. Despite the fact that, in 
1754, Thomas Hartwell was paid to make an example of each 
of the two types of gun sent to the New York Indians the 
previous year, as patterns for future use, this was the 
last gift of guns to the Indians supplied by the Ordnance 
until 1813,, uhi-h il! 1-1-m-elonla W44-1.1 4Ai: - - P""_ in . U. s 'Li ;i No reasons for the failure to continue the long- 
established practice are given, but perhaps it was found 
to be much cheaper to obtain them directly from the 
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private trade, where patterns acceptable to the Indians 
had long been sold for around 10/-. Whatever the reasons, 
by 1756 the guns were being supplied by the firm of 
Richard Wilson and Company of the Minories, who 
established a monopoly of supply to the Board of Trade 
lasting into the 1790s. 84 
As well as the Indians, the Board had, 
intermittently, supplied arms to the governments of 
several of the North American colonies, usually at times 
of invasion threats from French Canada, but also to 
counter serious Indian outbreaks on the frontiers. 
However, most of the colonial governments lacked the 
necessary political cohesion and sufficiently strong 
connections with the British government to obtain either 
sufficient numbers or an adequate quality of arms from the 
central goyernment, and most of their arms purchases were 
from the private guntrade. In most instances the arms sent 
to the colonies, which were purchased 'at a price' appear 
to have been of out-dated patterns and of mediocre to poor 
quality. Issues of arms by the Ordnance to the colonies 
before the Seven Years War were concentrated in the 
period of the War of the Spanish Succession, and only 
occasional between 1715 and 1754; these include 1000 
muskets, 12 blunderbusses, 12 'harquebusses' [wall pieces] 
and 300 pairs of pistols to South Carolina in 1720,85300 
Land Service muskets with bayonets, slings and cartridge 
86 boxes to New Hampshire in 1723, and another 300 muskets 
& bayonets to South Carolina in 1730,87With the threat of 
an invasion from the Spanish Caribbean in 1739,1000 
muskets & bayonets were sent to South Carolina and Georgia 
in September2 1739, and another 1000 to New York in 
November, as well as a total of 2450 to the various 
threatened Caribbean islands and 300 to Newfoundland to 
protect the fishermen in 1739-40.88 New York's four 
Independent Companies lost their arms through an 
arsonist's fire at Fort George in 1740, and two years 
later these 384 muskets & bayonets were replaced. 891n 1744 
Newfoundland received shipment of 500 Dutch muskets sent 
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to the garrisons at Carboniereq Terryland and Trinity 
Harbour, and a year later the newly raised South Carolina 
Independent Companies received 312 muskets & 
bayonets. 90The arms of the American colonial troops who 
captured Louisbourg in June, 1745, were described as 'what 
was bought for the Coast of Guinea Trade, and most of them 
are very bad' so replacement arms for two battalions of 
1000 men each were shipped over in August, 1745, along 
with 200 wall pieces. 
91 The settlers who were to replace 
the French inhabitants of Nova Scotia and found the town 
of Halifax were given 1000 muskets with long Spanish 
bayonets to protect their settlements in 1749, and these 
appear to have been a mixed bag of old and captured arms 
in the Tower stores. 
92During August, 1753, Maryland was 
authorized to receive 300 muskets with single bridle 
93 locks, and New Jersey 1500 muskets and bayonets. These 
arms were intended for the colonial militia and were sent 
at the request of the respective colonial governments. New 
Jersey had not received her allotment by early 1755, and 
privately purchased 500 muskets & bayonets from the Wilson 
firm in London to equip her 'Blues' regiment. 94 
During this seven year period of armed truce, a 
number of changes in personnel amongst the various 
contractors took place, which caused a shift not only in 
names during the coming upsurge in production, but in 
responsibilities as well. John Vaughan, the Birmingham 
lockmaker active since the reign of Queen Anne, died early 
in 1748, and his last orders were delivered late in 
1747.95 Thomas Hollier, another key figure in the system, 
died in the spring of 1754, and in May his lease of the 
Armoury Mills at Lewisham was taken over for thirty-one 
years by Richard Hornbuckle; 95 however, for most of this 
time Hornbuckle seems to have concentrated on the 
refurbishing of edged and pole arms, and the supplying of 
gun furniture, bayonets and small work was parcelled out 
to separate contractors. The first of these to appear in 
the records were the uncle and nephew partnership of 
William and Edward Loxham, who became sword-cutlers to the 
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Office and took over the supply of swords and bayonetsq 
having a virtual monopoly in the latter area until the 
middle of the American War. At the same time, in July, 
1754, William Sharp, brother of Richard who had acted as 
engraver to the Office since at least 1743, now offered to 
supply forged nails and triggers, pinning wire, swivels, 
steel rammers, steel springs and Sea Service pistol ribs 
(i. e. smallwork) and this was accepted. Later in the 
following year Sharpe described his situation as that of a 
Pieceman in the Small Gun Office, who, as had his brotherg 
always worked in the Storehouses, the same as other 
piecemen; he asked that this 'indulgence' be confirmed, 
and granted to four other men, presumably his 
employees. 961n September the partnership of Joseph 
Hartwell and Thomas Mayor contracted to supply brasswork 
to the Office, replacing Jonathan Buttall who had recently 
died; although a brass founder in his own right, Buttall 
does not otherwise appear in the records and is assumed to 
have supplied Thomas Hollier as a sub-contractor. 97 In 
February, 1755, Richard Waller requested permission to 
take his son James into partnership as a contractor for 
rough stocking, to which the Board agreed. This 
partnership was to function until Richard's death in 
February, 1769, when Joseph Loder was admitted as a second 
rough stocker, along with James Waller. 98 
When Virginia Lieutenant-Governor Dinwiddie's report 
of January, 1754, on George Washington's visit to the 
French forts in the upper Ohio Valley during 1753, was 
digested in London, it became clear to the Pelham Ministry 
that French intentions of claiming and holding this vast 
area were being actively pursued to the detriment not only 
of English claimsy but the English fur and Indian trades 
as well. Although peace continued to be the official 
policy of both sidesq yet each was determined to halt the 
progr6ss of the other in the trans-Appalachian region. 
After the failure of Washington's expedition against the 
French fort-building operation at the forks of the Ohio 
River, and the failure of the Albany- Congress to reach 
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agreement over united colonial action and control of the 
Indian trade, London countered by establishing a Northern 
and Southern Superintendancy of Indian Affairs, a single 
Commander in Chief for North American forces, and 
determined to send a force of regular British troops to 
strengthen the colonial militia and enforce British 
claims. A request was received as early as June, 1754, 
from the Governor of North Carolina, Arthur Dobbs, for 
1000 'assorted, non-King's Pattern' muskets for his 
colonial forces, and he was sent Dutch muskets from the 
1741 purchase, fitted with flat bladed bayonets. 
99 In 
October the Board received instructions to prepare 
complete sets of arms for two regiments, Halkett's (44th) 
and Dunbar's (48th) of 700 men each, and for two other 
regiments of 1000 each which would be raised in North 
America. The first two, the so-called 'Irish regiments' 
were supplied with King's Pattern muskets having steel 
rammers but without nose-caps. 
100 The two other regiments, 
which were to become the first and second battalions of 
the Royal American Regiment (62nd, re-numbered 60th) were 
issued with two types of musket: the first battalion 
received 1000 with single-bridle locks, wood rammers and 
nosebands, while the second received Dutch muskets, also 
with nosebands and wooden rammers. 
101 
The commander of the North American expedition and 
the new Commander-in-Chief in North America was Major- 
General Edward Braddock, an old campaigner, lieutenant- 
colonel of the Coldstream Guards and currently Colonel of 
the 14th Foot, and the choice of H. R. H. the Duke of 
Cumberland who was also effective commander-in-chief of 
Britain's land forces. 102 Cumberland was anxious that 
Braddock receive every assistance in the execution of the 
coming operations: the Duke's secretary, Colonel Napierg 
wrote to the Board that the Quartermaster General of the 
expedition wanted 'a Dozen of Rifled Barrel Carbines' and 
received the Duke's orders to apply to the Board for them, 
and that the 'H. R. H. thought it would be of Service to 
send three Suits of Armour for the Engineers who in that 
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Woody Country may be obliged to reconoitre within Musquet 
Shot. ' The Board responded with an order 'that 12 Rifled 
Barrel Guns with their proper Moulds, 4 Barrels of Powder, 
ý cwt of Lead and Six Dozen of Signal Rockets with their 
Sticks and 3 Suits of Backs, Breasts and Headpieces be 
sent and added to the Proportion., 
103 The rifles referred 
to were part of the sixty which had been in store since 
the end of the last war; this is confirmed by a Return of 
Arms in the Tower dated 31 December 1754, which records 
only forty-seven rifles then remaining. 104 The engineers, 
who were intended to carry the rifles, being at the very 
head of the vanguard of Braddock's force when the surprise 
confrontation took place in the ravine near Turtle Creek 
on 9 July 1755, (most certainly reconnoitring within 
musket shot! ), it is highly unlikely that either their 
rifles or armour escaped falling into the hands of the 
enemy, since the Indians would have considered these as 
prize items amongst the immense booty they took. 
The period from 1739 to 1754 witnessed the Ordnance 
System under its first period of full-blown operation 
under the stresses which it was designed to meet. 
Unfortunately the surviving documents do not tell us 
whether the Board felt that the System lived up to 
expectations, and there are a number of occurrences which 
might create some uncertainty in drawing a positive 
conclusion. Amongst these are the early purchases of arms 
in Liege, the delays in component supplies because of the 
severe winter weather in 1739-40, (which two items may 
well have been linked), the taking on of seven new setters 
up in 1742-4, and the outright purchase of specialist arms 
such as the carbines for the Duke of Cumberland's Dragoons 
and Loudoun's Regiment. However, my overall impression is 
that each of these factors was within the Board's overall 
outlook, and that none of them were in fact panic 
reactions to unexpected events. The harshness of winter 
weather was a factor which would have been well known, and 
from which delays might be expected in the normal course 
of events. The purchase of Liege arms was almost certainly 
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done with the predictable demands from Ireland at the 
beginning of a war, and the planned raising of ten new 
regiments of marines, in mind. The new regiments were seen 
as an economy measure and as a way of avoiding an 
increase in the established standing army - always a bone 
of political contention. The adding of new setters up to 
the manufacturing network was done without disrupting the 
fundamental suppliers or the existing setters up, in such 
a way that they merely took up components which were not 
being used and produced complete arms from them, 
augmenting and not competing with the older firms. This 
was, in fact, very probably the way in which the System 
was intended to work when expansion was called for under 
wartime pressure. The purchase of specialist arms (from a 
long-established contractor to the Board) avoided an 
injection of new patterns and negotiations into the normal 
manufacturing sequence, and achieved the desired effect 
with no disruption of that sequence. 
If the interpretation of the above circumstances is 
correct, then the Ordnance System can be seen to have 
worked admirably during the period of increased demand 
created by the wars of 1739-48. Basic components were 
supplied in sufficient numbers to fully employ an expanded 
network of setters up, and the demands of the various 
branches of the service were met, so far as the records 
tell us, without complaint. One exception to this latter 
point must be mentioned. The marines were not pleased with 
the 'Dutch muskets' from Liege with which they were 
issued, but the evidence clearly shows that this was a 
matter of regimental pride being hurt, rather than 
inadequate weapons being issued to them. They felt that 
they should have had weapons fully up to army quality, and 
did not want to accept weapons of inferior finish. The 
issue did get over the timing problem for the Board, and 
the marines were re-equipped with King's Pattern arms in 
the course of the war. 105 With the smooth transition 
from expanded wartime production to peacetime 
refurbishment and conversion, the Board were justified in 
concluding that their arrangements for small arms produc- 
tion were satisfactory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WAR, PEACE AND REBELLION, 1755 - 1783. 
As seen from London, the aggressive stance taken by 
Britain's North American colonists and the French regime 
in Canada required little more effort than an 
expeditionary force such as was fitting out under 
Braddock's command, to put matters right. There was as yet 
no general feeling that resumption of the broader dispute 
for empire was imminent, so that, apart from issuing the 
stores for the North American expedition (all met from 
existing materials), the Ordnance moved but slowly towards 
a resumption of small arms production. The stores were 
very full of arms returned from the regiments which were 
being converted from wooden to steel rammers, and there 
was little urgent need for a new production until such 
time as the army might be considerably expanded. 
Early in December, 1754, the Board ordered Waller to 
be issued with 2377 barrels, double bridle locks and 
stocks to be rough stocked, and then set up with steel 
rammers. In addition, 13,000 of the wooden rammered 
muskets [Pattern 17391 then in store were to be altered to 
steel rammers by the Small Gun Office workmen, and in 
connection with this project contracts were let in mid- 
December for 11,700 cast brass nosecaps, and brass for 
sleeving 7000 forepipes. 
1 Later in the month it was 
decided that 10,000 new arms should be produced, and 
letters were written to the Birmingham components makers. 
Waller was to supply 5800 Land Service and 4200 Sea 
Service stocks for immediate use, as well as 10,000 more 
in six month's time, and another 16,000 with twelve 
month's seasoning. 
2 
Before this programme could be embarked upon, a major 
shake-up was to occur within the framework of the Ordnance 
System, which demonstrated the growth in the power which 
the Board was now able to wield within the guntrade, and 
the Board's ability to back up its undertakings in the 
face of opposition from that trade. 
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On 17 March 1755 the Board directed that gunmakers 
James Barber, Charles Pickfatt, Richard Wilson and John 
Hirst be written to 
to know what number of Rough Stocked 
Land Musquets for Steel Rammers each of them will 
undertake to set up and Deliver into ye Stores at the 
Tower p Month to pass the View as usual at the price 
of 6s each as settled in 1750.3 
A joint reply from Barber, Pickfatt and Wilson was 
received by the Board on the 19th stating that they could 
not do the setting up for less than 6/8 'as the hands they 
employed during the late war had gone into other trades' 
nor can they estimate monthly production. 4 While the 
alternative employment of key personnel may have been a 
perfectly honest reason for the counter-proposal, yet it 
proved, for these gunmakers, a singularly badly timed 
ploy, as did their failure to attempt an estimate of 
delivery times. A fortnight later the remaining gunmaker, 
John Hirst, sent in his response to the Board's letter, 
offering to set up two thousand muskets with steel rammers 
in six months, and requesting protections [from the press 
gangs] for his workers. The Board accepted his proposal 
and granted the protections. 
5 Although it was long 
before the days of labour unions, it was not long before 
the 'combination' whom he had cut out were after him. On 
29 April Hirst wrote to the Lieutenant-General of the 
Ordnance saying that 
the Gunmakers are endeavouring to get away 
his men because he would not enter into a Combination 
with them to advance the price of setting up Musquets 
and [, ] as he is informed[, ] intend to give in 
Proposals for setting them up at a less price than 
what he is allowed[, ] which cannot be done in a sound 
workmanlike manner [, ] and are using their utmost 
Endeavours to distress him 000 
6 
The Lieutenant-General (Sir John Ligonier) backed him to 
the hilt, saying that 'as Mr Hirst was the means of 
keeping down the price at the first he should have all 
proper Encouragement., 7 The Board backed the decision 
and never had cause to regret it. Thomas Hatcher, the 
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Master Furbisher, also seems to have been involved in the 
unrest amongst some portions of the workforce, and may 
have been connected with the 'combination. ' At any rate 
the Board felt contrained to warn him that they 
do strictly forbid him to raise or 
promote any Disturbance either among the People 
employed in the Small Gun Office or out of the Office 
among the people of the Gun Trade [, ] but that they 
expect he will attend his Duty constantly and do all 
he can to forward the Office Business. 
Hatcher was also warned against putting his work as an 
inspector of East India Company arms ahead of his Office 
work, or having any connexion with the external trade 
without the express permission of the Board or the 
Surveyor General. 8- Hatcher had been a private gunmaker 
in Whitechapel since 1744, and an inspector for both the 
Hudson's Bay Company trade guns and the East India 
Company's arms before taking over Wooldridge's tasks, 9 
and had obviously been too much concerned with outside 
work at a time when the Board required his complete 
attention. As a result of the Board's decision concerning 
Hirst, the London gunmakers were cut out of the Ordnance 
System, except possibly as sub-contractors whose names do 
not appear in the Ordnance records, and between them the 
Wallers and Hirst rough stocked and set up all of the 
contractor-made arms until the late 1760s; this does not 
include complete arms turned in by a number of makers, as 
had always been the case. The only one of the London 
'combination' who managed to work his way back into the 
good graces of the Board during the war was Richard 
Wilson, whose production capacity was so large that, 
perhaps, the Board co. uld not ignore him. A few new names 
amongst the London trade- Michael Memory, John Bumford, 
John Brazierý Richard How, Joseph Buckmaster, Thomas 
Henshaw and Henry Hadley, set up varying numbers of arms 
for the Board in 1756-7y but the numbers were 
insignificant when compared either with Hirst's production 
or the totals produced during the war. 
As in 1739, it was not until after the official 
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declaration of war, in May, 17569 that the Ordnance 
entered into large-scale manufacturing arrangements with 
their contractors; and, as in 1728 and 1739, the gap in 
production presented the opportunity to make changes to 
the design of a number of features, this time in a number 
of different types of arms. Probably the first of these to 
be implemented was in the area of Sea Service arms. We 
have already discussed the alteration work which, although 
authorised in 1746, had not been commenced until at least 
four years later, but in addition to this a major change 
in both muskets and pistols was introduced during this 
period which involved a change in the shape and size of 
the sidepiece and the lockplate. This was the elimination 
of the third screw securing the lock in the stock, at the 
tail of the lock, and the adoption of the same design and 
location as used on Land Service arms for the placement of 
the two remaining sidenails. The sidepiece now took the 
same outline form as for the Land Service series, but was 
flat on its surface rather than rounded, and inlet flush 
with the stock. When new contracts for locks were made in 
1756-7, they were all for the new pattern two-hole type. 
The arm which was subjected to the most important 
changes was the Land Service musket, specifically to the 
Long Land version. These modifications in design were the 
most important since the original King's Pattern of 1728, 
for they incorporated changes made in the Pattern 1739, as 
well as those begun in 1749 before new production ceased, 
with several entirely new features adopted in 1754-5 for 
the forthcoming production. It is therefore reasonable to 
assign to this virtually all-new design a model 
designation, that of Pattern 1756. Perhaps the most 
noticeable changes were made in the stock: beginning with 
the Pattern 1728 the walnut stock had been made with a 
very thin, elegant fore-end, and the butt was finished 
with a high comb with rounded sides and a deep hand-rail 
effect on the sides; the swell at the tailpipe was 
pronounced and ball-like in shape, and the lock and 
sidepiece flat were ornamented with elaborate raised 
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elliptical 'aprons'. On the Pattern 1739 the forward pair 
of 'aprons' had been dropped, but all other features were 
unchanged. In 1749 the steel rammer had been officially 
adopted, and a cast-brass nosecap had been produced as 
part of the conversion unit which also included a 
retaining spring for the tailpipe and a sleeve or collar 
for brazing into the forepipe. On the Pattern 1756 the 
stock was made altogether heavier, thicker throughout the 
fore-end area, with a longer less pronounced swell at the 
tailpipe, and with the comb of the butt made less high, 
with thinner, flat sides and less of a grooved effect to 
the hand-rails. The lower, rounded, portion of the butt 
was made slightly heavier; the raised areas on the 
terminals of the lock- and sidepiece-flats were re-shaped 
with a plain rounded line following that of the lockplate 
at the front (as already done on the Pattern 1739) and a 
plain teardrop-shaped extension at the rear. A heavier 
type of brass nosecap was adopted along with the steel 
rammer for all new production, and a new long, tapered 
forepipe with a flared mouth, called the 'trumpet pipe' 
was adopted for the foremost rammer pipe, smaller in its 
diameters and bored internally expressly for the diameter 
of the steel rammer; the retaining spring in the tailpipe 
became a standard feature. Apart from the new nosecap and 
trumpet pipe, the other furniture remained unchanged. The 
lock also underwent changes in design. All internal parts 
were now to conform closely to gauges, and the lockplate 
was re-shaped with a straighter lower edge, doing away 
with the dip at the rear, the so..! called 'banana' shape. 
From 1756 the Long Land musket lock was 'improved, better 
filed, and all their parts made to particular 
Gauges. ' 10 The bayonet was unchanged in its dimensions, 
but the base of the socket was now forged with an integral 
raised collarg and the apron around the base of the elbow 
on the socket was abolished and the area formed as a plain 
surface. The Pattern 1756 (with the several additional 
changes made to the design of the lock in 1764 and 1778) 
was to remain the standard for the Long Land Pattern 
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musket until its production finally ceased in the late 
1790s. 
During the same period that changes were decided upon 
for the Long Land musket, it was determined that an 
entirely new pattern of musket should be produced and 
supplied to the marines, who were finally officially 
established as a permanent force by an Order in Council of 
3 April 1755, with a basic establishment of fifty one 
hundred man companies. The muskets produced to a special 
pattern for the marines in 1748 had never been issued to 
them, since they were shortly afterwards disbanded at the 
cessation of hostilities, but it would appear that from 
the alacrity with which the Board met the demands for the 
initial issue of marine muskets early in 1756, the older 
arms were issued at that time. As one might expect of a 
'sea soldier's' musket, the new arm was a simplified 
version of the Land Service musket, with no suggestion of 
the 'Sea Service' in its design beyond simplicity, 
ruggedness and comparative cheapness in finish and cost. 
Apart from the Short Land Musket for Dragoons, the Marine 
musket of 1756 was the first widely distributed musket to 
use the shorter 42-inch barrel. The furniture combined old 
and new features: the barrel-shaped rammer pipes were the 
usual pattern; until 1759 all, were made with wooden 
rammers, without nosecaps or tailpipes, but when the steel 
rammer was introduced on those for the militia in 1759 a 
nosecap, trumpet forepipe and tailpipe were added; the 
trigger guard was the standard Land Service design; the 
thumb piece was omitted. The buttplate and sidepiece were 
of a new pattern and distinctive to this new arm: the 
sidepiece was in outline identical to the Land Service 
sidepiece, but it was thinner, with a flat surface, and 
inlet flush with the level of the stock; the buttplate was 
made with a much shorter tapering tang with three slight 
steps2 and secured by a simple screw rather than with a 
cast-on lug and pin arrangment. The lock was the 
conventional Land Pattern, but it seems likely that 
available stocks of old, pre-1756, locks would have been 
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used at least on early production. The bayonet was the 
conventional Land Service pattern. The first warrants for 
sets of the distinctive Marine musket furniture were 
issued in October, 1755, and the first of Waller's 
warrants to rough stock them was issued on 8 September 
1756. Before they had got very far along in the production 
process, the Militia Bill of 1757 was passed, and it was 
decided to issue this same musket to the newly raised 
militia. Although the new arm was referred to as. the 'new 
Pattern Short Musquet for Marines' in December, 1756, by 
the time the issue stage was reached it had acquired the 
designation 'Marine or Militia Musquet' which it was to 
retain; production last occurred during the early years of 
the American War, by which time the Short Land musket had 
been generally adopted and was considered close enough in 
design to serve for the several arms of the service. 
11 
The appearance of a distinctive carbine for the Royal 
Artillery has already been discussed, and the Artillery 
Officer's fuzee with bayonet reappears in October, 1755, 
when two new companies are ordered raised, for which 24 
Officer's carbines & bayonets as well as 182 carbines & 
bayonets for the men are required. 
12 The rough stocked 
officer's carbines were delivered by Waller in April, 
1756, and the men's carbines were set up by Pickfatt and 
John Bumford under warrants of March, 1756.13 These 
Artillery carbines were to come into wider issue in the 
course of the war, being served out to highland regiments 
and other units acting as light infantry. The shorter 42- 
inch barrel was combined with a carbine bore, a wooden 
rammer, and a set of smaller, simpler, lightweight 
furniture to produce a much handier weapon for the use of 
mobile troops. Although the non-specific nature of the 
records makes it difficult to be certain, these 'Artillery 
& Highlanders' carbines probably formed the bulk of 
carbine production during the Seven Years' War. I 
The most distinctive and elegant carbine to appear at 
the beginning of the war was that for the Horse Grenadier 
Guards (usually known simply as the 'Horse Guards' or 
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'Blues'). In July, 1755, '6 Firelocks and Bayonets for 
Serjeants (as delivered to His Royal Highness the Duke's 
Regiment of Dragoons)' were ordered for the 2nd Troop of 
the Horse Grenadier Guards. ý 
14 During the next half-year 
the original idea was expanded, and by the end of December 
Thomas Hartwell was given 'sole direction' of the carbines 
and pistols for the Horse Guards, and they were now 
intended for the entire regiment, not simply for the 
serjeants. 
15 Isaac Kelso got the job of rough stocking 
and cleansing off these arms, and the amounts recorded 
were 371 carbines and 381 pairs of pistols; it was noted 
that they were 'Stocked with Extraordinarily Good 
Walnuttree & more labour bestowed to finish them' so that 
Kelso's request for an increased price for the work was 
granted. 
16 The 'Blues' carbine, like the common carbine 
for the. cavalry, is 'home-stocked', that is, with the wood 
of the fore-end coming right to the muzzle of the barrel, 
and not intended to take a bayonet, and has a 37-inch 
carbine-bore barrel, with a brass blade foresight. But 
there the resemblance ceases; the 'Blues' carbine has a 
new style of lock with a flat, bevelled-edge lockplate and 
cock, and a flat, bevelled edge sideplate resembling those 
popular on fowling pieces of the period; like the fowling 
piece, it also has elaborate shell-carving rather than a 
conventional elliptical 'apron' at the tang of the barrel. 
The trigger guard is of the Land Pattern, but with the 
front terminal of the bow made thin and pinched-in, not 
intended to take the screw for a lower sling swivel; the 
swivels are omitted in favour of a sling bar mounted on 
the left side of the stock, secured at the rear by the 
rear sidenail, and at the front by a screw through the 
stock from the right side, just to the rear of the swell. 
Originally fitted with a wooden rammer and barrel-shaped 
pipes, later production used a steel rammer with a trumpet 
f orepipe. As for the 'Blues' pistol, there is no clear 
reference to it in the records, but from a single example 
with features highly similar to those of the carbine, it 
may be described as also having the new style of flat lock 
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and cock, the shell-carving at the tang, and being fitted 
with a distinctive 10-inch PiStOl7bore barrel, and the 
older, more elegant style of 'long-ear'd' or masked 
buttcap. 17 
Another new carbine appeared at this time, that for 
Light Dragoons. The nature of the record keeping is such 
that it is often impossible to clearly differentiate 
between the several different patterns of carbine 
introduced during the Seven Years' War, and the first 
suggestion that a separate carbine and pistol for Light 
Dragoons might exist came with the augmentation order of 2 
February 1756 which specified that each of the eleven new 
troops were to receive 65 carbines & bayonets and 72 
pistolsi 
18 
a further reference of late 1758 indicates 
that only the light companies of the dragoons had been so 
armed. 
19 The carbines have been identified from existing 
specimens as having thirty-six inch carbine-bore barrels, 
with furniture of the usual Land Pattern but reduced in 
size, excepting the trigger guard bow which is like that 
for the 'Blues' carbine, not being intended to take the 
screw for a sling swivel. A sling bar is fitted along the 
left side, again exactly like that on the 'Blues' 
carbine. The lock is of the conventional rounded-surface 
1756 pattern, in carbine size with the lockplate measuring 
Ox 1 1/16" as compared to the 6 7/8" x lk" of the musket. 
The stock is of the conventional Land Service pattern, but 
slightly built, on the lines of the Artillery carbine of 
the period. Originally made for wooden rammers, some were 
later converted for steel rods by fitting a composite 
trumpet forepipe and retaining spring in the tailpipe. 
20 
All that can be determined from the records about the 
Light Dragoon pistol is that 9849ý2- pairs of Land Service 
pistols were rough stocked by Waller and 9627 pairs set up 
by Hirstý but there is no indication of how many of these 
were of the conventional 12-inch barrelled dragoon pistol 
with the 'long ear'd buttcap' introduced in 1738, and how 
many of the new 9-inch carbine-bore barrelled Light 
Dragoon pistol with a 'short-eared' buttcap; in addition 
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to these features there were a number of other design 
innovations. The sideplate was flat and inlet flush with 
the stock, and of a simple pattern perhaps described best 
as the letter C lying open side down at the front, and 
open side up at the rear; it was to be used on several 
other types of arms in later years, most notably the Baker 
rifle from 1800. There was no trigger plate, but a small 
iron nut inlet ahead of the trigger into which the barrel 
tang screw was threaded. The front finial of the trigger 
guard was of a plain tapered design also used on the 
current Artillery carbines. A wooden rammer was used, with 
a single barrel-shaped pipe about midway along the rod 
channel, and there was neither thumb piece nor nosecap. 
The lock was of the 1756 pattern, the lockplate measuring 
5k" x 15/16" 1 which is distinctly smaller in both 
dimensions than the 'heavy' dragoon pistol, although of 
the same design. No Land Service pistols of any sort were 
supplied by Waller or Hirst before 1758, and the majority 
of the Light Dragoons pistols reported today bear lock 
dates from 1759.2-1 _ 
While it may seem strange that attention should have 
been given to the development and introduction of a whole 
series of subsidiary arms just at the time when a renewal 
of war was clearly anticipated, it should be remembered 
that the Ordnance was particularly well supplied with Land 
Service muskets, there being well over 100,000 in store at 
the beginning of 1756; - 
22 it was, perhaps, an example of 
shrewd timing and perception on the Board's part, to cater 
for the requirements of the various and increasing 
specialist branches of the armed services at the moment 
when financial backing was least likely to be cavilled 
about or withheld. 
Despite the healthy state of musket stores, steps 
were being taken to re-establish a large Lcale 
manufacturing programme. As early as February, 1755, the 
Tower gates were ordered to be opened 'as soon as the men 
could see to work 1 
23 
and in March warrants were ordered 
to be drawn for the rough stocking of 2000 Sea Service 
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muskets and 200 musketoons, the repairing of 500 Sea 
Service musket barrels and 200 musketoon barrelsq and for 
two Birmingham barrel contractors to supply 2000 musket 
2 4- barrels each. In May 3000 Bright Sea Service muskets 
were ordered to be repaired, as there were none 
serviceable in store 
25 In July Waller received his first 
warrant to rough stock 1000 Long Land Pattern muskets, 
followed a month later by another to rough stock 1000 each 
of Bright and Black Sea Service muskets. 
26 In September 
Hirst entered the operation, receiving warrants to set up 
500 Long Land and 500 Sea Service muskets, followed in 
October by additional warrants for 3000 Land and 2000 Sea 
Service muskets; also in October Waller was warranted to 
rough stock a further 1000 Long Land muskets. - 
27, At the 
end of October Hirst informed the Board that he had 
thirty-four men constantly employed, and that in a little 
time he will be able to set up one thousand arms per 
month; the Board replied that he would be supported. The 
figure of thirty-four is probably for sub-contracting 
firms, not for a total of workmen, and it is interesting 
to note that, some years later in defending his devotion 
to the Board's work, Waller also claimed that he had 
about 40 'men' working for him during this war. 
28-. 
- By 
December the programme was escalating, and the Board 
minuted that 10,000 arms were to be got up and Richard 
Davis, described at the time he joined the Small Gun 
Office staff in 1753 as 'the best Gun Lock Maker in 
London' was sent to the Birmingham lockmakers to ensure 
that their tumbler tools, screw plates and taps were all 
made to the same gauge; in addition to rough stocking a 
further 1697 Long Land muskets, Waller was to furnish 5800 
Land and 4200 Sea Service rough stocks for immediate use, 
and a further 10,000 Land with six months' seasoning and 
16,000 with twelve months' seasoning. By the end of 1755 
the Board was expecting some 5600 Land muskets and 4000 
Sea Service muskets in the rough, stocked state, of which 
3500 Land and 2500 Sea Service were already ordered to be 
set up; almost 1600 sets of furniture for the new Marine 
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musket were on order, and the ground work was laid for the 
expansion which would occur in the coming year. 
29 
- 
Early in the new year the Surveyor General gave his 
opinion that 20,000 Long Land and 5000 Short Land muskets 
should be prepared for stores, and warrants were ordered 
made out; the list is given as illustrating the new names 
amongst the contractors, and those considered most worthy 
of the Board's patronage: 
Musket Barrels New Pattern Locks 
Long Short Total hardened & engraved 
J. Oughton 4000 2000 6000 
E. Jordan 3000 1800 4800 4800 
B. Willet 2200 200 2400 2400 
H. Hadley 3400 200 3600 3600 
S. Galton 3400 400 3800 3800 
J. Farmer 4000 400 4400 4400 
W. Grice & R. Edge 6000 
20,000 5000 25,000 25,000 
William Sharp nails and triggers . 252000 
Hartwell & Mayor sets of brass furniture 259000 
30 
George Markbe, one of the gunsmiths who had carried out 
the 1740 survey on regimental arms, was now sent to 
Birmingham as resident Viewer to inspect all barrels and 
31, locks produced there. - . In February, for reasons neither 
recorded nor obvious, ten London gunmakers were given 
small orders for setting up a total of 850 Land Pattern 
muskets and 182 Artillery carbines; Messrs Pickfatt, 
Wilson, Gandon, Bumford, Brazier, Hall and Memory each 
received 100, while -Collumbell, Buckmaster and 
Henshaw 
received 50 each, with Pickfatt and Bumford dividing the 
carbines between them. -' 
2 The numbers are too 
insignificant to be considered as 'sweeteners' for 
slighting them in favour of Hirst, and too small to 
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represent an important element in the Board's planningg so 
the motive for placing the orders must remain unexplained. 
Other contractors new to the Board requested, and received 
warrants for setting up arms as the production programme 
expanded, and may be explained by a desire on the part of 
the Board to hedge its bets in case Hirst could not cope 
with the enlarged numbers. Most of these smaller firms did 
not contribute more than one contract, and their total 
contribution, made almost entirely before 1759, amounted 
to no more than 11,800 out of the 304,800 arms set up 
during the war. However, there were a number of other new 
firms amongst the components contractors who did add 
considerably to the overall production throughout the 
course of the war, and who do not appear on the initial 
list of early 1756 quoted- above. Some of them appeared 
late in 1756, but most came in during 1757, by which time 
the structure of the production programme seems to have 
been settled in the collective mind of the Board. Chief 
amongst these were John Whately junior of Birmingham, who 
supplied barrels second in quantity only to Joseph 
Oughton, and the partnership of Haskins & Vernon, who 
supplied locks second in quantity only to Grice & Edge. 
Partnerships between individuals already established in 
their own right as manufacturers play a major role in 
supplying the Ordnance during this war; apart from those 
already mentioned2 Farmer & Galton were third in the 
quantity of barrels supplied, and fourth in the list of 
lock suppliersq while William Grice & Son were fourth in 
numbers of locks supplied. When the totals are studied as 
a group, it is clear that one rough stocker, one setter 
up, one furniture supplier, five barrel makers and seven 
lock makers supplied the Ordnance with the vast majority 
of their production during this war. 
33 
Despite the achievements of the Ordnance System 
during the course of the Seven Years' War, the Ordnance 
early resorted to the purchase of foreign arms. While the 
System was still getting into its stride, in August, 1756, 
Messrs Charles Pye and George Cruikshank were paid for 
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5001 Dutch muskets & bayonets bought by them at Amsterdam 
34 for H. M. Service. In October, 1759, when there was no 
apparent reason for doing so, a further 10,000 were 
purchased by one Henry Guignard, which were clearly 
second-hand arms, many of which required repair work. _35 
Unlike the arms bought during the previous, and the 
succeeding, war these were clearly not made to an English 
pattern, but were bought in the market place. 
As usual when the relations between England and 
France became tense, the Irish Government reacted with 
feelings of great insecurity in the face of a potential 
French invasion, and indeed with the perpetually run-down 
condition of the Irish Establishment and the hand to mouth 
financial existence which it led, there would seem to have 
been reason for some concern. After long periods of 
neglect and unconcern, at the first intimation of possible 
invasion, or of the draughting of troops from the Irish to 
the English Establishment, the Lord Lieutenant was always 
quick off the mark to request a substantial shipment of 
arms and military stores from the London Board, and these 
requests from Ireland always arrived when the Board was 
having to cope with large numbers of requests from 
regiments for replacement arms, as well as for arms for 
newly raised regiments and for equipping overseas 
expeditions; the present situation was little different 
except that the Board happened to have a very full store 
of arms. Although the Board always felt compelled to 
furnish the requested arms and supplies, the problem of 
payment was perpetual; thus, although requested to send 
116,962.9.0. for 7000 muskets and bayonets and other 
stores shipped to Dublin in April, 1755, and a further 
000. for 400 dragoon muskets and bayonets despatched in 
April, 1756, the bills were still outstanding in 1758.36 
By May, 1756, the lockmakers in the Small Gun Office 
were so busy that Hirst had to do his own lock repairing 
work; John Woodq lockmaker of Wednesbury sent in some 
double bridle locks of the old pattern from the last war, 
which were fit for service and in the soft stateg along 
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with a slightly larger group of same which were 
defective. Their workmen were so occupied that the Board, 
while accepting the soft locks which would have to be 
engraved and hardened, refused the defective onesq and 
told Wood to remove them. _3 
7 This is all the more 
surprising in that the very next month the Board were 
complaining that the gunmakers were being dilatory, and 
that if they did not speed up their deliveries the 
warrants would be recalled. Some interesting replies were 
received: Willet said that he had sent in three parcels of 
locks, but had not heard whether they had yet passed the 
View; Farmer & Galton said they were waiting for a lock 
viewer to be sent to Birmingham with the proper gauges. 
(Where was Markbe, who had been ordered to Birmingham in 
January? ) Edward Jordan replied that John Wood and others 
had got several of his men away from him. Thomas Hartwell 
was ordered to explain why Richard Davis had not been 
sent, and exactly to whom and when the Pattern Locks had 
been delivered, and why Willets had not been informed 
about his locks. 
38 Regrettably, Hartwell's report must 
have been rendered verbally, although by July it is clear 
that Markbe's responsibilities had been limited to barrels 
and bayonets, and perhaps Richard Davis had not been sent 
on his way as soon as the Board had assumed he had. 
Between January and December, 1756, Hartwell and Mayor 
delivered in 21,550 sets of brass furniture for Land 
Service muskets, including the new trumpet forepipe, as 
well as 5000 sets for Sea Service muskets and 1200 sets of 
carbine furniture. The balance of their 1756 warrants, 
amounting to 9450 sets of Land musket furniture, were 
delivered by the end of May, 1757.39, But for all of the 
preparation which had gone on during 1755, the results 
during 1756 still indicated that the System was very much 
still trying to find its stride, and although we have some 
evidence of the Board's dissatisfaction with some aspects, 
it is not otherwise clear from the surviving evidence how 
much of the apparent delay was expected, and how much was 
due to factors which the Board still needed to resolve. 
151 
Part of the troubles may have been the question of price; 
there is no doubt but that a good part of the workmen in 
the trade were working on East India Company orders, which 
were better paid for a slightly lower standard of work, 
and too many of the Birmingham trade were engaged on an 
order for the Irish Board of Ordnance of 3000 musket 
barrels and locks which were of the same pattern as those 
for the English Board, 'but not quite so good'; so on 2 
October the Board granted a price increase, which allowed 
8/6 for a musket barrel as against 7/-, and 7/6 for a 
musket lock, compared with 6/-. The allowance for flints 
was also increased from 12/- to 14/- per thousand. 
40 By 
early January, 1757, Waller had delivered in 25,000 rough 
musket stocks, as well as some 10,000 rough stocked Long 
Land muskets, 3000 Bright Sea Service muskets, along with 
another 5700 whose finish is not specified, 5000 Marine 
muskets., and 1100 pairs of Sea Service pistols. Of the 
Long Land muskets, Hirst during the same period set up 
6473, as well as 600 whose length was not specified, 3500 
Bright Sea Service muskets, with another 2000 of 
unspecified finish, as well as 776 carbines. Hirst had 
certainly achieved his announced intention of being able 
41 
to furnish 1000 arms per month. - 
On 2 March 1757 Colonel James Prevost of the 60th 
(Royal American) Regiment was paid 1900. for having 
purchased 
'300 Riffle Barrel Carbines with Steel 
Ramrods Screws and Bayonets, Ten Moulds each to cast 
twelve Balls at a Time and 150 Riffle Moulds 
furnish'd by him for the Use of Hiý Majesty's Troops 
pursuant to the Right Honble the Earl of Loudoun's 
Warrant datd 3d Do., 42, 
Prevost had previously been in the Dutch service, and 
at the time this purchase must have been made he was on a 
recruiting visit in Germany, so that both from previous 
knowledge and proximity at the time, there seems little 
doubt but that the rifles purchased by him would have been 
V& 43 of German, or possibly Liege, origin. This was the 
first large-scale acquisition of rifles for the British 
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service, and references throughout the North American 
phase of the Seven Years' War indicate that they were in 
use in the northern and central campaigns from at least 
1758 onwards, where they were issued to selected 
individuals in the regular British regiments. 
44 As with 
the 1746 purchase, the motivation appears to have come 
from European experience and not American evidence, apart 
from a general appreciation that rifles were useful in 
wooded country for skirmishing purposes. On the 
Ticonderoga campaign in 1758 they seem to have served 
largely as food-getting tools. 
45. 
By April, 1757, the stocks of components appear to 
have been sufficient and the problems surrounding their 
accumulation to have been resolved, and the Board could 
think in more expansive terms about large-scale completion 
of arms. This, at least, is the situation as indicated by 
the surviving evidence, but exactly why it had taken them 
so long to reach this stage is not made clear; at least 
fifty percent of the contractors were local, and no delay 
in communications could occur when they were literally 
just round the corner; it may well be that by this time 
the work being done for the slave trade and the East India 
Company was completed, releasing workmen for the Board's 
work; given the slow pace at which all governmental 
machinery moved during the Eighteenth Century the elapsed 
time may have been considered acceptable if not entirely 
satisfactory, and the threat of cancelling warrants may 
not have been as serious it appears on the surface. At the 
beginning of the month John Hirst offered to set up 20,000 
arms per year, and by the middle of the month' Thomas 
Hartwell was able to report to the Board that various 
contractors had also sent in their offers; these included 
the Wallers who would rough stock twenty to thirty- 
thousand arms 'provided they are not hindered for want of 
Barrels & Locks'q Hirst's offer being conditional upon not 
being 'hindered by the want of Rough Stock'd Guns, brass 
Work and other materials'; Mayor & Co. would supply from 
twenty to forty-thousand sets of brass furniture, while 
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William Sharp was willing to contract for 'any number' of 
steel rammers, springs, and sets of nails and triggers for 
from twenty to fifty-thousand; Peter and James Esdaile 
would supply 18-hole cartridge boxes and any sort of 
bayonet scabbards required, also from twenty to fifty 
thousand in the year. The Board ordered that contracts be 
let for 20,000 of each sort, and that the contractors 
nominate two securities to be bound with them for 
performing their contracts, and in financial penalties for 
failure; these penalties amounted to 120QO for Hirst, 
11000 for the Wallers, and 15,00 each for the others. 
46 In 
June another of the small-scale agreements with the London 
makers was made, and an informative comparison recorded of 
their previous year's work: 
Number proposed Number set up 
in one year last yý_ar 
Richard Wilson 5000 574 
John Bumford 4000 836 
Richard How 1500 250 
Joseph Buckmaster 1200 250 
Michael Memory 1500 500 
Thomas Henshaw 1000 50 
John Hirst by contract 20,000 
34p2OO 19p963 
and it was further ordered that Buckmaster, Bumford, 
Henshaw, How and Memory be granted warrants to set up 
muskets 'as fast as the Rough Stocked Musquets come into 
Store, so as not to interfere with Mr Hursts 
, 47 Contract. - Three points are raised by this curious 
arrangement: why did the Board bother with these small 
orders when they were satisfied with Hirst's output; why, 
in the face of such poor results during the previous year) 
did they agree with these men again; and how, if the 
Wallers were to deliver in 20,000 rough stocked arms2 were 
these other setters up to avoid interfering with Hirst's 
production of the same number of arms? The question of 
keeping the London trade 'sweet' may have played a part, 
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since these men were amongst the best able to execute 
larger orders, and it must be assumed that giving them 
work did not interfere with Hirst's own workforce of sub- 
contractors. Was the Board's optimism warranted2 and did 
these men carry out their contracts? The records justify a 
negative conclusion. Buckmaster delivered in 248 arms, 
Bumfprd managed only 200, Thomas Henshaw made no 
deliveries, Richard How delivered in 1070 arms, Michael 
Memory only 610 and Richard Wilson more than completed 
his work with a total of 5910 arms during the year. 
48 It 
is not surprising to find that this is the last year in 
which these men, with the exception of Richard Wilson, 
were employed by the Ordnance. Under the terms of the 
arrangements made with the standing contractors, the 
results were far, better. During 1757 Hartwell & Mayor 
provided 10,000 sets -of brass 
furniture for Marine 
muskets, 2000 sets for carbines, 5400 for Sea -Service 
muskets and 4500 set for Sea Service pistols, while the 
Wallers delivered in 26,000 rough stocked Land and Marine 
muskets, 5000 Sea Service muskets, 300 musketoons, 1024 
unspecified carbines and 900 for the Artillery, as well as 
624 Highlander's and 28 Artillery Officer's fuzees. of 
these, Hirst set up during the same period, 23,382 Land and 
Marine muskets, 1500 Sea Service muskets, 500 musketoons, 
2500 unspecified carbines and the 624 Highlander's, as 
well as 700 pairs of Land and 1500 pairs Sea Service 
pistols. 
49, The slightly higher numbers recorded for 
setting up than for rough stocking are normally accounted 
for by the rough stocked arms being already in store. 
mention of a specific Highlander's carbine, 624 of 
which were produced during 1757, introduces the special 
subject of distinctive arms for the Highland regiments. It 
is during the Seven Years' War that these special 
regiments were first raised in any quantity. The first 
small companies of Highlanders had been raised in 1725, 
but these had accounted for only 285 muskets & bayonets, 
with an augmentation in 1727 totalling another 336.50 
There is no suggestion that these were in any way special 
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arms, but the imprecise record-keeping of the time leaves 
this at least open to question. With the raising of the 
Royal Highland Regiment, which became the 42nd Foot (the 
Black Watch) in 1739, we have the first indica'tion of a 
special arm, for Lewis Barber furnished 229 complete 
muskets and bayonets for 30/- each 'to the Pattn of Lord 
Crawford's regiment' rather than to the King's Pattern, in 
May, 1740. - 
51 Here again the reference is to muskets and 
bayonets, not carbines, but as with Lord Loudoun's carbine 
and bayonet of 1745, these are assumed to be of a lighter 
weight than the King's Pattern, and, being slightly 
cheaper, are also assumed to be of somewhat lesser quality 
as is the Loudoun carbine. That Crawford's muskets were 
something out of the ordinary is further suggested by an 
order from Thomas Hollier in June, 1746, for 165 'Flatt 
Bayonets' for Lord John Murray's (the 42nd) 
regiment. 
52 Because of the light infantry context in which 
all Highland regiments were held at the time, the special 
nature of their arms is considered to be concerned with 
lightness and facility of use, suggesting at the very 
least a shorter barrel and slimmer stock with less 
decoration, and with lighter weight and perhaps less brass 
furniture (e. g. the omission of the nosecap and 
thumbpiece). The next highland troops to be raised were 
two battalions, Fraser's and Montgomery's, by a warrant of 
14 January 1757, at which time it was specified that each 
was to have '1040 muskets & bayonets with wooden rammers, 
and 1080 sidepistols with 
'straps. ' 53. The wooden rammers 
at a time when the line regiments were being equipped with 
steel rammered muskets, is indicative of the official 
attitude on highlander's arms, and this is also the first 
mention of the distinctive highland side-pistol, with its 
all-metal 'ram's horn' butt and archaic form of fluted 
barrel and ball trigger without a trigger guard. However, 
these pistols, worn singly as part of the highland garb 
and generally regarded more as costume than handgung were 
never manufactured for the Ordnance, but were always 'paid 
for in lieu' and supplied by the colonels of the 
1-56 
respective regiments. During the Seven Years' War period 
the colonels were allowed 16/6 per pistol, and payments 
for them are scattered throughout the Bill Books and 
Treasurer's Ledgers. 54 Early in 1762, William Grice 
informed the Board that large numbers of the these pistols 
had been, and were being made in Birmingham, 'both in iron 
and Walnuttree Stocks which are of a very bad sort, ' for 
which the purchasers were paying no more than 18/- the 
pair (as opposed to the allowance being made of 16/6 
each). Investigating the allegation, Thomas Hartwell 
reported to the Board that a pair of pistols (he does not 
say highland pistols) cost the Office 35/4 per pair. The 
Board therefore ordered that for this particular warrant 
of 10 November 1761 to Maclean's Royal Highland Volunteers 
regiment the 648 pistols should be issued from the Tower 
1ý5 land not paid for in Money (as formerly practiced). . 
This is the only instance in which these side-pistols are 
not mentioned specifically as having been paid for in 
lieu, and there is no further evidence in the records that 
such pistols were available for issue from the Tower, or 
that they were manufactured for the Board. Hartwell's 
reference to the cost would be based on the evidence of a 
pattern made to determine a fair allowance to be made 
which was a standard practice, and the Board's minute to 
issue them from the Tower is typical of the broad 
directives given before checking with the storekeeper's 
department to see if such stores actually existed; 
Hartwell or Hatcher were frequently having to inform the 
Board that no such arms as called for in a specific 
warrant existed. 
56 At a time when few other carbines were 
being distinguished in the records it is probably 
significant that the 624 carbines with bayonets for 
Highland companies which were rough stocked by Waller 
using barrels repaired and altered for bayonets, and locks 
repaired by Hirst in August, and set up by Hirst in 
Septemberg 17572 are mentioned by name; it is perhaps also 
significant that this is the last such mention, and that 
in its general summary of types of arms to be kept in 
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store, minuted in September, 1757 (see below) the Board 
refer to 'Carbines with Bayonets for Artillery or 
Highlanders' (my emphasis). It is noticeable that in the 
various warrants for augmentations to the earlier highland 
regiments, (Murray'sý Fraser's and Montgomery's) the 
references are to muskets with wooden rammers & bayonets 
57 rather than carbines, and that not until 1 May 1759 
were carbines with wooden rammers and bayonets mentioned 
for a complete re-equipment of Murray's (42nd) 
regiment. 
5,8 At the end of that month the Board state. that 
they cannot at present supply the 42nd with carbines, and 
have 
. 
lately sent muskets, because all previous 
augmentations (which they quote) have been supplied with 
muskets; later in 1759 several newly raised highland 
regiments were supplied with standard steel rammered Land 
muskets. 59 When Morris's Highlanders were raised in 
October, 1759, the warrant called for wooden rammered 
carbines & bayonets, and an augmentation to Keith's of the 
same date likewise specified the same, as did a subsequent 
augmentation to Keith's in December, 1759; Graeme's 
Highlanders raised in November, 1761, were warranted for 
wooden rammered carbines & bayonets, as were Maclean's of 
the same date, and Johnston's in October, 1762. ý0. The 
situation of what arms were carried by highland regiments 
is further confused by the question of local issues from 
field stores; a number of units (not only highlanders) 
exchanged their muskets for carbines after arriving for 
service in North America, 61 where 5000 carbines & 
bayonets with wooden rammers were sent in December, 1758t 
and a like number with Admiral Saunders' expedition sent 
out in November, 1759,62 while the Highland Corps serving 
in Germany were sent steel rammered muskets in 1761 and 
1762, strongly suggesting that this is what they were 
already carrying. 
63 It seems safe only to conclude that 
highland regiments raised before 1759 are most likely to 
have received wooden rammered muskets, which they may have 
exchanged locally for wooden rammered carbines for the 
duration of a particular campaign, and that regiments 
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raised from 1759 would generally have been equipped with 
wooden rammered carbines, except as noted above. Side- 
pistols would have been carried by all these regiments for 
parade and review purposes, and these would have been 
supplied by the colonel of the regiment by private 
purchase, the money being re-imbursed to him at a fixed 
rate of 16/6 per pistol, by the Ordnance. By the time of 
the American War, when the shorter and lighter Short Land 
musket was in the hands of most troops, the highland 
regiments received these arms rather than carbines, and 
side-pistols were little in evidence beyond being paid for 
by the Ordnance. 
By the autumn of 1757 the military and naval 
commitments of Great Britain had expanded considerably 
beyond the level perceived in early 1756, and the Ordnance 
accordingly increased the numbers of arms which it felt 
ought to be kept in store at the Tower at all times; 
because it gives some idea of priorities, as well as the 
names by which the Board thought of the different types of 
arms being manufactured for it, the list is given in 
full: 64 
Long Land Musquets with Steel Rammers 
& Long Forepipes 
' 
50,000 
Short Do with Wood Rammers for Dragoons 102000 
Short Musquets of the New Pattern for Marines 
or Militia 30,000 
Carbines with Bayonets for Artillery or High- 
landers 5,000 
Carbines without Bayonets for Horse 29000 
Land*Service Pistols Pairs 129000 
Sea Service Musquets with Bayonets Bright 109000 
Black 102000 
Musquetoons 21000 
Sea Service Pistols Pairs 10,000 
The number of standard infantry muskets was 
increased by 30,000 over the 1756 requirement, and quotas 
set for the dragoon and marine muskets which have not 
previously appeared. *The absence of any reference to a 
carbine and pistol for the Light Dragoons is curious, 
especially since the evidence discussed above indicates 
that they were being considered, even if not yet actually 
1.59 
produced when this list was formulated. 
To make room for the incoming new arms, and to serve 
the immediate needs of expeditions and replacements, 
numbers of older arms were removed to the stores of the 
several Out Ports, 3000 each going to Portsmouth, 
Plymouth, Sheerness and Chatham. These arms consisted of 
Long Land muskets with wooden rammers (2798)9 Dutch 
muskets also with wooden rammers (6207), muskets with flat 
locks and wooden rammers (1866) and muskets 'of various 
patterns' (1237). 
ý5- Although it was never put into the 
official record, yet it is obvious that it was deliberate 
Ordnance policy throughout our period always to work off 
the older arms as far as possible before beginning to 
issue new ones. The result was almost invariably a 
complaint from the regiment to whom they were issued, 
unless an overseas administration received the largesse: 
they were generally glad to have anything so long as they 
did not have to pay for it, but the policy remained in 
effect. 
There were no notable occurrences in Ordnance 
development or production during 1758, except that the 
lock and barrel makers finally began to deliver sizeable 
quantities of these two components. The partnership of 
William Grice and Richard Edge had supplied 15,400 double 
bridle musket locks during 1757, and managed 16,500 during 
1758, along with 4793 Sea Service musket locks, 1501 
carbine locks, 230112 pairs of Sea Service pistol locks. 
James Farmer delivered 3900 Land musket locks. Edward 
Jordan supplied another 2145, and after his death during 
the year his son Thomas Jordan, turned in 2847 Land musket 
locks, 665 Sea Service musket locks, and 10912 pairs of Sea 
Service pistol locks. George Haskins, not yet in 
partnership with George Vernon) delivered 2000 Land musket 
locks, 500 Sea Service musket and 500 pairs of Sea Service 
pistol locks, and 85 musketoon locks. His future partner 
George Vernon also supplied 2000 Land musket looks along 
with 750 Sea Service musket and 500 carbine locks. John 
Willet delivered 1300 Land musket locks and 220 pairs of 
1 .1s; () 
Sea Service pistol locks, and his executors Tomkys & Short 
a further 565 as well as 1067 Sea Service musket locks, 90 
'old pattern' (presumably pre-1756) carbine locks, 79ý 
pairs of Land Service pistol and 149 pairs of Sea Service 
pistol locks. Land musket lock production during 1758 
totalled 31,257.66 
Musket barrel production was now divided between long 
(46") and short (42") and the records are not always clear 
which is meant by the entry 'Land musket barrels'; 
however, there was a general tendency to specify only when 
something was out of the ordinary., to assumet for 
instance, that 'Land Pattern' meant 'Long Land Pattern' 
unless described as 'Short Land Pattern', and in compiling 
the figures for Land musket barrel production I have used 
this guideline, tenuous though it is. One of the few 
pieces of documentation to survive in the Ordnance records 
which was organized to an almost Twentieth Century degree 
of precision and detail is the monthly reports of the 
inspection of barrels carried out by George Markbe in 
Birmingham; these are entered in the Board's minutes from 
ý 7, 
December, 1756. until December, 1762, , with several 
omissions which may represent actual absence of inspection 
rather than non-entry of the report. They record the 
number of barrels of the several types (long and short 
musket, Marine or Militia, Sea Service musket, carbine 
[not differentiated], and pairs of pistol, not 
differentiated), and the number 'Passed and marked' - that 
is passed inspection and so stamped on the barrel- and the 
number 'turned back' or rejected. Also, from May,. 1758, 
the Board began to accept '2nd Grade' Short barrels, and 
there are entries for a very small number of '3d or India 
grade' being accepted in 1760. These monthly reports show 
that during 1758 eight Birmingham contractors listed in 
the order of their contributions (Whately, Farmer & 
Galtong Oughtong Richard Wilson [of London, but buying 
from the trade rather than forging himself], Thomas 
Jordan, Willetsq Edward & Thomas Jordan, and Harris & 
Barker) turned in 12,689 Long Land musket barrels, 8473 
Short Land, 1441 Marine or Militia, 581 carbine and 3088ý 
pairs of pistol barrels. The absence of Sea Service musket 
and the small number of Marine or Militia barrels is 
explained by the fact that large stocks of old and 
repaired barrels were still being used in the rough 
stocking of these two types. From March, 1.755 to the end 
of 1758, John Hirst had repaired and/or altered 43,339 
musket barrels, of which only 2872 are specified as being 
of'Dutch origin. The repairs were mostly cutting off and 
new looping, some being fitted with new breechplugs, and 
the bores polished. During the same period he also 
repaired and altered for bayonets 3429 carbine barrels, 
including the 624 for the Highlander's carbines in 
September, 1757. Hirst's repair work during 1758 amounted 
to 5000 musket barrels, as well as 5518 musket and 1382 
pistol locks being repaired. -'68 
From the above it will be seen that during 1758, 
including Hirst's repaired products, there were 36,775 
musket locks and 27,603 Land and Marine musket barrels 
delivered. Complementing these, Hartwell & Mayor turned in 
35,704 sets of Land musket furniture and 17,700 for Marine 
or Militia muskets, as well as 11,254 sets for Sea Service 
muskets, 4212 carbines, 1748 musketoons, and 5000 pairs of 
Land Service pistols. From this stockpile of components, 
the Wallers rough stocked 19,995 Land and Marine muskets, 
9567 Sea Service muskets, 76 musketoons, 570 artillery 
carbines, 66 artillery officer's fuzees, 1081 pairs of 
Land Service pistols and 3240 pairs of Sea Service 
pistols. Hirst in his turn set up from Waller's production 
19,088 Land and Marine muskets, 6990 Sea Service muskets, 
200 carbines, 200 pairs of Land Service and 2600 pairs of 
Sea Service pistols. 
69 The figures suggest that, taken 
all in all, production was about level with that of the 
previous year, and represent a mean for the capacity of 
the system; no complaints are recorded from the Board 
during this year, perhaps indicating that they felt all 
was going smoothly, 
IA2 
The year. which, before its end, would be hailed as 
'The Year of Victory' thanks to Britain's naval and 
military achievements, was one of further expansion for 
the Ordnance, with new products and some new faces. The 
organization of contracts for the year's production began 
several months earlier than in 1758, and early in January, 
1759, the Wallers offered to rough stock sixty to seventy 
thousand arms during the coming year, and Hirst offered to 
set up sixty thousand. The latter figure was accepted by 
the Board and warrants issued for that number from each 
firm. - 
70 The Board had sent Thomas Hartwell to Birmingham 
to 'hasten the Barrel Makers' and he had reported that he 
was able to obtain 4000 barrels at a shilling less than 
the Office price by promising the contractors that they 
would be paid for them as soon as they had passed View and 
Proof; he also recommended that an assistant for George 
Markbe in Viewing be found, and in February John Stewart 
was sent to Birmingham for this purpose. 
71 It would thus 
appear that at least part of the problem in slow 
deliveries was due to the Office system of payment 'in 
course of the Office' by debenture, and that ready money 
procured ready goods. In February the Birmingham 
contractors sent in their replies to the Clerk of the 
Works' enquiry about forthcoming production; Farmer & 
Galton said they could supply 300 barrels and 300 locks 
per week for the coming year, and Whately & Son could 
furnish fourteen to fifteen thousand barrels; each 
partnership was given a warrant for 12,000 of each item 
offered. Haskins & Vernon, having formed a partnership 
since their last separate contracts, offered ten thousand 
locks, and Thomas Jordan offered ten thousand each of 
barrels and locks, which offers were accepted and warrants 
issued. . 
72 Another aspect of the difficulties facing both 
office and contractors came to light in April, when Grice 
& Edge reported that they had just about completed their 
warrant for ten thousand locks, and that they were badly 
in need of cash; the Board owed them not less than 16,600, 
and they requested immediate payment of at least three of 
I C, Q 
their completed warrants amounting to 12-3000. The Board's 
response was, unfortunately, typical: 'Ordered that they 
be acquainted they will have Money as soon as the Board 
can spare it, 1 
73. 
This approach, no matter how justified from the 
Board's point of view, coupled with the hold-ups 
experienced in the inspection of components and payment 
for them, cannot have inspired the contractors to greater 
efforts on the Board's behalf. The entire situation was 
based on the knowledge that the Board was paying a good 
price for the product, was ordering in large quantities, 
and was guaranteeing payment, but not immediate payment, 
and that all parties concerned in an agreement were fully 
aware of all these circumstances. It is enlightening to 
note that regardless of the vitriolic nature of some of 
the complaints and the responses to them, the very 
contractors making the complaints always came back for 
more when opportunity offered, and that with very rare and 
specific exceptions, the Board always re-employed them. It 
was a very small world in terms of the number of decision 
makers and initiators involved: the Board was the fount of 
all largesse, and it had very high standards when it came 
to accepting contractors and their work. The contractors 
had to choose workmen who could 'work to the pattern' and 
these were in a distinct minority within the gun trade, 
whether London or midlands, or they would risk being 
dismissed from the list of standing contractors held by 
the Board. The big variable was the availability of these 
particularly skilled workmen; throughout its history the 
gun trade has always been one of fits and starts, periods 
of intense activity followed byt sometimes, years of 
almost no work, and many of the best workmen would enter 
into other allied trades, which often involved moving from 
a gun trade centre to some other locality. Only an 
increase in the price of work could lure them away from 
other employment, and back into the gun trade; I this 
generally meant either that the Board would have to 
increase its price, or that the profit margin of the 
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contractor would have to be narrowed. The Board did 
increase its prices, generally at the outbreak of a war 
when both raw materials and labour were at a premium, but 
they were always able to invoke the threat of purchasing 
abroad to solve their problems at the expense of the 
dome-stic contractor. The Board's loyalty to its chief 
contractors, such as Waller and Hirst, was always 
conditioned by the overall circumstances and the 
necessities of the moment; no matter how desirable, no man 
was indispensable. 
On 23 March 1759 a Royal Warrant was issued for the 
raising of a regiment of light dragoons to be commanded by 
Colonel George Augustus Eliott. This was the first time 
that a complete regiment of this type had been formed, 
previous light dragoons (originally raised in 1756) being 
in troop strength only and attached to existing regiments 
of Dragoons and Dragoon Guards. Eliott seems to have had a 
personal interest in small arms, (see below, page 185 ), 
and his influence may have been such that it was his own 
design of carbine and pistol which were adopted for his 
regiment and subsequently f. or all light dragoon regiments 
for the remainder of our period. There was a considerable 
delay in the production of these new arms (initially 396 
carbines 
, 
without bayonets and 414 pairs of pistols, and by 
the time they appear to have 71been first produced, there 
were two additional light dragoon regiments in course of 
raising, which, with the unspecific nature of the 
production records9 makes it impossible to sort out one 
from the other. Fortunately, two of the three patterns of 
carbine and pistol have been identified today and can be 
described. Our first glimpse of the Eliott does not come 
until Januaryp 1760, when Markbe's report of barrels 
inspected for that month mentions, in addition to 
'carbines for light troops' also 'Do. for Eliott's Light 
Horse. ' 74 
The second regiment of light dragoons to be raised in 
1759 was that commanded by Colonel John Burgoyne, the 
'Gentleman Johnny' whose reputation was ruined during the 
I fi 5 
American War, but who proved a highly capable commander of 
light troops during the campaign in Portugal in 1762. This 
regiment (the 16th, or Queen's Light Dragoons) received 
its warrant on 10 August 1759, and was almost immediately 
augmented, on 15 October, thereby requiring a total of 462 
carbines without bayonets and 474 pairs of pistols. A 
second augmentation of January, 1760, raised the arms 
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requirements by 204 carbines and 204 pairs of pistols. 
The next regiment of light dragoons to be raised was 
that of Colonel Hales, which received its warrant on 9 
November, and which was to be equipped with 292 carbines 
without bayonets and 300 pairs of pistols; like Burgoyne's 
it was almost immediately augmented, and a month later was 
to receive an additional 146 carbines and 150 pairs of 
pistols. It was further expanded by an augmentation in 
January, 1760, calling for a further 228 carbines and 228 
pairs of pistols. 
76 Aberdour's small regiment of light 
dragoons was raised on 12 November 1759, and required 108 
carbines and 112 pairs of pistols, but no more is heard of 
it, and it does not directly concern this history except 
as requiring light dragoon arms 9 
77 
The final regiment of light dragoons whose raising is 
relevant for Ordnance history during this war was that of 
the Marquis of Granby, raised in April, 1760, and known as 
the 21st Light Dragoons or 'Royal Forresters. ' It was to 
be equipped with 396 carbines and 408 pairs of pistols of 
a special pattern. As with the other light dragoons it was 
soon augmented, and in July was increased by sixty 
carbines and sixty pairs of pistols. Granby's influence as 
commander-in-chief of the British forces serving under 
Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick on the Continent is 
undisputed; also, a number of his men are believed to 
have previously served in the Duke of Cumberland's 
Dragoons, so that the fact that he was able to have a 
special design of carbine and pistol made for his men by 
the Ordnance, and the styling of that design, should not 
be too, surprising. 
78 
The Eliott Carbinef like its contemporary the Royal 
1.66 
Forrester's Carbine, went through two phases. The first of 
these was as a wooden rammered carbine with a 'home- 
stocked' or full-length fore-end not intended for a 
bayonet, which was produced during the 1760-1762 period. 
The second pattern appeared in 1773-5 and will be dealt 
with in sequence. The first Eliott Carbine was fitted with 
an automatic dog-catch engaging on the lower side of the 
cock, a design used previously by James Barber, from whom 
it may have descended to the Ordnance although Barber had 
not been a contractor since 1749. Its forepipe appears 
externally to be composite, and the mould was obviously 
originally made up in this way, as with other carbines of 
this period. The furniture is distinctive, with the Light 
Dragoon sidepiece, and a trigger guard which incorporates 
a raised lug on its lower tang that is pierced for the 
lower sling swivel screw, and has a longer and plainer 
forward finial. There is no nosecap, and the buttplate 
tang is similar to that used on the Artillery & 
Highlander's Carbine, with a short tapering, three-stepped 
form. The carbine-bore barrel is 28 inches in length and 
has a brass blade foresight inlet into the barrel near the 
muzzle. Most of these carbines were subsequently 
'repaired' when the dog-catch was removed, and a sling 
ring bar of the same pattern as used on the Light Dragoon 
carbines fitted along the left side. 
79 
The Royal Forrester's Carbine of the first production 
is also designed around a carbine-bore 28-inch barrel and 
has the same general pattern of stock as the Eliott. The 
most distinctive feature of this carbine is its flat lock 
and cock, and its flat, fowling-piece type of sideplate, 
both features originating on the Duke of Cumberland's 
Dragoon Carbine of 1746 and still in use at this time on 
the 'Blues' Carbine. No example of this early pattern is 
known at the time of writing, but a painting of a private 
in the Royal Forresters in the Royal Collection suggests 
that it may have used the same trigger guard pattern as 
the Eliott of this periodg and seems to indicate that the 
fore-end may have had either a nosecap or reinforcing 
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band, a most uncharacteristic feature for Ordnance 
production of this period. 
8.0 The Royal Forrester's pistol 
also used the flat lock and a reduced scale version of the 
same sporting-pattern sideplate; it was made with a 10- 
inch carbine-bore barrel, and used the old-fashioned 'long 
ear'd' buttcap, and had a thumb piece. 
81ý There was 
obviously some impatience to get the regment armed, for in 
late May the Board ordered that the arms be delivered to 
the regimental agent from time to time, as fast as they 
were completed, 'without waiting till the whole are 
finished', and by late October they had their complete set 
of arms. 82 
Whether Hales' Light Dragoons were originally issued 
with a carbine of special design is unknown: the records 
do not refer to any particular features at the time of 
manufacture, and no examples have been identified today. 
However, in January, 1764, the Tower received 506 carbines 
from this regiment 'which have been altered in such a 
manner as renders them unfit for Service, ' and it was 
recommended that they 'may be sold at the next Sale with 
35 Rifled Bullet Guns of different Patterns' which was 
approved. 83 The nature of the alteration is not referred 
to, but including them for sale with a small group of 
rifled pieces does suggest that it may have involved 
rifling the barrels, or re-barrelling them with rifled 
barrels, as far-fetched as this must appear. The fact of 
their having been altered during their extremely short 
service life and then passed quickly into the civilian 
market so soon afterwards leaves little possibility of 
their being positively identified today. 
These light dragoon arms represent new patterns of 
arms introduced by the Ordnance during the Seven Years' 
War, and unfortunately due to the lack of detail in the 
records it is impossible to make any estimate of their 
production beyond the basic figures given in the original 
and subsequent augmentation warrants, all of which appear 
to have been complied with. Such special service arms were 
not normally included in the broad production programme of 
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the Board, and would not be expected to be found in store 
on demand; they would be returned into store and then re- 
issued to the parent unit as required, and perhaps their 
numbers would be completed to fill the current demand. 
Overall production for 1759 showed an increase over 
that for the previous year. With the raising of the 
militia under the Militia Act of 1757 to meet the invasion 
threat only defeated by Admiral Hawke's spectacular 
victory at Quiberon Bay in November, the demand for Marine 
or Militia arms rose sharplyt and during the year 239000 
sets of furniture for these arms were delivered; the 
Wallers rough stocked 2721239 and Hirst set up 269760 of 
these, including 560 fitted with steel rammers, the first 
time this feature was applied to the Marine or Militia 
musket. Many of the wooden rammered arms already in the 
hands of local militia depots were converted to steel 
rods, but much of this work was a product of the post-war 
years. At first the Board objected to the conversion work 
and insisted that militia colonels or Lord Lieutenants 
assume the costs, but Government soon adjusted this 
84 
situation and assumed the costs. , Land musket production 
achieved only a poor second place in the total -output. 
Mayor & Co. delivered 159000 sets of furniture, and the 
Wallers rough stocked 12,301 of which Hirst set up 10,249. 
With an invasion threateningg the production of muskets 
for the Senior Service might have been expected to jump, 
but such was not the case: Waller rough stocked only 5095, 
along with 3055 pairs of Sea Service pistolsq and Hirst 
set up 6914 and 3214 pairs respectivelyg obviously drawing 
to some extent on existing stores., 
85 In fact, Hirst 
obviously felt he had been let down, commenting early in 
1760 that he had completed nearly 50,000 arms during the 
last yearg(out of the contracted 60,000) as many as he 
could for want of materialse 
86 
Complaints had been coming in for some time from both 
the army and the militia about the number of breakages in 
lock parts9 and in December George Markbe was ordered to 
investigateg and the stipulate that for the future only 
169 
the best Swedish iron was to be used in making locks. - 
$7 
Small arms production during 1760 showed an increase 
over the previous year, but it is not clear why this 
should have been the case, since it was now clear to 
Government that the French were losing, and it was not yet 
accepted that a war with Spain was even likely. Waller and 
Hirst were each granted a warrant to provide sixty 
thousand arms in their respective categories. The firm of 
Grice & Edge requested that either a Lock Viewer be sent 
to Birmingham to inspect locks before they were hardened, 
or that locks be hardened in the Tower and a reduction 
made in the price; Thomas Hartwell replied that there was 
no space in the Tower for lock hardening to be done, an 
illuminating sidelight on wartime conditions in the Tower, 
and recommended that a Viewer be sent. The Surveyor 
General ruled that a Viewer should be sent, but that 
viewing in the soft state in the Tower should also be 
continued. Thomas Hodgetts, a Small Gun Office lock maker 
was sent to Birmingham as Lock Viewer. Unfortunately 
Hodgetts did not do his job properly, and by the end of 
the year all locks were again to be sent to the Tower for 
viewing. 88 Wartime pressures were also having their effect 
in the Sea Service area: Hartwell notified the Board in 
February that the state of Sea Service musket barrels was 
very low, and that there were no more old barrels in store 
to be converted for Sea Service; he informed the Board 
that many of the best Land Service barrels broke in proof 
near the muzzle, and that these could be cut-off to 40- 
inches and 36-inches, and be new looped and sighted to 
make very good barrels. The barrel makers had already 
agreed to do this work, turning in the barrels re-worked 
for 6/6 each. The Board agreed to this arrangement. 
89 A 
further improvement in production management was 
introduced in August when the Board ordered that in future 
whenever any rough stocked arms were issued to a Master 
Gunmaker for setting up, the necessary brasswork, rammers, 
nailst triggers and other materials were to be issued all 
together at the same time, and not parcelled out in small 
l7n 
quantities from time to time as 
apparently done previously. By this means the contractor 
would be sure of having all the necessary components 
available before beginning the work, and not be held up 
for lack of some part of them in the course of the 
assembly. 90 - Land muskets returned to head of the list in 
the overall output, but Marine or Militia Muskets and 
carbines were prominent. Ten thousand sets each of Land 
musket and Marine or Militia musket furniture were 
delivered in, and the Wallers rough stocked 21,343 Land 
and Militia muskets, of which 8859 were Militia and 1494 
were Short Land for Dragoons, with 10,990 Long Land 
musket$. Hirst set up 21,271 Land and Marine or Militia 
muskets, 1757 of the 6935 latter having steel rammers, and 
including 2218 for dragoons. Some of these latter were to 
be issued to many of the newly raised Independent 
Companies, instead of Long Land muskets with steel 
rammers; in other words, these new units were to receive 
second-line arms. 
" 1. Seventeen sixty is also the last year 
in which Long Land muskets made for wooden rammers are 
clearly identifiable; 728 had been supplied in 1758,966 
in 1759 and a final 303 in 1760; it is possible that they 
were made after this date, but they are not differentiated 
in the surviving records. Carbine production increased to 
such a degree that Hirst requested and received an 
increased price allowance of 6/6 each 'as there is more 
work since so many different patterns have been 
made. . 92 Carbine production in 1760, which now included 
cavalry, light dragoon, artillery & highlander's, 
artillery officer's, Gentleman Cadets, Eliott's and Royal 
Forrester's amounted to 5000 sets of furniture (as well 
as 50 sets for officer's carbines), with 4886 being rough 
stocked, along with 14 for officer's and 42 Gentleman 
Cadet's carbines (for which the furniture had been 
delivered in September, 1759). Of these Hirst set up 4840, 
as well as 456 with flat locks (Royal Forrester's), the 
largest carbine production to date. Waller also rough 
stocked 7060 Sea Service muskets and 34 musketoons, as 
17 11 
well as 1340ý2 pairs of Sea Service pistols and 2425 pairs 
of Land Service pistols. Of these Hirst set up 6100 Sea 
Service muskets and 15 musketoons, 4000 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols, and 2007 pairs of Land Service pistols as 
well as 468 pairs of pistols for the Royal Forrester's, 
with flat locks. While these flat-locked pistols are 
distinguished, the Light Dragoon pistols with conventional 
locks, of which many have been noted with locks dated 
1760, are not indicated separately, and it is impossible 
to determine the numbers of ordinary Dragoon and Light 
Dragoon pistols made. 
93 
Production during 1761 witnessed a notable increase 
in the output of both rough stocked and set up arms. This 
was occasioned by a report of Thomas Hartwell in January, 
which stated that 40,000 new arms would be required to 
achieve the numbers ordered to be kept in store, and 
warrants were issued to the Wallers and Hirst to each 
complete that number of arms. 
94 In addition, 4000 arms 
were to be sent to replace losses in- Germany 
95 In 
additio-n to the new arms contracted for in the usual 
manner, a warrant for the purchase of 10,000 arms abroad 
began to bear fruit during 1761- these were being supplied 
by one Henry Guinard, and were clearly second-hand arms 
bought in the market place. By July, Guinard had already 
delivered 2477 of these arms, and reported that he had a 
further 522 being repaired; although the Board said that 
it did not want any more of them, at least another 2200 
were delivered, but many of them were entirely 
unserviceable. It seems unlikely that more than about half 
of these arms were ever delivered, and most were probably 
sold off directly from store at the end of the war. 
96 The 
partnership of Hartwell & Mayor was formally dissolved 
consequent upon the death of Joseph Hartwell in April, and 
Thomas Mayor now became the sole supplier of brasswork to 
the Ordnance.. 97 Thomas Hartwell was given yet another hat 
to add to the several which he already wore when the 
Master General appointed him Clerk of the Works and Proof 
Master at the Towerp replacing Ralph Ward; Hartwell was to 
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continue as Modeller with his son Robert as an 
assistant. 
98 Musket production during 1761 was about 
equally divided between Land and Marine or Militia. The 
Wallers rough stocked 13,024 Long Land and 2397 Short for 
Dragoons, and 13,156 of Marine or Militia. Hirst drew to 
some extent on accumulated stores and set up 15,500 Long 
Land muskets, 2100 Short for Dragoons, and 13,000 Marine 
or Militia of which 330 were fitted with steel rammers. 
With the end of the North American phase of the conflict 
in 1760, the need for infantry carbines (primarily for the 
Highland regiments and other light-armed troops) eased, 
and carbine production dropped: the Wallers rough stocked 
2784 of which Hirst set up 2419, in addition to 112 with 
flat lockplates for the Royal Forresters. Land pistol 
production totalled 19803-2 pairs of pistols and 58ý pairs 
of flat locked Royal Forrester's pistols rough stocked by 
the Wallers, with Hirst setting up 1881ý2- of the former and 
118 12 of the latter. Sea Service production amounted to 
4000 muskets, 433 musketoons and 2448ý2 pairs of pistols 
rough stocked by the Wallers, of which Hirst set up 4651 
muskets, 362 musketoons and 2788 pairs of pistols (drawing 
on stores for the overages)* 
99 
On 9 January 1762 warrants were issued for an annual 
production of 20,000 Long Land muskets, 2000 Short for 
Dragoons, 6000 Marine or Militia, 5000 carbines 
(unspecified), 6000 Sea Service muskets, 500 musketoons, 
2000 pairs of Land Service pistols and 3000 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols. In addition, 17,994 long, 5966 short and 
5284 Sea Service musket barrels were called for, as well 
as 2800 for carbines, 365 for musketoons and 1000 pairs 
for pistols. The lock makers were to supply 16,417 Land 
Service and 212000 Sea Service musket locks and 1723 for 
carbines. The precise jigures indicate that these were 
required to bring the stores up to the agreed 
numbers. 
100 The following month the Clerk of the Small Gun 
office was ordered to prepare and pack up 20,000 Land 
muskets with wooden rammers, which probably represent the 
first of several shipments of arms to Portugal, as 
173 
England's ally in the new war against Spain. 
101 Shortly 
afterwards a warrant was drawn for the supplying to 
Portugal of 26,400 muskets & bayonets, and 4800 carbines 
and pairs of pistols for cavalry. Early in May the Board 
noted that to complete the supply of arms going to the 
King of Portugal, 2000 muskets with steel rammers and 1000 
short muskets with wood rammers were needed, and a few 
days later this was supplemented by 300 muskets & bayonets 
with steel rammers. 
102 On top of this muddle, in July the 
Portuguese envoy de Mello requested a further 2000 muskets 
&, bayonets which he said his king would pay for. - 
103 A list 
of October sets forth what appears to be the total 
quantities of arms supplied by the Ordnance for Portugal 
at this time: 24,400 muskets & bayonets with wooden 
rammers, 2000 with steel rammers, and the original 4800 
carbines & bayonets with wooden rammers and pairs of 
pistols for cavalry. These arms were to be accompanied by 
two gunmakers and two gunlock makers equipped with tools 
and spare parts, and 2000 additional muskets & bayonets 
with steel rammers. 
104 From this period until the late 
1880s Portugal was to purchase, as well as manufacture in 
her own armouries, military small arms of current British 
patterns, with the local product being engraved on the 
lockplates LISBOA and bearing the crowned cypher of the 
current monarch. 
The equipment for the expedition against Havana, 
Cuba, commanded by the Earl of Albemarle, was to include 
'for the Engineers Rifled Barrel'd Pieces, 10, ' with 60 
flints, 10 moulds, and three quarters of lead. 
105 These 
are assumed to be part of those rifles purchased in 1746 
and still in store at the Tower. Engineers continued to be 
viewed as troops suitable for carrying rifles, operating 
in the van of advancing forces, '... as well to establish 
our footing ... as to cover our approaches to dislodge the 
enemy from their posts. ' 
106 
1 
Considering the extension of the war effort to 
encompass a Spanish campaign on land and sea as well as 
the defense of Portugal, it is extremely surprising to 
. 
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note that Ordnance production in 1762 was less than during 
the previous year. Mayor delivered in some 15,800 sets of 
Land musket furniture and 16,000 for Marine or Militia 
muskets, 4000 for Sea Service muskets and 2000 for 
carbines. The Wallers rough stocked 27,124 Land and Marine 
or Militia muskets, of which Hirst set up 24,583, of which 
3859 of the 9698 Marine or Militia muskets were fitted 
with steel rammers. The Waller's carbine production 
amounted to 6674, the largest of the war, as well as 181 
with flat locks, and 50 officer's fuzees, of which Hirst 
set up 6814, plus 188 with flat locks for the Royal 
Forresters, and all of the fuzees. Land pistols produced 
during the year included 2904 pairs plus 89 pairs with 
flat locks rough stocked, with 29533-2 and 84 pairs 
respectively being set up. Sea Service production amounted 
to 5398 muskets, 410 musketoons and 1012- pairs of pistols 
rough stocked, of which 4664 muskets, 451 musketoons and 
23ý pairs of pistols were set up. 
107 
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to see 
that the Ordnance System, as conceived and set up during 
the 1710-30 period, probably operated at its peak of 
efficiency and effectiveness during the Seven Years' War; 
it is difficult to be absolutely certain because in each 
of the wars there were certain modifications which make 
precise comparisons impossible, but if the smallest number 
of contractors producing the largest number of products be 
taken as a guideline,. then this is certainly the case. 
During the years from 1755 to 1763, a total of thirty- 
seven contractors (1 brasswork, 3 rough stockers, 10 
setters up, and 23 barrel and lock makers) provided some 
294,000 sets of brass furniture, 249,700 barrels, 291,200 
locks, 3042800 rough stocked arms, and 304,800 set up 
arms. And if the list of contractors is shortened to take 
into consideration only those who produced in significant 
numbers, say five-figure totals, then there was only 1 
rough stocker, 1 setter up, 5 barrel and lock makers, and 
4 lock makers who contributed the majority of the 
materials. 
108 There were more types of arms produced 
1-75 
during this war than at any other period to date (eighteen 
distinct patterns with wooden and steel rammer variants 
for two of them), and fewer foreign arms purchased than 
during any other war of our period. While it is true that 
the Ordnance began the war with a larger stock of up-to- 
date serviceable arms than was to be the case again, it 
took less time for the processes of administration and 
production to get into full operation once the need was 
perceived. Existing stocks of arms in store sufficed to 
get the opening, North American, phase of the war moving 
(however disastrously), and little more than a year after 
the formal declaration of war in May, 1756, the System 
appears to have been functioning as its organizers 
intended. The achievements of the Board in productivity 
were enormous when the pre-Industrial Revolution state of 
manufacturing and the high standards of working to a 
pattern and to gauges which the Board insisted upon are 
taken into consideration. Once the combination of the 
London trade in attempting to keep up prices had been 
dealt with, and some slowness on the part of the 
Birmingham workers had been resolved, there were no 
further recorded labour problems during the remainder of 
the war. In satisfying the demands of the armed forces the 
Board probably achieved greater success than at any other 
time during the Eighteenth Century, although a paucity of 
regimental records makes it impossible to analyse this 
factor at its most significant level. Given the amount and 
types of evidence at our disposal, it seems fair to 
conclude that during the Seven Years' War the Ordnance 
System functioned as closely as possible to the ideal 
which its designers sought, and at a level which it was 
not again to achieve. 
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The return of peace early in 1763, unlike that in 
1748, brought no cessation of production on the part of 
the Ordnance. Apart from the very recent heavy demands of 
the Spanish campaign, Britain's military commitment had 
been much greater than during the War of the Austrian 
Succession, and the fighting on three continents was far 
more frequent and savage, with losses and damage to arms 
being much higher than during the previous conflict. It 
was therefore necessary not only to make good these 
deficiencies but to replenish the stocks of new arms. 
Despite the disbandment of dozens of regiments, the 
numbers of arms in Ordnance stores were considered 
inadequate. However, the condition of peace removed a 
degree of the urgency from the Board's needs, and in 
February, 1763, all of the contractors were written to, 
asking at what abatement in price they. would continue to 
manufacture their various components for the 
future. 109 Most of the replies have not survived, but Hirst 
informed the Board that he could not set up arms for less 
than the present prices, and reminded them of his 
performance during the war; Hartwell confirmed Hirst's 
statement. 
110 But there were those in the trade ever 
anxious to secure the profits of the Board's work, and 
punish Hirst for his success; Richard Wilson of the 
Minories, one of the largest and most influential men in 
the London gun trade, -wrote and offered to set up arms 
more cheaply than Hirst, but the Master General (now the 
Marquis of Granby) and Board confirme<1 Hirst's agreement 
and condemned Wilson as one of those who had entered into 
combination against the Board and Hirst in 1754, in an 
attempt to raise prices, and as one whose contributions 
during the war had been small and of poor quality. 
ill On 
the same day that they rejected Wilson's offer, warrants 
were issued to the Wallers and Hirst for the rough 
stocking and setting up of 21,170 Long Land muskets, 4000 
Militia muskets with steel rammers, 2000 Marine muskets 
with wood rammers (this now becomes the distinction 
between these two variants on the Marine or Militia), 2000 
177 
carbines of sorts, 1000 pairs of Land Pistols, 2000 Sea 
Service muskets, 50 musketoons and 2000 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols. Warrants were also issued to the 
components contractors (Farmer & Galton2 Haskins & Vernon, 
Whately & Son, Edge & Son, Short & Co-2 Harris & Barker, 
Joseph Grice, Grice & Son and Oughton & Son) for 16,240 
Long Land musket barrels, 3967 short musket barrels, 525 
carbine barrels and 3903 double bridle musket locks. 
112 
Rifles continued to be an item of interest to the 
Board, although in what precise context does not appear. 
At the end of the year John Hirst offered to supply rifles 
which, from their price, 16. each, appear to be breech 
loading, and the Board ordered twenty 'at the above Price 
and agreeable to the Pattern this day produced to the 
Bd. ' 113 None of this tiny group have been . identified at 
the time of writing. 
With the return of peace, and of disbanded regiment's 
arms into store, there came the usual large auctions at 
the Tower of old and unserviceable stores, to make room 
for these returned arms and to realize what money could be 
had from materials no longer considered worth keeping in 
Government ownership. Many thousands of tons of old arms, 
barrels and locks passed into the civilian gun trade to be 
worked up into the standard African slave-trade gun of the 
period, and, to a limited extent, the cheaper grades of 
commercial arms of military pattern. Many of the customers 
at these twice-yearly auctions were contractors to the 
Board for small arms. 114 
Deliveries on the warrants granted at the beginning 
of the year were not up to the standard of wartime 
production. The Wallers produced 15,151 of the 21,170 Long 
Land muskets, 2800 Militia and 2007 Marine muskets, 2005 
Sea Service musket-s, 1978 carbines, 50 musketoons, 1009 
pairs of Land pistols and only 3k pairs of Sea Service 
pistols. Hirst managed to set up 14,523 Long Land musketsv 
3697 Militia and 1387 Marine muskets, 2004 Sea Service 
muskets, 1621 carbines, 48 musketoons, 1011 pairs of Land 
Service pistols and one pair of Sea Service pistols. 
115 
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Having accepted the design of the new Marine or 
Militia musket at the beginning of the war, the Admiralty 
now found fault with it and other arms issued to the 
marines during the war. They had compared a Marine musket 
with a Long Land Pattern, and wanted the former replaced 
with muskets 'of army quality. ' The Board admitted that 
due to sudden large augmentations to the marine force, 
Dutch muskets had occasionally been issued. They reminded 
their Lordships of the Admiralty that the new marine 
musket had been approved by them, and offered only to 
replace the Dutch arms still in the hands of the marines 
with Long Land Pattern muskets. 116 It is very unlikely 
that the Admiralty accepted this offer, since it would 
have left the troops with two different lengths of musket 
of quite different styles. Marine muskets continued to be 
made until the middle of the American War. 
Late in February William Grice of Birmingham offered 
to clean and repair the locks of all the arms returned 
from the regiments2 which offer the Board accepted. It was 
also determined to sell at the next auction all arms in 
store not of the King's Pattern. 
117 
The Marquis of Granby's light dragoon regiment of 
Royal Forresters had been disbanded, and the efforts of 
the commander of the 16th (Queen's) Light Dragoons, John 
Burgoyne, to obtain Granby's specially designed carbines 
and pistols proved successful. A Royal Warrant was issued 
for the returned arms to be issued to Burgoyne's regiment 
after they had been cleaned and repaired. By the end of 
March they had been issued. 11.8 It was by this means that 
the production of these special arms was prolonged until 
the 1790s when another commander of the 16th introduced a 
more m odern design. 
The annual warrants for the production of small arms 
were not issued until April, at which time Hirst was 
ordered to set up 9000 muskets, 500 carbines and 500 pairs 
of pistols. The Birmingham contractors were to supply 3000 
Long Land musket barrels, 4800 for short Land muskets, 600 
for carbines, 338 for Sea Service muskets, 9 musketoon 
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and 110 pairs of pistol barrels as well as 6206 double- 
bridle musket locks, 413 Sea Service musket locks, 741 
round carbine locks, 244 pairs of round pistol locks and 
119 366 pairs of Sea Service pistol locks. , 
In June a major step was taken which, while it may 
have pleased the army of the day, created great problems 
for the modern historian. It was decided to cease dating 
the locks and having the contractor's name on them, 
substituting simply the word TOWER engraved across the 
tail of the lockplate. The Clerk of the Small Gun Office 
wrote 
that in the late War many Gentlemen of the Army 
objected to such guns as were set up or repaired with 
Locks of a late date, which they imagined to be Old 
Guns, though the same perhaps had never been in 
Service, he [the Clerk] therefore proposed that all 
new Locks (instead of the makers name and date of the 
Year) should be engraved with the word Tower only, 
and also that all Old Locks, now in the hands of Mr 
Grice to be repaired should be altered in the same 
manner and likewise all the Small Arms which are sett 
up or repaired at the SGO. 
The same was Approved of by the Board & Ordered 
accordingly. 120 
Thus at one stroke several thousand old arms will have 
been modified in their lock markings, and all new 
production locks deprived of a certain dating. The process 
of altering lock markings continued whenever arms came in 
for repairs during the years to come, with Grice & Son and 
Haskins & Vernon doing most of the work not being carried 
out by the Small Gun Office workers in the Tower. In 
September Haskins & Vernon were ordered to repair all of 
the Extra Flat carbine and pistol locks, such as were used 
on the 'Blues' and Royal Forrester's arms, creating 
another area 
'of confusion for the modern student. 
121 
Only 
a tiny number of locks have been noted still bearing a 
date of 1764. 
During 1764 the Wallers produced 6322 rough stocked 
Long Land muskets, 4000 steel rammered Militia muskets, 89 
short wooden rammered muskets for dragoons, 865 carbines, 
10 carbines with flat locks, 425 pairs of Land pistols and 
180 
152 pairs of flat locked pistols which were probably for 
the 'Blues. ' Hirst set up 5577 Long Land muskets and 4261 
steel rammered Militia as well as 11 wooden rammeredy 499 
carbines, 1107 Sea Service muskets, 50 musketoons, 358 
pairs of Land service pistols, all of the 152 flat locked 
pistols, 3ý2 pairs of Sea Service pistols and 20 rifles 0 
122 
With the benefit of hindsight we are able to observe 
that Ordnance activity, so far as it is recorded in the 
surviving -records, was at a minimum during the next three 
years, almost a calm before the storm which was to follow. 
However, certain features of future production begin to 
appear, notably the increase in the orders for short (42") 
musket barrels. Just when a decision was taken to 
supercede the 46-inch barrel with the shorter version for 
all line infantry is not mentioned, but no concerted 
action appears in the records prior to 1768. The warrants 
for 1765 were not issued until late August, -when Waller 
and Hirst were ordered to provide 3000 Long Land muskets, 
2000 Marine or Militia, 500 Sea Service muskets, 250 
carbines and 250 pairs of Sea Service pistols-. 
123 In 
October a return of serviceable arms in the several 
British garrisons showed 54,750 muskets in the Tower out 
of a total of 61,219, along with 4701 carbines of the 
total 5595 and 8407 pairs of pistols of the total 9079 
pairs. Most of the balance were in Edinburgh and Fort 
George. 124 These figures doubtless explain the small 
quantity of new production being ordered by the Board. 
Waller turned in the 3000,2000 and 500 muskets of his 
warrant, but produced 440 carbines and 40 officer's 
fuzees, along with the specified 250 pairs of Sea Service 
pistols. Hirst set up 4490 Land muskets, 1519 steel 
rammeredý Militia muskets, 643 carbines and the 40 fuzees, 
13 pairs of 12-inch barrelled and 54 pairs of 9-inch 
barrelled Land pistols (one of the few detailed 
descriptions noted)* 
125 
The following year produced increased orders for 
Waller and Hirst, as well as for the Birmingham 
contractors. Whether these latter orders represeat the 
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beginnings of the changeover to the shorter barrelled 
infantry arm is not clear, but they are arguably framed in 
that direction. It is perhaps also significant that the 
Wallers received two sets of warrants for rough stocking, 
one dated in February, and the second in April, while the 
Birmingham contractors had received their warrants in 
March. The Waller's earlier warrant called for only 304 
Long Land muskets, with 916 carbines of sorts, 95 pairs of 
carbine-bore pistols and 1324 pairs of pistol-bore 12" 
pistols. 126 Then followed warrants for 8000 Long Land and 
12,000 short Land barrels, with 1000 carbine barrels, and 
for 20,000 musket locks and 500 pairs of pistol locks. 
127 
The decision about not naming or dating locks was repeated 
in the orders for the 21,0000 locks. The April warrants to 
the Wallers and Hirst called for 159000 muskets of sortsq 
(i. e., long and short and perhaps Marine or Militia) and 
696 carbines, as well as (in Hirst's case) the 304 muskets 
of February. 
128 It all added up to a new flurry of 
production with the emphasis on the 42-inch barrelled Land 
musket. Production on these warrants suggests that some 
hesitation occurred somewhere along the production lineq 
though where is not clear. The Wallers produced 7294 rough 
stocked muskets, 893 carbines and 23 with flat locksq 1324 
pairs of Sea Service pistols and 95 pairs of Land Service 
with flat locks; Hirst set up 5621 Land muskets, 557 steel 
rammered Militia muskets, 500 Sea Service musketsq 772 
carbines and 3 for Gentleman Cadets, along with 250 pair 
of Sea Service pistols. ' 
129 
Seventeen sixty-seven was, like its predecessorg a 
year of stockpiling as well as production. Warrants to the 
Birmingham components contractors were not issued until 
julyt and they called for 6000 Long Land barrelsq 149000 
short Land barrels, 600 carbine and 2000 pairs of pistol 
barrelsq along with 6000 Land musketq 4000 Sea Service 
musket and 2000 pairs of pistol locks. 
130 The emphasis 
within the total annual production of 20,000 musket 
barrels shifted notably further towards the shorter 
barrel. William Grice and William Sharp (who also supplied 
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smallwork and was engraver to the Board) each received 
warrants for 5000 steel rammers, and it was at this time 
that the Board named Grice as the person responsible for 
the innovation of tempering steel rammers, although they 
do not say when he introduced this operation. 
131 The scale 
of the new production was such that the Board managed to 
negotiate a new set of prices for locks. Beginning with 
the 10 July warrants the conventional round double-bridle 
musket lock was to cost 6/-,. the carbine lock of the same 
style 5/9, the flat Sea Service musket lock was to cost 
4/2, while the round double-bridle Land pistol locks were 
to be 11/- the pair, and Sea Service pistol locks 6/- the 
pair. 132 The Wallers received a warrant to rough stock 
only 4000 muskets, and Hirst was to set up only 220 
carbines and 500 pairs -of 
Sea Service psitols, strongly 
suggesting (with the large production of components) that 
some decisions were being taken with regard to a new 
pattern of arm. 
133, 
In April, 1767, a new carbine was ordered made for 
the First and Second Troops of Horse Grenadier Guards to 
replace worn out arms; these are described as having 
barrels 'of 3 feet 6 inches length.. * with Bayonets and 
Steel Rammers' and as such constitute a new and distinct 
pattern of arm, probably becoming the prototype for the 
Heavy Dragoon carbine of 1770 which had the same 
characteristics* Two hundred and fifty-six of them were 
issued in June, and it was then noted that the ammunition 
for the old arms did not fit the new ones, confirming that 
they had previously carried the Short Land Musket with 
134 Wood Rammer for Dragoons. Other carbines were also 
produced this year, and most exceptionally they are 
specified by types: the Wallers rbugh stocked 257 Horse 
Grenadier Guards carbines, 50 Artillery Officer's . fuzees 
and 2 Gentleman Cadet'st and Hirst set up the HGG and 
officer's carbines as well as 108 Artillery, 23 with flat 
locks, 43 Light Dragoon, 35 Cavalry, and 11 Eliott Light 
Dragoon. 135 
Production for 1767 was considerably. up on the 
183 
previous year. The Wallers rough stocked 12,110 Land 
muskets in addition to the above-mentioned carbines, and 
Hirst set up 5178 Land muskets (probably Long Land), 7922 
steel rammered Militia muskets, and 500 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols as well as the previously listed 
carbines. 
136 
From what took place in 1768, it is clear that a 
number of key decisions had been taken regarding a new arm 
for the infantry during 1767. The major re-alignment in 
the proportions of the two lengths of musket barrels 
ordered in 1766 and 1767 suggests that a change was being 
seriously considered. On 26 January 1768 the Board ordered 
that patterns of all the various types of small arms then 
produced be sent to the Adjutant General of the army, at 
the desire of the Master General. 137 Less than a month 
later trials were scheduled to take place at Woolwich of 
various lengths of musket barrel, which were attended by 
Adjutant General William Hervey, General Williamson of the 
Royal Artillery and Thomas Hartwell. 
138 Early in May the 
Board received a return of Long Land musket barrels then 
ready in the hands of the Birmingham contractors, a total 
of 4572, and ordered that these, and no more, be received 
into store. 139 On 6 June it was noted that 'His Majesty 
having approved of an Alteration of the Pattern of Small 
Arms, and fixed upon a certain Number to be kept in 
Store, ' and the following day warrants were issued for a 
total of 34,746 Short Land musket barrels and 16,522 
double-bridle musket locks, and a month later 'An Abstract 
of the Number of Steel Rammers, Heelplates, Handles and 
other particulars that will be wanting for making up 
40,000 Short Land Service Musquets of the New Pattern 
approved by the King' was ordered by the Surveyor 
General. 140 The Rubicon had been crossedt and henceforth 
(in due coursel) the British line infantry would be armed 
with a shortert lighter and handier musket. 
A Royal 
Warrant confirming the decision was issued to the Master 
General the Marquis of Granby on 11 June 1768: 
George R. 
Whereas it hath been represented to Us that the 
1.84 
Land Service Musquets now made use of by Our several 
Regiments of Foot are too long and heavy, and that 
Musquets of another Sort would be more convenient, a 
Pattern of which hathbeen presented to Us for Our 
Royal Approbation; We do hereby approve of the said 
Pattern Musquet, and our Will and Pleasure is that 
for the future all the Musquets for Our several Regi- 
ments of Foot be made agreeable to the said Pattern, 
Vizt: Three feet Six Inches long in 'the Barrel, and 
weighing Ten Pounds and a half at a Medium. And Our 
further Will and Pleasure is, that you cause the 
number to be kept in Store to be made up [to] One 
hundred Thousand, and that the said Number be esteem- 
ed the proper State to be kept in Our Magazines. But 
it is Our Express Command that none of the said New 
Pattern Arms be issued till after all those of the 
Pattern now in use have been delivered out of Our 
Magazines,... - 141 
Of particular interest in the wording of this instruction 
are the doubling of the number of Land muskets to be kept 
in store over the specification of 1757, and the 
admonition not to issue any of the new arms until all of 
the old, Long Land Pattern, had been served out. The 
unexpected advent of the American Rebellion upset these 
calculations, and accelerated both the production of the 
Short Land Musket and the withdrawal of the Long, the 
latter mostlytl)mugh exchange before leaving Britain. Note 
also in the Warrant that the 'several Regiments of Foot' 
are specified as the recipients of the new muskets: the 
Long Land musket remained in the hands of the Guards 
regiments (with the exception of some of the Guards 
Brigade serving in North America from 1780) until the 
1790s. 
In line with simplifying the identification of the 
principal patterns of muskets through the use of date 
designationsq there is little difficulty is assigning the 
term 'Pattern 1768' to the Short Land musket now adopted 
for general issue throughout the British infantry. 
Everything associated with its production) except the 
locks, rammers and smallwork, was described as of the 'New 
Pattern' but too few examples of this early production 
have been positively identified to determine how many real 
1a5 
alterations were made to the design of the component 
parts. Superficial comparison with the Long Land musket of 
the time shows no external changes to the barrel (save for 
its length of 42-inches) or to the several items of brass 
furniture, except the buttplate, which is given a shorter, 
three-stepped, tapering tang, secured by the usual pin 
through the stock, nor to the lines and decoration of the 
stock. Until and unless further evidence is forthcomingg 
the Pattern 1768 musket must be considered as a short 
version of the Pattern 1756 arm in all of its componentsp 
except as noted. The first order for the new pattern brass 
furniture was given out on 6 July 1768, calling for 30,600 
sets. Production during the following years produced no 
further orders for furniture until 17742 suggesting that 
the materials already in hand were sufficient and of the 
same pattern, and that available long-tang and Marine or 
Militia buttplates may well have been altered. 
In August the Admiralty reported that the arms of the 
Marines stationed at their main depots of Chatham, 
Portsmouth and Plymouth were worn outq and requested that 
the replacement arms be fitted with steel rammers. This 
amounted to a total issue of 3710 arms, and the Board 
ordered thatq upon receiving the old arms into store, the 
new ones would be issued. The year 1768 therefore saw the 
equipment of a major portion of the Marine force with 
steel rammered 42-inch muskets for the first time, well in 
advance of the line infantry. 
142 
Production of complete arms during 1768 increased 
considerably over that of 1767, although not yet 
in 
connexion with the Pattern 1768 musket. 
The Wallers 
produced 7773 Land musketsq 3295 of them steel rammered 
Short Land musketsy and 10,709 steel rammered Militia 
muskets, along with 50 carbines and, 
3 for Gentleman 
Cadets. Hirst set up 3439 Land muskets of which 1000 were 
steel rammered Short Landl and 
11y709 steel rammered 
Militia muskets, and 50 Eliott carbines. 
143 
On 17 February 1769 Richard Waller, who had supplied 
the overwhelming majority of walnut stocks 
and rough 
136 
stocking operations to the Ordnance since 1718, died. His 
son James had been in partnership with him since early 
1755, and had run the business since 1767. On 10 February 
Joseph Loder, who had worked for the Board very briefly in 
1756, was admitted Gun Stock Maker to the Office in place 
of the retired and, a week later, deceased elder Waller, 
and from this time onwards the two firms shared out the 
rough stocking between them, 
144 Another new contractor, 
Jane Mayor, widow of Thomas Mayor who had supplied 
brasswork to the Board since 1761, took over her husband's 
business and was warranted Brassfounder for Small Arms by 
the Board on 20 April 1768.145 
Another new carbine, once again related to the new 
perception of greater mobility of the army, was warranted 
on 6 March 1769, for Serjeants of Grenadier companies. 146 
This idea had originated among the provisions of the 
Cloathing Warrant of 19 December 1768, but it was not 
until January, 17702 that the exact pattern for this new 
type was approved, and an immediate order given for the 
production of the first 119 examples*- 
147 The 
distinguishing feature of this carbine is its carbine-bore 
39-inch barrel, the only weapon used by the British army 
to have this barrel length prior to the adoption of the 
India Pattern musket in 1797. The brass furniture was also 
distinctive, only the trigger guard and rammer pipes being 
straightforward reduced scale versions of the current Land 
Pattern mounts. The long-tang buttplate -was similar to, 
but differently stepped than the Long Land Pattern. The 
sideplate was the flat-surfaced S-shaped pattern adopted 
for the Light Dragoon pistol, and the thumb piece was a 
plain oval. The nosecap on the one identified example is 
of sheet rather than cast brass, but this may be a 
contemporary repair. In October, 1770, a Royal Warrant was 
granted, extending the issue of Serjeants Carbines to -the 
serjeants of the battalion companies of the three fusilier 
regiments (7th, 21st and 23rd Foot). 
148 
Towards the end of the year diplomatic tension began 
mounting against Spain over the ownership of the Falkland 
187 
Islands, and warrants were issued for the production of 
1000 Bright and 2000 Black Sea Service 
muskets . 
14 9 Production during 1769 concentrated on the 
Pattern 1768 musket, with a large proportion of the 
components having been delivered into store during 1768. 
Joseph Loder and James Waller between them rough stocked 
20,000 of these new arms and 168 wooden rammered short 
muskets f or dragoons; Hirs t. set up 17 9 000 of the new 
muskets, as well as 824 pairs of Sea Service pistols and 
95 pairs of pistols with 10-inch carbine-bore barrels. 
150 
At the end of 1769 the supply of Short Land Muskets 
with Wood Rammers for Dragoons ran out; the Board were 
unable to meet a demand from the 14th Dragoons and in 
January, 1770, the regiment was told to wait until the 
pattern for a new dragoon carbine was approved. 151fhis 
occurred early in March, after the Adjutant General, 
Harvey, had decided to accept the 42-inch barrelled 
carbine made for the two troops of Horse Grenadier Guards 
in 1767 as a pattern for all regiments of Dragoons and 
DragoonsL; however, the Royal Warrant establishing the new 
arm was not issued until 15 March 1771.152 No sooner had 
the Board been notified of this decision, than it 
warranted Waller and Hirst to rough stock and set up 168 
of the old pattern muskets, thinking perhaps that it might 
be some time before the components for the new carbines 
could be prepared, while those for the muskets were 
readily availableý-53' 
. 
The two remaining regiments of Light Dragoons, the 
15th and 16th (Eliott's and the Queen's) were also in need 
of new arms, and although warrants were issued for 
complete new sets of arms for each regiment, the. design of 
the current Eliott carbine was also under reviewq and it 
was several years before they received entirely new 
arms. 154 The focus of the new pattern was to be the 
substitution of a steel for the current wooden rammers of 
the first-production carbines; the first proposal involved 
fixing the rammer-retaining spring in the wood of the 
fore-end rather than rivetting within the tailpipeg but 
188 
Hartwell reported against this early in March, saying it 
would entail extra work and materials, and represent no 
improvement over the tailpipe method. He was ordered to 
attend the Board with an example of either Eliott's or 
Burgoyne's (the old Royal . Forresters) carbines. 
15 5By the 
end of the month Hartwell reported that sufficient cut-off 
steel rammers were available along with springs and 
tailpipes, and the Board ordered Eliott and Burgoyne I to be 
informed that these components could be collected by 
delivered to a 'Proper Person to receive them' whenever 
they pleased. 156 Unfortunately, by the end of May it was 
reported that the available rammers were of too small a 
diameter to fit the carbines correctly, and it Appears 
that this attempted conversion scheme foundered. Here the 
question. of new light dragoon carbines rested until 1772. 
Early in March the Board informed the Birmingham 
contractors that there would be no warrants for locks and 
barrels during 1770. The contractors replied by requesting 
the Board to take their dead stock off theit hands, as 
they were in a bad way for work, having to pay ready 
mo ney and borrow at high interest rates, The Board does 
not appear to have responded to this request, but in 
December it did order 1000 carbine - barrels and 500 Sea 
Service musket locks., 157 
Despite the absence of work for the Birmingham 
contractors, there was considerable activity. Hirst was 
given 11,000 musket barrels to cut off, new loop and 
sight, and warrants for setting up the Pattern 1768musket 
totalling 7095. Waller and Loder were each to rough stock 
2000 Long Land muskets, with Waller providing anothe: r 4000 
Pattern 1768 muskets and 1500 Sea Service muskets. 
158 
Early in May the Board ordered a carbine-bore pistol 
and an example of the pistol of the First Troop of Horse 
Guards to be brought to them, and a week later decided 
that the First Troop of Life Guards were to have a np-w set 
of pistols on a pattern of Lord de la Warr's, which would 
be inspected by Major D'Auvergne. It is not clear from the 
records whether any action was taken on this decision. 
159 
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In October, Thomas Blakemore of Darlaston, Staffs-ý 
replaced the late George Haskins as a Gun Lock Maker to 
the Board. 160 Blakemore was to be a prolific supplier of 
locks during the period of the American War. Another 
gunlock maker who would ultimately achieve considerable 
renown mad e his first appearance in the Ordnance records 
in November, 1770: Henry Nock (rendered, as so often, 
Knock), submitted a peculiar design of lock which was 
rejected by the examiners. The description given is not 
sufficient. for it to be taken as a possible first attempt 
at his later-famous screwleýs-lock. 
161 
Production during 1770 amounted to 4000 Pattern 1768 
muskets, 4502 Sea Service muskets, and 319 carbines rough 
stocked by Waller and Loder, of which 119 were the new 
Serjeant of Grenadier carbine done by Loder. Hirst 
produced 6095 Pattern 1768 muskets and 168 wooden rammered 
Short Land for Dragoons, as well as 4500 Sea Service 
muskets and 319 carbines (including, 119 Serjeant of 
Grenadier's). 3-62 
On 4 January 1771 a Royal Warrant was issued for the 
establishing and arming of one company of light infantry 
for each of the existing forty-four regiments on the 
British Establishment. Although this particular warrant 
was cancelled on 5 March, the concep. t was carried into 
effect, and a Light Infantry carbine & bayonet with a 42- 
inch barrel was introduced for these companies, the 
serjeants of which were to carry the new Serjeant's 
Carbine. 163 It used conventional Land Pattern furniture 
and was more robustly stocked than its predecessor, the 
Artillery & Highlander's carbine of the 1750s. Because it 
includes no variant forms of component it is generally not 
differentiated in the production records, and its 
manufacture is assumed to be included within those 
large 
groups of unspecified carbines with bayonets and 
42-inch 
barrels. It is identical in appearance to the Heavy 
Dragoon carbine just coming into productionv except that 
conventional sling swivels were used rather than a sling 
bar. 164 
i9o 
At the beginning of 1771 the tension over the 
ownership of the Falkland Islands looked like ending in a 
war with Spain, and production of Sea Service muskets took 
priority. Warrants were issued for 3000 to be rough 
stocked and set up, but almost immediately a crisis arose 
over a lack of locks. In February 861 old pattern [pre- 
17561 round [Land service] repaired locks were issued for 
use in completing the Sea Service muskets, since they 
could not any longer be used on Land Service muskets; in 
April it was reported that there were only 770 correct Sea 
Service 
-locks available, 
but several thousand of the new 
pattern round Land Service locks, to complete 1500 of the 
165 
arms; it was ordered that the round lo6k be used.. At 
the time of writing none of this small group of emergency 
Sea Service muskets, using old and new Land Service locks, 
has been identified. Later in the year warrants for 6500 
more rough stocked Sea Service muskets were issued. _166 
The next most pressing problem facing the Ordnance in 
the new year was that of a new carbine for dragoons. 
Warrants were issued to Waller and Hirst for another 200 
of the old wooden rammered muskets in mid-February, and at 
the end of the month the Board ordered that despite the 
warrants of 5 Oct. 17709 4 January and 8 February 1771, 
'the said arms be not yet set up as it is not determined 
167 
whether they should have Wood or Steel Rammers. ' , 
However, 520 of the old muskets had already been rough 
stocked and 270 of these set up; the guns could not be 
altered for steel rammers in the rough stocked stage, and 
further work was halted. 
168 By mid-May 1000 barrels for 
dragoon carbines were reported completed, all that was 
wanting was the flat sideplates to set them up, and these 
were ultimately set up by Hirst before the end of the 
year. 
16 9 However, in December, the 4th Dragoons were still 
being sent the old wooden rammered Short Land muskets as 
replacement arms* 
170 
Although no warrant for its establishment has been 
located in the recordsv a new pattern of Artillery carbine 
seems to have come into use at this time. The only feature 
cl 
which distinguishes it from other Land Pattern carbines is 
that the barrel is 37 inches in length and is fitted for a 
bayonet. This represents a shortening of the barrel from 
infantry length to cavalry length, and given the very 
secondary role played by small arms in the Artillery, this 
does not seem unreasonable. They were initially made with 
wooden rammers, but all those in store by November, 1775, 
were ordered converted to steel onest and all made 
subsequently were fitted with the steel rammer. 
171 
Small arms produced during 1771 included 4000 Pattern 
1768 muskets, 3000 Long Land muskets, 520 Short Land for 
Dragoon muskets, 6000 Sea Service muskets, 1300 Artillery 
carbines, 1000 Dragoon carbines and 30 unspecified 
carbines rough stocked by Waller and Loder. Of these Hirst 
set up 1000 of the Pattern 1768 muskets, all of the Long 
Land and Sea Service muskets, 270 of the Short Land for 
Dragoon muskets, and all of the carbines. 
172 Although it 
is only conjecture, the impression is that the Board was 
feeling pinched for money, and was completing only such 
projects as were being forcefully put forward. The build 
up of the stores to a level of 100,000 Pattern 1768 
muskets laid down in the establishment warrant was 
proceeding at a very leisurely pace despite most of the 
components having been delivered in within a year of the 
first warrants being issued, and the re-equipment of both 
the Heavy and Light Dragoons was moving equally slowly. 
While at least some carbines for the Heavy Dragoons 
had finally been producedt nothing had yet been resolved 
regarding a carbine for the Light Dragoons. It was a 
subject which created a lot of interest in army circles. 
The arms of the 15th had finally worn outt and may have 
suffered additionally in being converted from wooden to 
steel rammers; a warrant was issued on 10 January 1772-for 
a complete new set of 174 carbines. It was noted that the 
regiment 'was a first armed of a particular pattern with 
Wood Rammers2 which have since been fitted with Steel 
Rammers and there being none in Store of that Pattern' 
warrants were requested for barrels and brasswork; this 
192 
request was postponed, but further steps were to be 
taken. 173 In February Adjutant General Harvey, who seems 
to have had a personal interest in small arms) wrote to a 
f-ellow officer in Ireland: 
Our two regiments of Light Dragoons on this Estab- 
lishment [i. e. the British] have different carbines@ 
It is proposed, as new are to be made, for the future 
they are to be made exactly of one pattern, certainly 
right, much more so if those of the British and Irish 
establishments were also to be conformable. I believe 
those of the three Irish regiments are not according 
to one pattern ... I am to desire of you to mention 
it to the Lord Lieutenant that one of each species of 
the carbines of the Light Dragoons shall be sent to 
England. 174 
During May William Grice was ordered to supply 400 steel 
rods for carbines, and long forepipes for carbines with 
steel rammers and springs for carbine tailpipes were also 
ordered. The following month the new Master Furbisher, 
William King, who replaced the recently deceased Thomas 
Hatcher, and John Johnson, Clerk to the Surveyor General, 
reported to the Board on a new design of carbine 'as 
proposed for the several Regiments of Light Dragoons' 
which report was accepted, and the Board ordered that 
production of the new carbine proceed. 
17 5 In August, 
General Harvey gives us a glimpse of what was preferred by 
those in command of the units concerned: 
Lieutenant General Elliot and Major-General 
Burgoyne examined the carbine which was made; 
recommended to have bolts instead of pins, to fasten 
the barrel to the stock, but that the pins are con- 
tinued in the pattern, that the middle pipe is made 
only 1ý inches long instead of 2ý. One particular 
they desire me to mention-that the brass of the guard 
may be made quite smooth like that of the tailpipe. 
They much wish for a rifled barrel carbineý to be 
made, as a pattern, as they apprehend it may be well 
worth considering if rifled barrels for the Light 
Dragoons will not be particularly useful for H M's 
service. 
176 1 
From the pattern which eventually emerged, it is evident 
that the wishes of Eliott and Burgoyne were ignored, most 
likely in the interests of eco nomy as regards both 
193 
brasswork and rifling, but the Lieutenant Colonel of 
Burgoyne's regiment took it upon himself to provide a 
small number of rifled carbines for his troops before they 
went to North America in 1776 (see below2 page 210 ). 
That, so far as the records indicate, was the end of 
movement towards a new Light Dragoon carbine for another 
year. 
Apart from the appointment of a new Master Furbisher 
(who was to have but a short tenure, dying in 1780), John 
Johnson died in 1772 and was replaced as Clerk to the 
Surveyor General by Miles Edward Wilks, with King's 
vacated position of First Viewer at the Tower being filled 
by Richard How, a London gunmaker who had been a 
contractor to the Board in 1756-7, and who was to die in 
1775.177 
Small arms production for 1772 was the lowest of the 
inter-war period. Waller and Loder delivered in none of 
the Pattern 1768 muskets, 2000 Long Land muskets, and 
2000 Sea Service muskets in the rough stocked state, while 
Hirst set up 4000 Pattern 1768 muskets, and filed fit for 
stocking 5100 of the new musket barrels. 
178 
Early in 1773 the Daymen employed in the Tower by the 
Small Gun Office were ordered to alter the carbines of the 
Second Troop of Horse Guards (which had been issued in 
1767) by fitting a long trumpet forepipe. 
179 In May Hirst 
received 8000 musket barrels to be cut off, new looped and 
sighted, as well as 5993 new musket barrels to be filed 
fit for stocking. 
180 In early June it was ordered that the 
Gentleman Cadets of the Woolwich Academy were to have a 
complete new set of - arms, fitted with steel rammers , and 
these 48 carbines were completed by Hirst before the end 
181 
of the year. On 15 June the Board ordered that the new 
arms for General Eliott's regiment of Light Dragoons be 
prepared in accordance with the pattern approved by the 
King, and that Hirst make up a pattern carbine for the 
Adjutant General. 182 Less than a month later a Major 
Dundas requested to make an alteration in the pattern 
'preparing for the King's Regiment of Light Dragoons' and 
194 
the Master Furbisher was ordered to bring the pattern 
before the Board. 183 It is tempting to identify this 
change as the grooved rammer and notched nosecap which was 
to become the characteristic feature of the new Eliott 
carbine, but there is no supporting evidence on the 
details of the importunate major's last-minute change, nor 
even whether it was adopted. 
Production of the Heavy Dragoon carbine was still 
lagging well behind requirements. Requisitions from the 
6th and 11th Dragoons each calling for 360 carbines with 
steel rammers could not be met, as there were only 112 in 
store-, and orders were given for 500 additional barrels 
and accompanying brasswork. 
18,4 The way this order was 
written seems to suggest that the carbines were being 
produced almost on a regiment by regiment demand basis. 
In November Joseph Grice, nephew of the late Joseph 
Grice who had been a contractor for barrels since 1762, 
wrote the Board for permission to succeed his uncle in 
this position, which was approved. 
185, 
In the course of 1773 Waller and Loder rough stocked 
6000 Pattern 1768 muskets, 3104 Long Land muskets, 2000 
Sea Service muskets, 48 Gentleman Cadet's carbines, 174 
Heavy Dragoon carbines, 12 Eliott carbines (probably as 
patterns), and 3 'Blues' carbines; Loder also rough 
stocked 250 unspecified carbines. Hirst set up 2000 Long 
Land muskets, 2000 Sea Service muskets, and all of the 
Dragoon and Cadet carbines. There is no mention of the 
Eliott carbines at this stage of production. 
186 
A state of the serviceable arms in store at the Tower 
in the Spring of 1774 shows only 6000 of the new Pattern 
1768 muskets, and 2000 Sea Service muskets, both in the 
rough stocked state only. There were also 14,222 . Short 
Land barrels and 18,133 locks, of which only 7648 were new 
production, the remainder being repaired. 
187 The Warrant 
Books make it clear that new production arms were being 
issued to the regiments almost as fast as they could be 
made. 
In April John Hirst was joined by his son James as a 
19 5 
partner in the setting up operations for the 
Board. 188 Shortly afterwards the new partnership was given 
its first warrant, to set up 25 carbines for the 
'Blues. ' 159 In May the warrants for the year's production 
were issued; 500 carbine locks were to be made by the 
Birmingham contractorsý while 4000 Militia muskets were to 
be rough stocked, 2000 of which were to be set up 019. 
Q 
In July Jane Mayor received her first warrant for Land 
musket furniture since that of 6 July 1768, amounting to 
various quantities to make up 10,000 sets. No deliveries 
of any sort of furniture are recorded from 1768 until 
September, 1773, and until this July, 1774, delive ry., all 
had been for small amounts of carbine furniture. This 
suggests that furniture taken from older broken-up arms 
was much utilised during the introduction period of 
several new patterns of arm. 
' 9 'ihe new carbines for the 
dragoons were not only in short supply, but those issued 
were not giving satisfaction. Two regiments in particular 
complained that while the old arms were fitted with 
trigger plates the new ones were not, and that they also 
lacked rammer stops, and had green wood in the stocks; the 
rods were not threaded for a worm, and the lock screws 
were poor quality. 
192 Regrettably, no response from the 
Board has survived. Generally army complaints were found 
to be based on the ignorance or mismanagement of the 
soldiers, but these complaints over quality suggest a 
higher level of dissatisfaction than was normally the 
case. It would. appear that some regimental officers were 
taking the guidance offered by Bennett Cuth__Jertson, 
based on the Cloathing Warrant of 1768, seriouslyg and 
inspecting the arms issued to them in a professional 
manner. 193 
On 19 October 1774 an Order in Council prohibited for 
the following six months the exportation of gunpowder, 
ammunition, small arms and warlike stores to the North 
American colonies. 194 This prohibition was to be renewed 
half -yearly until 1783. It is the first indication in- the 
Ordnance records of the trouble brewing across the 
196 
Atlantic, and indeed the Minutes of the Board for the 
second half of 1774 are devoid of anything noteworthy 
concerning the production of small arms. 
Production during this final year of peace remained 
low. Waller and Loder rough stocked 4000 Militia muskets, 
1000 Dragoon carbines, 200 Serjeant's carbines, 25 'Blues' 
carbines, and 250 unspecified (probably Light Infantry) 
carbines. Hirst set up 2000 Militia muskets, 3104 Long 
Land muskets, and all of the carbines, although the total 
of unspecified carbines he set up amounted to 500.195ý 
While the inter-war years after the War I of the 
Austrian Succession had been occupied largely with repair 
and conversion work by the workforce of the Small Gun 
Office, and had seen virtually no new production of small 
arms, the years between the close of the Seven Years' War 
and the outbreak of the American Rebellion were busy ones 
for both the Ordnance workers and the contractors. Apart 
from bringing up the stores to agreed levels, these years 
saw. the approval and production of at least six new 
patterns of small arms (Short Land musket for infantry, 
Light Infantry, Heavy Dragoon, new Eliott, Serjeant's, 
Gentleman Cadet's, and Artillery carbines). During this 
eleven year peri-od production had totaled 111,911 barrels, 
103,794 locks, and 121,304 rough stocked arms. Of the 
latter there were set up twenty-one different types of 
arms as complete weapons. These included 29,095 Pattern 
1768 muskets, 26,309 Long Land muskets, 25,968 Militia 
muskets with steel rammers, 11 Marine muskets with wood 
rammers, (4900 Land muskets with barrel -length not 
specified), 638 Short Land muskets with wooden rammers for 
Dragoons, 14,107 Sea Service muskets, 50 musketoons, and 
ten types of carbine: 
Artillery 1408 
Artillery, Officer's fuzee 87 






Eliott's Light Dragoon 61 
Light Dragoon 43 
Serjeant of Grenadiers 319 
with bayonet, unspecified 1833 
unspecified 1250 
Pistol production totalled 2249ý pairs, which included 
1577ý Sea Service, 13 pairs of dragoon pistols with 12- 
inch barrels, 50 pairs of 'Blues' pistols with 10-inch 
carbine-bore barrels, 54 pairs of Light Dragoon p istols 
with 9-inch barrels, 152 pairs with flat locks (Royal 
Forrester's) for the 16th Light Dragoons, and 358 pairs 
unspecified. 
196 
Unlike the period immediately preceding the outbreak 
of the Seven Years' War, there are no surviving returns 
for the state of arms in store in 1775. But there is no 
doubt from what information does survive that the Board 
moved much more quickly to get into full production, and 
met with much less success in doing so than had been the 
case during the opening period of the previous conflict. 
****** 
The first four months of 1775 were filled with 
activity on the part of both Board and contractors. 
Warrants were issued to the Hirsts in January for setting 
up 4000 Militia and 2000 Short Land muskets, and the 
following month Waller and Loder were each to rough stock 
3000 muskets, while William Grice was to repair 4000 
musket locks. One hundred carbines were to be fitted with 
steel rammers. In March 200 Marine muskets with steel 
rammers were ordered to Portsmouth, and all those with 
wooden rammers in store at Portsmouth were to be sent to 
the Tower as quickly as possible; John York, who had been 
appointed Viewer of Small Arms at Birmingham in the room 
of the deceased John Stewart, was sent north to view 9093 
barrels and 4117 locks then waiting in the hands of the 
contractors. On the basis of York's report, a 
further 4700 
197 
barrels and 4367 locks were warranted in April. 
198 
I 
The names of the contractors with whom the Board 
commenced the present wartime production programme 
included James Waller and Joseph Loder as rough stockers, 
John & James Hirst as setters up, with Jane Mayor 
supplying brasswork. The Birmingham barrel makers included 
Samuel Galtgn & Son, Barker & Harris, Benjamin Willet 
junior, Joseph Oughton and John Whately; those supplying 
locks were Thomas Blakemore, Henry Nock, William Grice & 
Son, and Galton & Son; tothe chagrin of all the standing 
contractors, this list was to be much expanded in the 
course of the war. 
198 
By mid-year further contracts were let; in late June 
Waller and Loder were ordered each to rough stock 2000 
Marine or Militia muskets, and Hirst was given 4000 musket 
199 barrels to cut, new loop and sight. In JulYq having 
received a state of the old and new pattern muskets with 
wood and steel rammers then in store (which most 
unfortunately does not survive), the Board ordered 'that 
the long and short Land Musquets with wood Rammers - 
be 
200 
altered to steel Rammers. That this order was not 
entirely carried out will appear in due course. This same 
report also informed the Board that there were rough 
stocked muskets, either in store or in the hands of the 
stockmakers, amounting to 6000 Pattern 1768,6000 Militia 
and 2000 Sea Service, and these were ordered set up 
'forthwith, ' 
, and 
that a further 26,000 barrels and 20,000 
locks be ordered. The following month another 3000 barrels 
and locks were ordered to geplace those which had been 
sent (as complete muskets) to Quebec* 
201 
On 25 July a major decision was taken with regard to 
the design of the brass furniture for Land muskets: it was 
ordered that for the future the furniture for the Land and 
Militia muskets was to be of the same pattern, with the 
flat sideplate of the latter and the pin-held tang and 
thumbpiece of the former being adopted as the standard. On 
the same day Jane Mayor received a warrant for making up 
the numbers of brass Land furniture to 15,000, all of 
which were paid for by December. By the same order, new 
199 
pattern bayonet scabbards were ordered 'as the old Pattern 
Bayonets are now totally out of use for short Land and 
Militia Musquets 0,202 The las t order placed for 
distinctive Marine or Militia furniture was dated 31 
January 1775, and consisted only of 4000 buttplates and 
2000 nosecaps , and. was paid for by May of that year. 
203 
The Birmingham lockmakers were the cause of the 
Board's greatest, worry during the present production 
period. On 12 September Messrs Galton & Son, Grice & Son, 
Blakemore, Edge, and Willett wrote that 
at the time they received the Board's orders for 
supplying Locks, the workmen were fully employed for 
the East India Company at a higher price than they 
can afford to give, and therefore refused to work for 
the Office unless at an advance of 1/- each, which 
they refused to comply with in hopes that they would 
work at the usual price, but as the workmen still 
persist notwithstanding every effort to suppress, 
they therefore requested the Board's directions 
herein. I 
The Board obviously smelled a combination against them, 
and replied that there would be no increase in price and 
that they expected the orders to be complied withý 
04 The 
lockmakers replied to the Board on 9 December, saying that 
they could not proceed with the work, since new 
contractors and the East India Company were keeping the 
workmen busy, and that only a certain number of the 
workforce were capable of making Tower locks. They were 
again informed by the Board that there would be no 
increase in the prices allowed. 
205 Judging from the manner 
in which those contractors who supplied both barrels and 
locks were able to complete their barrel work, it is very 
likely that there was a genuine difficulty with the 
lockmaking workforce, and that this was not a deliberate 
ploy on the part of the contractors to raise the price. 
More encouraging news came from the chief barrel 
suppliers, Whately and Oughton, who informed the Board in 
October that they had completed their current warrants and 
said they could each supply 1000 locks and 2500 barrels 
by the end of the year; the Board gave each of 
them 
200 
warrants for 1000 of each. 
206 Early in November the Board 
ordered all Artillery carbines then in store with wooden 
rammers to be immediately converted to steel rammers. 
207 
Small arms production in 1775 was small, amounting 
only to 3000 Land muskets and 2000 Militia muskets rough 
stocked by Loder, and 4900 Short Land muskets and 5100 
Militia muskets set up by Hirst. 
208 
Due to all of the varied and momentous events in 
world history consequent upon the success of the American 
rebels in establishing their independence after a struggle 
of eight years, a very distorted and exaggerated view of 
that struggie has been promulgated and elaborated over the 
years since 1783, which often makes it difficult to gain a 
clear perspective and balanced view of the events as they 
were seen at the time. To the British government of the 
day, and to most of the literate classes, the opening 
years were seen simply as a colonial rebellion, and as one 
which was not serious in its extent, although potentially 
injurious to trade if allowed to go unsuppressed for too 
long. There were no doubts in most informed people's minds 
that the existing military and naval resources could cope 
with the situation, and although the rebelý. I's, ' persistence 
surprised some, it was not until the imminent entry of the 
traditional enemy across the Channel became apparent by 
late 1777, that anyone in 
_a 
decision-making position 
became seriously concerned. It is against this background 
of relative unconcern and confidence that the supply of 
small arms by the Ordnance prior to 1778 must be 
viewed. 
209 
While there was no actual feeling of panic within the 
Board, the drain of small arms to the many regiments being 
sent to Noýth America had to be replaced to maintain the 
settled establishment of arms in store, and to this end 
greater production than had been achieved in 1775 was 
clearly necessary. It is perhaps indicative of the sense 
of general well-beingý that the first task tackled by the 
Board in the new year was the relatively minor one of a 
supply of rifles for the troops serving in America. The 
201 
Master General had sent a messenger with two rifles to 
Captain Tovey at Woolwich on Boxing Day of the previous 
year, and on New Year's Eve had written w4A-4pam to Lord 
George Germain asking him to obtain the King's orders for 
1000 'rifled barrelled pieces', explaining that 
The Highlanders who have many marksmen and 
Deerkillers amongst them are particularly desirous of 
having five of these pieces p Company. I am persuaded 
they would be of great use in America. Colonel Har- 
court [of the 16th Light Dragoons] desires also the 
same proportion, &I would submit whether every Bat- 
alion engaged in this Service should be provided with 
this, much boasted weapon, of that Country. 210 
On 15 January 1776 Germain replied to Townshend's letter 
giving the requested permission to order the rifles 'to be 
distributed among the different Corps as proposed by Your 
Lordship., 211 Townshend had already been in contact with 
Colonel William Faucett, who was then in Germany 
inspecting the troops gathering there to be sent to 
America, and only four days after receiving Germain's 
letter he noted that part of the rifles were already 
ordered, with the balance to be ordered as soon as 
possible. 
212 Two hundred rifles were being manufactured in 
Hanover by Heinrich Huhnstock, to be sent to England in 
batches of fifty at a time as quickly as possible, but for 
reasons which do not appear in the records, the balance 
were to be made in Englandý13 At the end of the month the 
Board ordered that the Viewer at Birmingham give 
directions to those barrel and lockmakers 'as can give 
most despatch & be relied upon' to provide '600 Rifled 
Barrel Guns according to a Pattern sent to Mr. Grice who 
had ingaged for 200 Exclusive of the above 600' and to 
inform the Board as to price and delivery time. 
214 On 12 
March the Master General wrote to General Howe at Boston, 
informing him that a quantity of rifles was then being 
made in Germany and Birmingham, whose distributioný with 
the exception of the Highlanders and General Burgoyne's 
regiment (the 16th Light Dragoons), would be left to his 
discretion. 215 In a second letter to Howe this 
discreýionary distribution was confirmedp saying 
that 
202 
there had not yet been any distribution madeq and adding 
that 'It is a nasty weapon but since the Enemy will teach 
us the use of them I shall send you the best I can produce 
both from Germany and here as soon as possible. ' 
2,1-6 The 
two hundred. Hanoverian rifles arrived in London during 
June, and 800 Birmingham rifles, which were made in equal 
quantities by Grice & Son, Benjamin Willets, Matthias 
Barker and Galton & Son, were delivered in two batches in 
September, and by the end of December, at a cost to the 
Ordnance of three guineas each. 
217 In June it was decided 
to experiment with the breech loading rifle designed and 
ably demonstrated by Captain Patrick Ferguson of the 70th 
Regiment, and it was ordered that one hundred of these be 
made at Birmingham, with the manufacture being supervised 
by Ferguson; these one hundred rifles were made by the 
same. four contractors who were making the muzzle loading 
rifles, and although the June order was intended to stop 
any further production of the earlier rifles, all of these 
as well as the Ferguson rifles were completed and paid for 
at the end of December. 
218 Ferguson's rifles had a very 
short service life, being utilized by his specially 
trained force of one hundred riflemen between the time of 
their arrival in America on 26 May 1777, and 12 September, 
the day after Ferguson was wounded in the arm during the 
Battle-of Brandywine, at which timeHowe returned the men 
to their parent regiments and put the rifles into Ordnance 
store on his arrival in Philadelphia. 
219 
-There is almost 
no evidence as to the ultimate distribution of the muzzle 
loading rifles, beyond references to fifty of them each 
being sent to the armies commanded by Burgoyne in Canada 
and Howe at New York. 
220 They were probably issued 
peacemeal to marksmen in the serving regiments, and there 
were a number of rifle companies in the British forces 
which probably made use of them. 
221 
Activity in other, more basic, areas of production 
began early in the year-. At the end of January Jane Mayor 
reported that she had completed, all outstanding orders for 
brasswork and requested moreq and on the same day 
203 
gunmakers William Wilson and William Holden asked to 
supply locks and barrels. Holden had previously offered to 
supply 3-400 locks and 800 barrels per month, and at the 
end of January he was given his first warrant, for 600 of 
each to be supplied within two months; Mrs. Mayor was 
given orders for 650 sets of Artillery and 318 sets of 
Eliott carbine furniture, and the Hirsts were warranted to 
set up 3000 Pattern 1768 muskets. 
222 At the end of 
February the Master Furbisher and Modeller reported on a 
carbine which General Eliott had sent in, which 
incorporated the notched nosecap which became its 
distinctive feature along with the grooved rammer to fit 
it. It was suggested that the nosecap might be made of 
iron rather than brass to prevent rapid wear, but King and 
Hartwell thought this might be too expensive. They were 
ordereAto determine the relative costs and report back 
?23 
It is worth noting that the order for Eliott carbine 
furniture given to Jane Mayor on 16 February and paid for 
on 16 March, included 318 brass nosecaps: of this pattern? 
On the application of its commander, the First Troop 
of Horse Grenadier Guards were to be issued with pistols 
of the same pattern as those made for the Royal Forresters 
during the Seven Years' War; after some investigation this 
was approved by the Board. These had 10-inch carbine-bore 
barrels and flat locks, with the old-fashioned long-eared 
buttcaps. A warrant for 136 pairs of these pistols was 
issued on 14 May. 
224 
. 
In late March Waller and Loder were each issued 
warrants to produce 3000 Land muskets, but not until the 
middle of May were 2000 muskets ordered to Hirst for 
setting up, when another 1000 barrels were ordered from 
225 William Holden. On 24 April the Board were informed 
that only 8554 locks had come in since June, 17759 and it 
was therefore decided to order 40,000 locks from Liege. A 
meeting with the lockmakers to be held at the Tower was 
scheduled for early May. 
226 By mid7year production orders 
were beginning to increase, with Hirst being given 
4000 
muskets for setting up, and warrants to Waller and 
Loder 
204 
to each rough stock 4000 Pattern 1768 and 1000 Militia 
muskets. By the end of the year these had been increased" 
by another 5500 for setting up, 
227 By the end of October 
John Hirst, whose entreprenurial skills had immensely 
enhanced the manufacturing capacity of the Ordnance from 
the beginning of the Seven Years' War, and who had held a 
virtual monopoly of the Board's setting up contracts and 
contractor-based repair work since that time, was dead, 
and his son and partner James was confirmed by the Board 
as his successor in the business. 22 
8Whether the son lacked 
his father's skills and trade contacts, or whether the 
demands made, were simply too large for one contractor to 
cope with is not clear, but whatever the cause James lost 
his monopoly of the setting up work by 1778, and had 
become relatively unimportant in the overall production 
programme by the end of the war. 
Despite . the continuing difficulties with the 
lockmakers over their deliveries, early. in August letters 
were sent to Galton, Willets, Grice, Blakemore and Nock 
asking how quickly they could provide 1000 carbine 'locks 
'without interfering with their present work. ' Their reply 
of almost a month later stated that it would take about a 
month from the time of receiving the pattern. They also 
mentioned that they had lately supplied some extra-filed 
flat double-bridle carbine locks to which no price had 
been fixed, and were informed, they would be allowed 8/- 
each for them. 229 In Eact, apart from 529 supplied by -the 
others at this time, Henry Nock seems to have had the 
monopoly of supplying these flat locks during the war, 
making all of those for pistols as well'as the bulk of the 
2'3'0 carbine locks. 
Tompson Davis, - who had been a smith in the Small Gun 
Office in 1774-5, - offered in mid-August, 1776, to set up 
guns for the Board; far from the outright refusals which 
such offers had until now evoked, the Board informed him 
that when they needed more than Hirst cdUld manage, he 
231 
would have a share. In December the Board finally 
accepted William Wilson's repeated offer to work for the 
205 
Board, and told him that if he could supply 500 muskets by 
31 December, he will be so employed. 
232 Wilson, who had 
been a partner in his father Richard's firm at the time of 
the combination against the Board at the outbreak of the 
Seven Years' Warg had apparently inherited the Board's 
ill-will from this incident, but his extensive network of 
sub-contractors and stature within the Gunmaker's Company 
and the trade generally appears to have obliged the Board 
to accept his offer, and he became the first contractor to 
break the Hirst monopoly. By the end of 1776 it is clear 
that the Board was considering alternatives to the Hirst 
monopoly, perhaps in light of the elder partner's death, 
or with an eye to future, greatly enlarged, requirements. 
Production during 1776 reflects Britain's increased 
military commitment in North America with its consequent 
drain upon the King's Stores. For most of the year brass 
furniture supply concentrated upon carbines, about 700 
sets for the Eliott, 500 for the Artillery and 300 for the 
Serjeant of Grenadiers being delivered in, with 3000 sets 
for Sea Service muskets and 10,000 sets for Land muskets 
being turned in during the final months of the year. The 
distinctions between Long Land and Short Land (Pattern 
1768) muskets are frequently blurred in the records of 
this period, but in general if the two are supplied 
together it is the Long Land which, as the lesser 
quantity, which is distinguished rather than the Short 
Land. Entries made as 'Land Muskets' have therefore been 
treated as Short Land in computing production figures. 
James Waller and Joseph Loder between them rough stocked 
3000 Long Land and 20,922 Short Land Muskets during 1776, 
as well as 2000 Marine muskets, 588 Light Dragoon 
carbines, 300 Serjeant of Grenadiers carbines, 192 
Artillery carbines and 192 unspecified carbinesq probably 
for Light Infantry. In addition, Waller produced 342 pairs 
of carbine-bore pistols and Loder the other 68 pairs of 
Royal Forrester's pistols. In the final year of his 
monopoly, Hirst set up 6000 Long Land and 119100 Short 
Land muskets, 6000 Militia muskets, 2000 
Sea Service 
206 
muskets, 474 Light Dragoon carbines with flat locks, 384 
Artillery carbinesq 300 Serjeant of Grenadiers, 228 Royal 
Forresters, 136 pairs of Royal Forresters pistols, and 684 
pairs of 9-inch barrelled carbine bore Light Dragoon 
pistols. William Wilson was not billed during 1776 for his 
500 muskets, 
233 
'The Year of the Hangman' opened with much activity 
in the accoutring of the Ferguson breech loading rifles, 
ajid with Hirst receiving a warrant to set up 2000 muskets, 
and Wilson a similar warrant for 200 more. Warrants were 
also issued to rough stock 2000 Bright and 4000 Black Sea 
Service muskets and 2000 pairs of Sea Service pistols, of 
which 2000 only of the Black Sea Service muskets were to 
be set up. The London gunmaker Michael Memory applied to 
work for the Board but was refused, but Thomas Tucker, a 
gunstock maker who told the Board he had plenty of well- 
seasoned walnut on hand, was not. He received a warrant to 
rough stock 2000 Short Land muskets, and the expansion of 
the Board's manufacturing base t ook another step 
forward. 234 In March, 1777, we are granted our only view 
in our period of at least a part of the workforce in the 
Small Gun Office. The proposed pay-scale submitted by the 
Surveyor General mentions: 
1 Viewer at Birmingham @ 4/- per day 
I Barrel Viewer. @ 3/- per day 
2 Lock Viewers @ 31r per day 
2 Gun Viewers @ 3/- per day 
10 Gunsmiths @ 2/6 per day 
24, Furbishers @ 2/- per day 
40 - 
235 
John Pratt, described as a gun lock maker, had been 
employed by the Office since at least 1771, and in April, 
1777, he submitted to the Board a minor improvement in 
musket furniture which the Board approved of and ordered 
into use on all muskets being set up in future. This 
consisted simply of the second ramrod pipe being flared at 
its mouth, a slightly smaller amount than the upper 
trumpet pipe, which prevented the rammer missing the pipe 
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when pushed down its channel in a hurry, and in fitting a 
square brass plate at the base of the channel, inserted 
beneath the upper finial of the trigger guard. 
236 It is 
unlikely that these improvements were incorporated in the 
only order for brass musket furniture given during 1777, 
on 13 May, when 10,000 sets were ordered; the new form of 
pipe is not mentioned in the orders until 22 January 1779, 
but it cannot be stated with certainty whether this is a 
vagary of bookkeeping or a reflection of the situation. 
There may have been ample numbers of the old second pipes 
on hand, and these would have been used up before a new 
one was introduced, although 1778 saw the production of 
20,000 sets of Land musket furniture without this feature 
being mentioned. On the other hand, it was normal practice 
to mention a feature when it was new, and then to stop 
doing so after a period of time, and if this was followed 
in the present instance, then the introduction of 'Pratt's 
pipe' and the rammer stop would have to be dated to early 
1779.237 
Pratt, although still employed as a Lock Viewer in 
the Small Gun Office apparently had outside facilities at 
his command, (unless we are dealing with two separate 
people of the same name), and on 9 May 1777 he was granted 
his first warrant, to set up 1000 Short Land muskets, 
which was followed in early June by a warrant for a 
further 2000. At the same time Thomas Tucker was to rough 
stock 2000, along with Waller and Loder who each were to 
rough stock 2000, with Loder receiving also a warrant to 
rough stock 2000 Bright Sea Service muskets.. Hirst and 
Wilson each received warrants to set up 2000 Short Land 
muskets, while a little later in the month Tompson Davies 
was warranted to set up 500 Short Land muskets. 
238 
The troubles with the lockmakers were not yet over, 
although it appears some agreement must have been reached 
at the meeting on 8 May, 1776. Under that agreement 
Galton, Willetts, Grice, Blakemore and Nock had contracted 
to send in a total of 47,000 musket locks in the coming 
year, but by 25 June 1777 only 28,355 had been received* 
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However, there is no indication that any locks had 
actually been ordered from Li-ege. 
239 
In late J. uly the balance of the rough stocked Sea 
Service arms ordered in February were equally distributed 
amongst Hirst, Pratt and Wilson to be set up; the Hirst 
monopoly was finished. At the same time a new man appeard 
in the rough stocking trade, and this caused a most 
informative complaint from James Waller. Richard Trested 
was a gunstock maker who had worked for the elder Waller 
for seventeen years, and had now set up on his own, and 
offered to rough stock for the Board, which they accepted. 
A week later James Waller wrote the Board, and as the 
letter contains so much illuminating detail, it is quoted 
in full: . 
Mr Waller his Father had served the Board more than 
50 years without the interference of any other Person 
except about 8 years ago when Mr Loder was admitted & 
as one Person has since obtained Orders & two more 
applying which they apprehended would rather impede 
than further the Office Business [, ] beg'd leave to 
observe that in the Year 1740 the then Master Genl 
desired Messrs Waller to make only for the Office 
which they punctually obeyed & that the men being 
very scarce Messrs Waller with profound secrecy great 
Trouble & expence did instruct and cause to be 
instructed 40 men and in the late War did in the 
space 6f 8 years Rough Stock upwards of 263,000 
musqts Carbines and Pistols & repaired 18000 
Stocký [, ] and further represented that James-Waller 
& Joseph Loder have provided 50,000 Land Musquets and 
10,000 Pair of Pistols Stocked solely for the Office 
Service & as the increasing the number of Masters 
will make their property more precarious as well'as 
the providing for the future as the walnutt from the 
Tree takes 2 years Seasoning for the Office Use [, ] 
they were of opinion that witho - ut 
great precaution is 
taken Dry Wood will not be easily got in this Kingdom 
& therefore hoped the Board would give them such 
directions as should be thought proper whether to 
make any further provision of Stocks or to Stop. 
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Given that there were only a limited number of capable 
workmeng and that the timber supply was also finite, some 
of Waller's pleading pakes sense. Unfortunately, the Board 
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chose to call them in and discuss the problem verbally, 
and all that was recorded of their discussion was an 
instruction to the firm to get more wood in. It is a sad 
contrast with the loyalty shown to John Hirst in former 
years, and one would like to think that it was purely a 
question of the greatly increased demand which prompted 
the Board to act as it did. In August, Richard Trested 
received his first warrants, to rough stock 800 Land 
muskets, and before the end of the year he was also 
setting up arms, but he was not to become a large scale 
producer on a level with Thomas Tucker, about whom the 
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Wallers had made no complaint. ý 
Having placated the rough stockers, the Board turned 
again to the problems facing the lockmakers. It was 
proposed by the lockmakers to try the sending of a Lock 
Viewer to reside at Birmingham, with additional viewers 
added to the staff at the Tower, and in future to issue 
orders for locks in the joint name of the standing 
contractors rather than separately. Although the last Lock 
Viewer sent to Birmingham had proved a failure and the 
idea had not been tried again until now, the Board agreed 
to the suggestions, and said they would establish a 
central warehouse in Birmingham where all the locks could 
be sent in for examination by the King's Viewer. They also 
asked the contractors how many locks per week they could 
send in. 
242 The lockmakers 'highly approved' of the 
Board's plan (largely of their own devising), and said 
they could send in 900 to 1500 locks per week, amounting 
to 50,000 to 70,000 per year 
? 43 It was also agreed at 
this time that in future the double border lines which had 
been engraved on the back of the hammer would be 
discontinued, as the process often caused the bending or 
other distortion of the piece; it seems also that the 
similar engraving on the top jaw of the cock was dropped 
at this time, and that the finial of the feather-spring 
was simplified from a trefoil to a teardrop designq and 
that the internal lock mechanism was modified by re- 
designing the length of " the sear-springy making 
it 
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shorter, and drilling the lockplate clean through so that 
two screws were now visible externally to the rear of the 
cock. A final feature which appears to have been 
introduced at this time was a change in the form of the 
comb of the cock: until now it had been, when seen from 
the side, of a thin and curled forward shape, and when 
seen from the back, of a broad, leaf-like shape. This was 
now changed to a heavier, more substantial design which, 
when seen from the side was broad and fairly straight, 
retaining a forward curl at the top formed by making a 
notch in the leading edge of the comb; viewed from the 
back the new comb was a straight narrow column. 
244 Each of 
these features would have made the lock somewhat cheaper 
to manufacture, and as there was no reduction in the 
prices allowed for locks, the profit margins of the 
contractors were correspondingly increased. A study of the 
Bill Books for the-period indicates no significant gap 
when it might be expected th at these new features would 
have been explained to the workmen, so it is imposible to 
say how long it took for these innovations to be 
incorporated into the completed locks. The omission of the 
engraving could have taken effect immediately, but each of 
the remaining features required new techniques or moulds 
to be made. It is even possible that the introduction of 
these features! was one of the problems facing the 
lockmakers. It may be signSlicant that in November William 
Holden told the Board that he had 246 'Double Bridle Round 
Musquet Locks which was made and intended for the Tower 
but the Pattern being altered since he cd not dispose of 
them. .9, The Board told him to send them in. 
ý45 Holden had 
supplied locks, as well as barrels, since January, 1776, 
and it does suggest that by November, 1777, the new 
pattern lock was being manufactured and that the 
Birmingham inspectors had turned down his older pattern 
locks. Returning to the end of August, Edward Hines was 
appointed resident Lock Viewer at Birmingham, and one 
assistant Viewer2 Ben Bullock, was added to the staff at 
the Tower. 246 No sooner had Hines got to Birmingham than 
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he informed the Board that the lockmakers now objected to 
a central warehouse, and that consequently he had no place 
to inspect the locks; the Board told him they would not 
change the new arrangements. By November the situation had 
deteriorated seriously, and the lockmakers were being 
prosecuted by the Board for breach of contract, in 
failing to deliver locks to the central warehouse; 
apparently outside contractors were inciting the 
workmen. 
247 
Early in December the Master General gave the Board a 
clean bill of health on Joseph Hunt, a gunmaker recently 
arrived from Birmingham and already established as a 
contractor to the East India Company, and Hunt received 
his first warrant, to set up 200 muskets. 
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By the end of 1777 it became clear to the Government 
that not only were the American rebels proving obstinate, 
but that it was extremely likely the French would take the 
opportunity of revenging themselves for the comprehensive 
defeat they had suffered at Britain's hands in the last 
war. An expansion of the Board's manufacturing capacity 
was therefore indicated, but there was no headlong rush to 
dismantle the existing system. We have already sieen how 
the Board were interested in the number of locks which the 
lockmakers could produce in a week or a year. This was in 
preparation for the establishment of the 'open contract' 
system, whereby approved contractors agreed to produce to 
capacity for the Board until given six month's notice to 
cease production, and under which deliveries would be 
acknowledged on the basis of 'Warrants of Justification, ' 
meaning that -the warrant would be issued , 
after-. the 
delivery and acceptance of a batch of componentso Later in 
December a meeting of the rough stockers with the Board 
was held at the Tower at which Waller and Loder told the 
Board they had 30,000 well seasoned stocks available, 
Tucker had 10,000 and Trested 500, and could produce at 
those levels 'provided they were not kept waiting for 
Barrels and Locks. 1 24 Is events would show, each of these 
firms produced well in excess of this initial . estimate 
212 
during the coming years. The Board's cutlers, Loxhamsý 
agreed at this time to produce 2800 bayonets per month. 
250 
Another contractor for setting up was approved during 
December, and Veritas Humphreys (Humphries) received his 
first warrant for 200 Sea Service muskets. 
251 This brought 
to six the number of new contractors who had been admitted 
to work for the Board during the year: Tucker and Trested 
for rough stocking, and Pratt, Davies, Hunt and Humphreys 
for setting up. II 
Difficulties with the lockmakers persisted; in mid- 
December the Board ordered 4000 round carbine locks 
immediately, without . 
interfering with musket lock 
pýroduction, but a fortnight later they were writing to 
enquire about the delays. 252 A few days later warrants 
were issued for 4000 barrels and 1000 locks for Artillery 
carbine. 253 
Small arms production during 1777 was not what might 
have been expected, given the expanded manufacturing 
base. The rough stockers delivered 9100 Short Land muskets, 
4750 Sea Service muskets, 1,000 Artillery carbinesý 164 
Royal Forrester's carbines, 342 pairs of carbine-bore 
pistols and 2300 pairs of Sea Service pistols. The setters 
up, with James Hirst's production well in advance of the 
others, completed 13,210 Short Land muskets, 4000 Long 
Land (Pratt's 2000 had iron rammer stoppers), 10,100 Sea 
Service muskets (4500 of them Bright, the remainder 
Black), with Hirst alone supplying 1000 Artillery 
carbines, 50 Royal Forrester's carbines and 2300 pairs of 
Sea Service pistols. 254 
The Board was dissatisfied with this performance. 
Whether or not it was intentional, what began as a simple 
quest for additional carbine production which would not 
interrupt the flow of muskets, developed into an auxiliary 
production programme which producedLonly an initial order 
of carbines, but almost 150,000 muskets. At the end of 
December Thomas Fitzherbert, a large-scale contractor to 
the Board for horses and drivers, departed for Liege with 
a Dragoon carbine and bayonet as a pattern, to determine 
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for what price and in what time the Liegeois would produce 
2000.255 By March of the following year this had already 
blossomed into a contract for 20,000 muskets & bayonets as 
well as the carbines and their bayonets. 
256 
By the end of January, 1778, the Board had already 
arranged for the setting up of 3000 Short Land muskets2 
and had rejected offers from two London gunmakers to set 
up arms because they wanted payment in ready money rather 
than 'in the course of the Of f ice' -by bill and 
debenture ý57 Galton & Son of Birmingham began to supply 
steel rammers from this time, and Thomas Gill became a 
contractor for bayonets in February, 1778. Richard 
Hornbuckle, lessee of the Armoury Mills, Lewisham, 
reported a month later that he could supply 400 bayonets 
per month, but only if he could find the necessary labour 
258 force; he does not appear to have succeeded. 
News of the surrender of General Burgoyne's army 
after the battles around Saratoga, on 17 October, reached 
Europe in early December and by the middle of that month 
the French had decided to enter the conflict on the side 
of the rebel Americans. Attempts were first made to enlist 
Spain in a tripartite alliance against Britain, but this 
having proved, temporarily, unsuccessful, the French 
signed formal alliances with the rebel commissioners on 6 
February 1778. Britain was now faced by the French navy in 
addition to rebel privateers, and by the additional threat 
of Spanish intervention. What had started as a colonial 
insurrection had now broadened into a more traditional 
conflict. I 
In March twelve wall pieces were ordered sent from 
the Tower to Woolwich, where they were to be fitted to a 
like number of Captain Congreve's light 3 pounder field 
carriages. 
259 These were another of the ingenious Captain 
William Congreve's innovations, similar in design to the 
amuzette of Marshal de Saxe, and intended for the 
protection of gun crews 
!6 0- There was still trouble with 
the supply of locks; Wilson and Pratt had failed to 
complete their 1777 warrants for Sea Service pistols 
due 
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to the lack of locks holding up the rough stockers. 
261 
Also in March James Hirst sent to the Board a pattern 
musket of which he proposed to supply four to five hundred 
per month. The pattern was sent to the Small Gun Office 
for inspection, and the Master Furbisher reported that it 
differed only in the form of the side piece, which was 
flat-surfaced and longer. Hirst was ordered to proceed 
with the deliveries, and ultimately some 17,000 of this 
variant, with a long S-shaped side piece, were 
262 delivered. What the background to those and other 
similar offers is does not appear in the records; whether 
Hirst's workmen were making such arms for another customer 
and they could be fitted into the production schedule more 
easily, or whether some process made it easier and cheaper 
to produce than the Land Pattern, is not clear. Given the 
nature of the variation the latter assumption seems most 
unlikely. The London gunmaker and contractor to the East 
India Company, Daniel Moore, offered at this time to 
supply four hundred muskets per month of a pattern which 
he submitted,. for L1.11.6. each complete; this was ordered 
to be received and reported on immediately. The Bill Books 
show that Moore delivered in some 16,332 Bright Sea 
Service muskets at this price between 1778 and 1780, and 
it is therefore assumed that the pattern he submitted was 
of this type, 
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Delays were apparently occurring in the delivery of 
proved barrels, for in late March the Board disseminated 
an announcement that z 
it was the Boards positive Commands, that all Barrels 
delivered for His Majesty's Service shall be proved 
as soon as possible after they are received for that 
Purpose, --and that no Barrels be proved for the East 
India Company or any other Persons till those for HM 
are proved. 264 
Since the East India Company, after using the Tower 
private proof. for ten years, from 1766 to 1776ý was now 
back with the Gunmaker's Company proof house2 anýsince 
both the Hudson's Bay and African company had always been 
with the Company, . 
it is more likely that the civilian 
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trade was the root of the problem. 
Delays there undoubtedly were, but by the end of June 
there were warrants out for 22,700 Short Land muskets to 
be rough stocked, as well as 4200 pairs of Sea Service 
pistols, 800 Dragoon carbines, and 400 for Serjeants, and 
other warrants to set up 24,400 Short Land muskets, the 
Dragoon carbines, 200 Sea Service. muskets and 600 pairs of 
the Sea Service pistols. 
265 With the traditional enemy in 
the offing, a sense of urgency and purpose can be sensed 
in the increased tempo of the Board's affairs. The Daymen 
in the Small Gun Office were now permitted to work from 5 
a. m. until 8 p. m. - 
266 In July, the London gunmaker Michael 
Memory, who had asked to work for the Board in February, 
1777, was given his first warrant, to rough stock 500 
muskets; Robert Ross of London, of whom nothing else is 
known, received warrants to rough stock and set up 200 
muskets in August and September, and in September John 
Harrison, also of London, was admitted to work for the 
Office and began his tenure with a warrant for rough 
stocking and setting up 500 Long Land muskets 
ý67 
In August, . 1778, orders were given to prepare four 
amusettes which were to be sent to Coxe Heath Camp in 
Ireland, and this was followed by orders to cast twelve 
barrels of five foot length to replace those sent to 
268 Ireland. Whether or not he actually designed these 
pieces, the Marshal de Saxe is credited with first 
publicising them in his autobiographical 'Mes Reveries' 
which, although written in the 1730s, was first published 
in 1757. Saxe gives only an engraving of his amusette, 
which is fitted with wheels. The barrel is a long thin 
affair with trunnions fitted. The Hessian Feldjagercorps 
then serving in America with the British army often used 
amusettes in its operations with seeming suacess, and this 
is probably where the idea came from to furnish some of 
them to the Loyalists troops later in the war. 
269 
Presumably becat4se of the greatly expanded production 
programme, the Board discovered in October that it had run 
out of money, and was f-198,176.19-10. over its annual 
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Parliamentary grant, and the artificers were sixteen 
months in arrears of pay; John Pratt had indeed complained 
the previous May, saying he was owed L6.030. 'having 
received no money since first employed. 1.27 
0 This 
revelation in no way seems to have affected the continued 
placing of warrants, and there were no other recorded 
complaints, or references to the deficit. During the 
second half of 1778, warrants to rough stock 27,000 Short 
Land muskets, 2000 Sea Service muskets, 200 wall pieces 
and 2000 pairs of Sea Service pistols were issued, and of 
these warrants were issued to set up 23,500 of the Land 
muskets, -3500 Sea Service muskets, and 1000 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols. 
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Small arms production during 1778 amounted to 45,510 
Short Land muskets, 4990 Long land muskets 22,000 Sea 
Service muskets, 750 Light Dragoon carbines with flat 
locks, 800 Eliott carbines, 1500 Artillery carbines, 400 
Serjeant's carbines, 800 Dragoon carbines, 200 wallpieces, 
6000 pairs of Sea Service pistols, 500 pairs of carbine- 
bore Land pistols, and 300 pairs of Royal Forrester's 
pistols in the rough stocked state, of which 42,965 Short 
Land muskets, 7000 Long Land muskets, 5893 Sea Service 
muskets, 200 wall pieces, 1000 Artillery carbines, 850 
Light Dragoon carbine (of which 250 by Pratt were 
described as having 'bolts and ketches to ye nosecap), 
800 Dragoon carbines, 400 Serjeant's carbines, 1200 pairs 
of 9-inch barrelled Light Dragoon pistols, and 3800 pairs 
of Sea Service pistols were set up. John Pratt was far and 
away the most productive of the setters up, accounting for 
20,000 of the 42,965 Short Land muskets and most of the 
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pistols. In addition to the domestic output, at least 
42,000 arm's and 10,000 walnut musket stocks had come from 
Liege during the year, doubling the number of available 
muskets. 273 
By mid-January 1779 the unfortunate John Pratt 
claimed to have completed L11,484. in work for the Board, 
but had thus far received only L1,000. in payment. In 
reply to his request for some casht wherein he stated he 
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was in great distress, the Board minuted that he should be 
sent fl, 000. 'when it can be spared'; and yet he continued 
to be a leading setter up.. 2-74 In January John Horsley, 
contractor for bayonets, completed his first warrant for 
12,000 and was promptly given another for the same 
number. 275 The following month more bayonet contractors 
were admitted, to work for the Board: Samuel & George 
Harvey, and Samuel Dawes, both of Birmingham. It is clear 
that another long-standing monopoly, that of the Loxhams 
(since 1755) for the supply of bayonets, had been 
effectively broken. -276 Expedients were being increasingly 
resorted to in the search for greater production. Daniel 
Moore was ordered to deliver in 3000 complete Sea Service 
muskets, the same as the previous 6000 already delivered; 
Oughton, normally a barrel contractor, was allowed to 
deliver in 400 musket locks in one month's time; Isaac 
Bissell, a large producer of the all-metal Highland 
pistols as purchased by regimental colonels, was allowed 
to deliver 500 musket barrels in three months; Pratt was 
to supply 1000 muskets, all of which except the barrels he 
was to supply himself, as well as 2000 complete Bright Sea 
Service muskets the same as Moore's; William Grice 
submitted a round pattern Sea Service look, which was 
rejected as unfit for the purpose; and finally, a price 
increase for pistol-bore pistol barrels (primarily used 
for Sea Service pistols) to 5/6 per pair (the same as 
allowed during the Seven Years' War) was allowed to Galton 
& Son and John Whatply in hopes of speeding up 
277 deliveries. 
On 30 April Colonel Harcourt, commanding the 16th 
L.. ýght Dragoons then in America, wrote the , 
Board 
requesting an issue of '54 Rifle Barrel Carbines' for his 
regiment, as part of the arms taken to America in 1776. 
The evidence is strong that he had privately purchased 
some rifles early in 1776, or had received a small number 
of the 1776-contract rifles made in Birmingham and 
Hanover. However, ýhese were not specifically mentioned in 
the King's Warrant of 8 March for arms for the regiment, 
218 
to replace those left in North America by order of the 
Commander-in-Chief (North America)2 and the Board replied 
that they could not, therefore, be issued; and 
furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Amherst, had 
observed that the 16th was reduced in numbers to the same 
size as other Light Dragoon regiments, and that they can 
have no more to serve on foot., 
278 As the 16th were now 
back in England, they no longer had any use for this 
specialist weapon suited to North American conditions. 
John Harrison, a London gunmaker who had become a 
contractor supplying complete Sea Service muskets only the 
previous year, died early in 1779, and in April his widow, 
Mrs. Penelope Harrison and James Thompson, Harrison's son- 
in-law, petitioned to be continued in the Board's employ; 
they were approved by the Board and granted another 
warrant for complete Sea Service muskets in the name of 
Harrison & Thompson. 279 This method was the chief means by 
which the Board acquired its Sea Service muskets during 
the American War; other contractors who supplied such 
complete arms were . 
Edward Bate, Michael Memory, and 
Daniel Moore, who between them furnished the Board with 
some 29,900 muskets. To this number John Pratt added 
another 9053 complete Sea Service muskets, at least 500 of 
which are described as having double-bridle locks, the 
design of which remains unidentified. 
280 Like Hirst's S- 
sideplate arms, (which were also delivered in by Pratt 
during 1779)t these were probably another wartime 
expedient with a degree of variation accepted by the Board 
as tolerable under the pressing requirement for arms, It 
is therefore very surprising to find the Board, in June, 
1779, writing to the gunmakers Griffin & Tow, Robert Ross, 
and their own Viewer, Ambrose- Pardoe, that 'no musquets 
281 
are wanted rough stocked at present, ' just at the time 
when they were writing to Birmingham that the several 
barrel makers were to send Short Land musket barrels with 
all possible dispatch, and when other expedient 
arrangments with Hirst and Pratt were made whereby they 
agreed to complete 4500 and 4304 (respectively) Short Land 
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muskets using the King's barrels and stocks. 2ý2 Whether it 
was seen by the Board as a matter of the finite work force 
being too much fragmented by the entry of additional 
contractors, or whether it was a quest-ion of the 
contractors expecting to be paid in ready money, or 
possibly one of simply reaching a capacity production with 
no consideration being given to long-term requirements, is 
unclear from the surviving documents. If the general frame 
of reference within which the Board operated is 
considered, then their usually pragmatic approach would 
suggest that they felt sufficient arms were being 
produced, taking into account foreign arms arrangements, 
to meet demands for the foreseeable future, and that their 
concern with existing contractors was simply a part of 
getting the most for their money. This view is given 
support by the Board's refusal in July of an offer from 
Herr Splittgerber, proprietor of the Prussian State 
Arsenal at Potsdam, to supply 100,000 stand of arms at 
27/6 each delivered to the Tower. The Board said they 
wanted no more muskets at present, but would be pleased to 
receive a pattern of the arms offered , for future 
reference. 
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'The arms offered, to Judge by a sealed 
pattern still in the Tower, were very different from the 
British service arm in both vital measurements such as 
bore and- barrel leagth, and would have required many 
changes in ammunition, maintenance and equipment. Since 
they were already -in existence, no significant changes 
could be made in the design to avoid these changes. The 
arms. being supplied from Liýge were made to the current 
British pattern and differed only in degree of finish. 
In September one of the more bizarre British military 
small arms came on the scene, when a warrant was given to 
lockmaker Henry Nock to manufacture twenty pieces to a 
design of one otherwise unknown James Wilson. This was a 
short shoulder arm fitted with seven barrels (six 
clustered around a central, barrel) and fired 
simultaneously by one lock. It was intended for naval use, 
being used to help clear the decks of enemy sailors, gun 
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crews and boarding parties, and was seen as a weapon for 
men stationed in the fighting tops on the masts of naval 
vessels. Nock was chosen to produce the novel arms at the 
expressed wish of the inventor. They enjoyed a chequered 
career. 
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Production for 1779 reflected the greatly increased 
military and naval commitment of the country. Sixty 
thousand sets of Land musket furniture and 400 sets for 
carbines were delivered. The four rough stocking firms 
supplied 51,000 Short Land muskets and 2000 Long Land 
muskets, 2000 Sea Service muskets, 2500 carbines, 400 
Serjeant's carbines, 100 'Blues' carbines, 184 musketoons, 
900 pairs of 9-inch Light Dragoon pistols and 4000 pairs 
of Sea Service pistols. Complete arms turned in by the 
several contractors included 7984 Short Land muskets, 
16,985 Short Land with S-side pieces, 330 Long Land 
muskets and 24,373 Sea Service muskets. Arms set up in the 
traditional manner included 49,841 Short Land muskets, 
9100 Long Land muskets, 100 wall pieces, 1000 Sea Service 
muskets, 184 musketoons, . 
956 Artillery carbines, 1220 
Eliott carbines, 800 Serjeant's carbines, 500 Cavalry 
carbines, 100 'Blues' carbines, 2594 unspecified 
carbinesq 750 pairs of. Light Dragoon pistols, 150 pairs of 
Royal Forrester's pistols, and 6150 pairs of Sea Service 
pistols. 285- Domestic production therefore netted the 
Ordnance some 84,240 Land muskets, but there were still 
large numbers of muskets arriving from Liege. 
. 
Thomas Fitzherbert had continued to superintend the 
shipping of muskets from Liege, along with rough stocks. 
Unfortunately the accounting system lacks detail, and 
while amoupts of money can be acurately totalled, these 
include the various freight and shipping charges and 
cannot be divided out to determine the precise number of 
arms involvedo There is one mention of 5000 arms and 2000 
stocks to be imported in March, and by S. eptember 
Fitzherbert was informing the Board that 1000 arms were 
ready for shipment from Holland and that another 2000 
might have been ready but that he had run into 
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difficulties with the workmen over rumours that he was to 
be supplanted by another firm. One of his workmen was 
already reportedly making arms from his pattern for the 
new firm. This rumour proved all too true, for on the same 
day they replied to Fitzherbert without any mention of 
this rumour, telling him simply that they would fulfil 
their engagements with him and that they expected he would 
do likewise, they wrote to George Craufurd and made an 
arrangement with him. Craufurd had written that 
Fitzherbert did not have sufficient contacts to procure 
any large quantity of arms, and that to forestall any 
t 
other power getting control of the limited number of good 
workmen and materials, he had contracted in June for 
several thousands which were ready for proof. He offered 
to deliver from twenty to forty thousand arms at the rate 
of 800 per week, with ramrods and bayonets of tempered 
steel, for 27/6 each free of all charges-, on board the 
ships in Holland. The Board accepted his proposal with a 
security to be posted of L2000.286 During 1779-80 
Fitzherbert had been paid E42,543., which at 27/6 per 
musket amounts to 30,940' arms, but this must be an 
incorrectly high figure since some of the money was for 
gunstocks (at 1/9 each) and charges. 
287 A total figure of 
not less than 25,000 during 1779 seems reasonable. While 
the ethics of the operation are undoubtedly questionable, 
there is no doubt that Craufurd proved far more capable of 
delivering large numbers of arms, and his ultimate 
treatment by the Board somewhat redresses the balance. On 
7. December a Royal Warrant was obtained for the purchase 
abroad of a further 40,000 stands of arms, beyond those 
which had been agreed with Craufurd in September " 
2-88, 
The only group of Li6ge-made Short Land Pattern 
muskets from this period which has yet been identified is 
at Hampton Court Palace, although a number have been lent 
to the Royal Armouries. as examples of the type. Apart from 
the Liege barrel-maker's sunken poinpns at the breech of 
the barrel, slight variations in the contouring of the 
buttplate tang, and the very crude engraving on the lock2 
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the use of European walnut, and the generally coarser 
finish on both wood and metal parts, there is nothing to 
distinguish these arms from the domestic produc&t. All 
those thus far examined conform to the Pattern 1768, with 
the 1775 modification to the flat-surfaced side piece, and 
the old style of lock with engraved top-jaw and hammer. It 
is possible, that some of the muskets made under the 
agreement with Craufurd may incorporate later features, 
but this is fairly unlikely as it would have involved 
changes to moulds and increased costs and probable delays 
which the Board would have been most unwilling to 
sanction. 
On 1 January 1780 the Board were informed that there 
were no Sea Service musket parts in store, but that 7000 
barrels were available to be cut and new looped for this 
service; these were immediately divided between Hirst and 
Pratt for the work to be performed. The absence of parts 
could hardly have been an unexpected announcement, since 
such a large part of the Board's supplies of Sea Service 
muskets had been supplied complete by the contractoks for 
most of the war period, but it does nevertheless clearly 
demonstrate the Board's primary* attention to the 
mainstream, Land musket, production. A further 4000 
barrels were. issued to Pratt later in January to be cut 
289 
and new looped. 
By, early April when Henry Nock ýnotified the Board 
that he had completed 49 of the seven-barrelled guns, he 
was asked how many he could deliver in a given time, and 
told to send in all those he had ready; Nock-replied that 
he could provide 1000 guns in a twelvemonth, if a large 
number were ordered at one time- he received a warrant for 
500. James Wilsong the inventor, was now ready to go 
aboard a ship to demonstrate the effectiveness of his 
idea; on 18 April he submitted a list of expenses for 
inventing and developing the seven-barrelled gun amounting 
to E1023-ý having previously requested some small civil 
employment of L300. per annum. The Board were aghast: 
the above account of Expences is- so much beyond the 
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Board's expectations that they cannot give any opinion 
thereon, nor can they venture to recommend Payment 
thereof. '290A few days later the Master General notified 
the Board that he expected they would show the usual mark 
of approbation which the Board gave to gentleman inventors 
of Wilson's rank, 'in proportion to the rewards they 
generally grant for Inventions of real Utility. ' The Board 
enquired into its precedents, and on 23 May Wilson was 
granted 1400.291 Nock was only protected in his monopoly 
of manufacture of these guns by his low prices; when he 
requested payment for those thus far produced at the rates 
of 115. for the rifled (only two of which were ever 
produced) and E13. for the smooth bored, the Board ordered 
the bills monied, and instructed Nock to make no more of 
the rifled version until further notice. They also 
recorded that William Wilson, Daniel Moore, John Pratt, 
Michael Memory and Harr. ison & Thompson had each offered to 
make the guns, but none of them at such a low figure as 
Nock'sý, 92, By the end of 1780 Nock had delivered 524 
smooth-bored seven-barrelled guns; only 23 additional were 
delivered in January 1781, with a final six of this first 
pattern in April, 1784.293 
Richard Trested, one of the Board's wartime rough 
stockers, requested more work late in April. The Board 
told him that when barrels and locks became available he 
would have his share, and with regard to setting up, which 
he had also requested to do, they told him that there were 
already more people than could be employed in that area- 
but, if he could get a supply of Sea Service pistol 
barrels and locks, he could set those up at the usual 
price and conditions. The Bill Books show that he rough 
294. 
stocked 1000 pairs of these pistols during the year. By 
the middle of the year it was clear that 1779 had been a 
peak year, and that requirements were well down; Wilsonv 
Harrison & Thompson, Davies and Memory were all informed 
that there was no work for them. 
295 
In Liege John Colgate, the Board's. resident viewerv 
had viewed 509000 arms, which Craufurd asked the Board to 
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purchase, but in mid-July the Board informed Craufurd 
that they did not want the arms, and that they had been 
viewed without obligating the Board to take them. This was 
shortly followed by a rather strange letter to the Board 
from the Master General, in which he told the Board not to 
buy the Craufurd arms, and that he had always been against 
the purchasing of foreign arms unless in absolute 
necessity. If the goal was to prevent them falling into 
enemy hands, they should be averted by employing London 
workmen to keep them from selling to the wrong people. In 
a second letter of obvious political context, he went on 
to say that he was well aware that complaints would come 
from the domestic workforce if any more foreign arms of 
inferior quality were allowed in, for which ready money 
was paid, while the home manufacturers were unemployed and 
waiting payment. All the Board could say in . reply was that 
warrants for more home-produced arms would be issued as 
soon as room could be found in the storehouses. 
2-96 This 
situation was not helped by the arrival of 11,160 arms 
returned from the Ordnance stores in New York City, as 
being superfluous to requirements there. Questions were 
asked about this return, since 5500 stand had been sent 
out early in thle year for New York, Quebec and Georgia, 
and many of the arms now returned were in un-opened 
chests. 297 
In November the Board lost one of itsmost productive 
contractors, although several of his various warrants were 
a 
not completed until 1781. An enquiry showed thatL9d. bribe 
had been paid to the Viewers to pass work not quite up to 
standard, and four gunsmiths' were dismissed for 
disobedience of orders, while three contractors, notably 
John Pratt, were no longer to be employed by the Office. 
The other two contractors were Riddle and Savage, whose 
functions have not been identified in the records. A year 
later Pratt applied to get his position restored to him, 
but without success. In 1790 he was allowed to supply 
about 250 Sea Service musketsq but after that no more is 
heard of him in Ordnance records. 
298 
2 21 5 
In Decemberg Ambrose Pardoe, a Whitechapel gunmaker 
who had been an Ordnance Viewer since April, 1766, 
petitioned to succeed the recently deceased William King 
as Master Furbisher, which was approved. Pardoe had acted 
as Head Viewer for the Ordnance in Liege, spending forty- 
seven weeks there in 1778-9 inspecting the arms made under 
the arrangement with Thomas Fitzherbertg who had paid him 
4/- per day* 
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As noted earlier, small arms production in 1780 
showed a decline over the previous Year. Only 15,000 sets 
of Land musket furniture were delivered ing and the rough 
stockers provided 14t798 Short Land muskets, 11,829 Long 
Land musketst 2000 Sea Service muskets, 90 Artillery 
carbines, 16 Serjeant's carbines and 5000 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols. Complete arms turned in by the various 
contractors included 2039 Short Land muskets with S-side 
pieces, 2120 Short Land musketsq 162957 Sea Service 
muskets, and 4328 pairs of Sea Service pistols. The 
setters up delivered 17,419 Short Land muskets, 4829 Long 
Land muskets, 4895 Sea Service muskets, 116 Cavalry 
carbines, 89 Artillery carbines, 16 Serjeant's carbines 
and 2750 pairs of Sea Service pistols. It was very 
fortunate that the Board's requirements were on the wane, 
since the now-dismissed Pratt had been responsible for the 
supply of a majority of the arms set up, as well as for 
some complete and more than 7500 of the rough stocked 
muskets. 
300 
The year which was to see the last large land battles 
of the American Rebellion, culminating in the surrender of 
Lord Cornwallis' army to a far larger Franco-American 
force at Yorktown, Virginia, in October, was one of much 
reduced activity on the part of the Ordnance. There was 
very little new production, and that centred on carbinesq 
while in July a large number of imprests were made out to 
the gunmakers on their long-overdue bills. 301 It was also 
the year in which General John Burgoyne succeeded in 
having a special pattern of oval-mouthed musketoon made by 
the Ordnance for his newly-raised regimentv the 23rd Light 
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Dragoons, which was ordered to India. In his initial 
letter to the Board in September, Burgoyne described the 
arm as a blunderbuss, of which he desired sixty to be 
made, but the Board always referred to it as a musketoon. 
Burgoyne also sent in a pattern pistol, but after Pardoe 
had examined it and judged it 'much inferior' to the 
Office-pattern Light Dragoon pistol, production of this 
new design was denied by the Board, as well on grounds of 
lack of time as inferiority of design, since Burgoyne's 
regiment was close to departure. Burgoyne's repeated 
attempts to insist on his pistol design were successfully 
resisted by the Board.. In October, the new musketoon, of 
which one hundred were to be made, was priced at fl. 13.4., 
and Samuel Galton was warranted to make the barrels for 
7/- each. A warrant for the issue of sixty musketoons to 
the 23rd Light Dragoons was issued on 3 November, but 
Hirst and Alexander Davidson did not receive their 
warrants to set up the arms until 20 December. Only sixty 
of the musketoons appear to have been completed, early in 
Januaryq 1782, in the same week that Burgoyne's regiment 
sailed. 302 These musketoons were fitted with a 16-inch 
barrel, the elliptical muzzle of which measured 1ý"xl"; 
the Eliott pattern of grooved rammer and notched nosecap 
were used, and the conventional. 'Extra flat' carbine lock. 
The side piece was similar to that on the 'Blues' 
carbine. 303 The precedent for this type of carbine for 
mounted troops came primarily from Austria, where 
elliptical-mouthed musketoons for cuirassiers had been 
issued in two models, 1759 and 1781, at a rate of . 12 per 
squadron. These were altogether larger weapons than 
Burgoyne's, but the concept was identical. They were 
withdrawn from the Austrian service in 1798.304 
The supply of carbines and pistols in store was so 
low that requisitions for these types of arms for New 
York and Georgia had to be filled with substitute arms, 
including 12-inch Dragoon pistols in place of the 9-inch 
ordered, and Liege-made carbines with bayonets in place of 
cavalry carbines.. Warrants for 3000 pairs of Light Dragoon 
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pistols and 1000 - carbines were issued in October and 
November, to complete a warrant for provincial troops in 
South Carolina. 305 
In September a warrant was issued for four amusettes 
with their carriages and harness to be sent to New York 
for the 'provincial forces, but a minute of the 27th 
indicates that they were for Benjamin Thompson's (later 
Count Rumford) King's American Dragoons which was destined 
for the Virginia campaign. 
306 This is the last reference 
to this piece of compromise mobility in the Ordnance 
records. 
In the course of 17812 10,500 sets of musket 
furniture, 1142 sets for Eliott carbines, sets for 2800 
pairs of Light Dragoon pistols, as well as other smaller 
varying amounts for 'Common' and Serjeant's carbines, Sea 
Service muskets and pistols and wall pieces were delivered 
in. Although totalling orý_Ply small numbers of each sort, 
it was the most comprehensive order for furniture placed 
during the war. The rough stockers delivered in no Short 
Land muskets, 6134 Long Land muskets, 833 carbines, 146 
pairs of 12-inch carbine-bore pistols and 107 pairs of Sea 
Service pistols. Harrison & Thompson was the only 
contractor -to deliver in completed arms in 1781,1000 
Bright Sea -Service muskets. The setters up produced 2735 
Short Land muskets, 976 Short Land muskets with flat-S 
side pieces, 6000 Long Land muskets, 450 Eliott carbines, 
350 (naval) musketoons with flat locks and wooden rammers, 
and 220 pairs of 12-inch carbine-bore pistols with wood 
307 
rammers. 
The strictures of the Master General on the 
acquisition of further foreign arms began to have some 
effect during 1781. In reply to a statement by Craufurd 
that he stood to lose f4bOO if the Board would not take 
another 5000 arms, the Board gave a completely 
unsympathetic response. 
308 
This is the only reference to 
the question of the Liýge muskets in the records for 1781, 
leading to the conclusion that very few9-if any2 arms were 
received from this source during the year., 
228 
Late in December a number of warrants for small armsy 
all dated 1 January 1782, were issued to the gunmakers, 
These included 6000 rough stocked Land muskets, 7000 Land 
muskets to be set up in one month, and in six weeks 1700 
Sea Service muskets; and, in two weeks, 1000 Eliott 
carbines. 
309 
On the actual first of January, 1782, a further 
warrant for the setting up of 3000 pairs of Sea Service 
pistols was issued. 
310 Further warrants for the setting up 
of a, total 8940 Land muskets were issued on 27 March to 
Hirst, Bate, Harrison & Thompson, Davidson, and a new 
contract9r, London gunmaker Daniel Goff, who apparently 
replaced Tompson Davies, who was appointed a Viewer in the 
Small Gun Office with pay from 1 March. 
311 
In late February the Assistant Inspector of 
Artillery, Captain Samuel Tovey, reported on a trial of 
the seven-barrelled gun. Tovey found that when using a 
charge of one-half dram of rifle powder in each barrel the 
recoil was noticeable, but that if a similar charge of 
ordinary service powder was usedg it was not. He requested 
the Board to fix, the type and charge of powder for 
cartridges for these guns, and that a proportion for each 
class of ship in the Navy be determined; the Board 
specified common service powder. 
312 The Admiralty had 
already fixed upon a proportion for seven barrelled guns 
as early as August, 1779, but the details have not been 
313 found. 
The fall of the North ministry in March, 1782, 
brought Charles Lennox, third Duke of Richmond, to the 
office of Master General of the Ordnance. With a brief 
politically inspired hiatus from April to December, 1783, 
Richmond was to remain in office until 1795. His many 
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In June, 1782, the Board informed James Craufund that 
they would now take the 5000 Liege muskets of the late 
contract, if he would have them re-inspected and take a 
guinea each for them; Craufurd accepted the lower price 
(a 
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loss to him of 6/6 per musket) but specified they must be 
examined against the pattern arm sent to him by the Board. 
By August they had all been shipped to the Tower, and in 
October Pardoe reported that the pattern musket was 
inferior in quality to the English arm but entirely fit 
for service; from its construction it would not last half 
as long as the English made arms. The Board responded that 
if the locks were as good as those formerly received from 
Craufurd, then they could now be accepted; Pardoe verified 
this feature and they were duly received into store. 
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There appear to have been at least another 5000 arms still 
in Liege, but these were not dealt with until 1783. 
Small arms production in 1782 reflected the full 
storehouses of the Office, as well as the shortages of the 
various types of carbines and pistols. Musket furniture 
production amounted to 9000 sets, as well as 360 sets for 
the Eliott carbine. The rough stockers delivered no Short 
Land muskets, 9634 Long Land muskets, 122 wall pieces, 667 
unspecified carbines, 500 Artillery carbines, 300 
Serjeant's carbines, 1950 Light Dragoon carbines with flat 
locks, 109949 Sea Service muskets, 90 Burgoyne's 
musketoons, 350 naval musketoons, 3474 pairs of carbine- 
bore Land pistols, 600 pairs of Light Dragoon pistols, 
1000 pairs of Sea Service pistols. Of these the setters up 
completed 7040 Short Land muskets, 5000 Long Land muskets, 
4630 Sea Service muskets, 122 wall pieces, 500 Artillery 
carbines, 400 Light Dragoon carbines with flat locks, -2069 
Eliott cýarbines, 200 Serjeant's carbines, 60 naval 
musketoons, 60 Burgoyne's musketoons, and 6497 pairs of 
Sea Service pistols. 
315 
The outgoing Master General, Viscount Townshend, had 
apparently made arrangements for the manufacture by the 
Office of some carbines and pistols for a Volunteer 
regiment of cavalry under his command, the Norfolk 
Rangers. In January, 1783, the Master Furbisher and Clerk 
of the Small Gun Office asked the Board whether these arms 
were to be actually provided by the Office or money paid 
in lieu for them; the Board replied on 21 January that 
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they should be supplied by the Office 'with all possible 
dispatch. , 316 Ten days later Townshend wrote the Board 
also requesting that they be completed as soon as 
possible, to which the Board replied that the Master 
General had written to the Secretary of State to know the 
King's commands whether the arms would now [with the end 
of hostilities] be issued. On the same day the Master 
Furbisher was ordered to stop work on the arms, and report 
what stage of progress they had reached. 317 On 14 March 
word was conveyed to the Board that despite a mistake in 
the warrant for these arms, the King wished that they 
should be supplied, and their issue was ordered 
accordingly. By 28 April the Board had learned from Pardoe 
that all of the arms had been completed before the orders 
countermanding their production had been received, 
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Pardoe had been in charge of the manufacture of these 
arms, and submitted a bill for 100 carbines 'with joint 
bayonets' at 35/- each and 2k pairs of pistols 'with 
moveable Butts' at 45/- the pair. Subsequent to this 
original order, 100 pistols with moveable butts 'in the 
German manner' were ordered, the separate butts being made 
319 by Henry Nock for 10/- each pair. The carbine is a 
conventional Eliott pattern to the barrel of which a 
bayonet blade and base plate has been hinged near the 
muzzle. The point of the bayonet is held by a small cup on 
the end of a rod which runs along the barrel to the breech 
where it terminates in a button. On pulling back on the 
button the bayonet point is released and the blade swings 
320 forward to lock on a spring-held barrel-boss. No 
positive identification of the pistols with their 
detachable butts has yet been made, although there are 
several possibilities extan't. 
Peace negotiations had been in train since April, 
1782, and preliminary articles were signed between the 
rebellious colonies and Britain on 30 November 1782, with 
similar preliminaries between France and Britain and Spain 
and Britain being signed on 20 January 1783. On 4 February 
the British Government proclaimed a cessation of 
231-, 
hostilities, and four days later the Board ordered its 
resident Birmingham inspectors to give notice to the 
contractors that no further stores would be received from 
them, and to return to the Tower immediately. 321 
Small arms production for the Board of Ordnance 
during the eight years of the American Rebellion failed 
to reach the levels achieved during the Seven Years' War, 
despite the far greater military and naval commitment 
which Britain put. into this unsuccessful conflict. A total 
of thirty-eight contractors (there were thirty-seven 
during the previous war) consisting of 1 brasswork 
founder, 15 barrel makers, 14 lock makers (including 9 who 
also supplied barrels), 5 rough stockers and 12. setters up 
furnished the Ordnance with 247,606 sets of brass 
furniture, 332,466 barrels, 276,011 locks, 293,254 rough 
stocked arms and 298,479 set up arms. The weapons produced 
included muskets, carbines, rif les and pistols as 
follows: 
Muskets Carbines Rifles Pistols 
Wall Pieces Cavalry muzzle- Dragoon 
Long Land Eliott loading. Lgt Dragoon 
Short Land Artillery Ferguson Royal For- 
Short Land S- Royal For- ester's 
side pieces rester's 'Blues' 
Marine or Militia Serjeant's Sea Service 






If the list of contractors is reduced to those producing 
in five-figure quantities, the numbers include the 1 
brasswork founder, 8 barrel makers, 7 lock makers, 4 rough 
stockers and 3 setters up. However, this simple 
computation is upset by a further production: to these 
arms produced under the Ordnance System must be added 
80,968 complete arms (mainly Sea Service muskets and 
pistols) furnished in 1779 and 1780 by a small group of 
eight London gunmakers (Bate, Goff, Harrison & Thompson, 
Hirst, Memory, Moore, Pratt and Tucker), which represent a 
clear failure on the part of the System to meet the needs 
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of the Board. 
322 Complete arms in such quantities as this 
were a harking back to the period prior to the 
introduction of the Ordnance System, when the gunmakers 
could deliver in arms the components and workmanship of 
which had not been inspected or approved prior to their 
being received as a finished arm. This method had always 
been made use of to some extent, but the period of the 
American Rebellion saw its greatest use, and that of the 
Seven Years' War its smallest implementation by the Board. 
Another indicator of failure in the System was the 
extensive purchasing of foreign arms and components, even 
though these were produced to an English pattern and under 
the inspection of a team of Ordnance viewers. This last 
factor makes it very unlikely that the Board were buying 
simply to keep the Liege workforce from making arms for 
the enemy; in the next war a buying policy designed to 
prevent the enemy obtaining arms was implemented, but 
during the American Rebellion the policy seems to have 
been based on the need for a rapid supply of arms which 
was not sufficiently forthcoming from the domestic 
producers. Although precise figures cannot be determined 
from the surviving evidence, it is likely that as many as 
125,000 arms may have been obtained from Lieýge during the 
war. 
The result was, that by the end of 1782 the Board 
had acquired some 504,000 complete arms which, even in 
terms of Britain's tremendous logistic effort in fighting 
the American rebels, French, Spanish and Dutch, 
represented a bad miscalculation, even though it must be 
held to be better to have too many than too few arms 
available. The Board may be said to have achieved its goal 
of a sufficient supply of small arms for Britain's armed 
forces, but it was only done by resorting to methods 
which, either in their nature or extent, must have been 
considered as retrograde expedients and unsatisfactory by 
many of the Ordnance hierarchy, especially the Treasurer. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Ordnance System was developed in response to the 
chaos which had dominated the supply of arms during the 
long period of the War of the Spanish Succession. It was 
intended not only to bring under direct Ordnance control a 
larger proportion of the gun making processes, but also to 
centralize the design of small arms, and remove from 
circulation the large variety of weapons supplied to the 
troops by regimental colonels, and to create a greater 
degree of uniformity of both weapons and weapons 
management, i. e. drill. Whether it was also intended to 
eliminate the necessity for foreign arms purchases in time 
of crisis seems at least doubtful, due to the regularity 
with which this device was employed with little or no 
adverse comment in the surviving records. 
The System took many years to bring to completion, 
largely because of the lack of money voted by parsimonious 
peacetime Parliaments politically committed to the 
smallest possible armed forces, and to the least possible 
expenditure on military paraphernalia allowed by the 
perceived view of national security. The Board of Ordnance 
appears to have developed the basic lines for the new 
system during the war years, and to have begun 
implementing them as soon as was financially practical 
after the conclusion of peace. They encountered obvious 
opposition from the Worshipful Company of Gunmakers of 
London, who had previously had both the design and supply 
of military small arms largely in their own hands, and 
indirect obstruction from the opinions, traditions and 
self-esteem of the regimental colonels and army 
bureaucracy whom they were intending to bring under much 
greater control. They enjoyed the active support of the 
current monarchq George 1, who was himself a blooded 
soldier and an excellent military administrator, but the 
political situation in England prevented this support from 
having the effect the Board might have wished. 
The first clear indication of a new system being put 
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into operation came with the contract of 15 September 1714 
when the orders were not for complete arms to be supplied, 
but for 'Land service musquet barrels, stocked and sett up 
with his Maj: Locks, brass work, according to the 
pattern'. The barrels, locks and brasswork were taken from 
supplies accumulated by the Board, and issued to the 
contractors for mounting in wooden stocks and finishing 
off. There seems to have been some indecision as to the 
best pattern for military arms during these years: the 
1714 contract called for brass- mounted arms, while the 
next big contract, for the 'Pattern of the 10,000' was for 
iron-mounted arms for both Land and Sea Service. With the 
completion of the 'Pattern of the 10,000' in 1721 the 
design of small arms appears to have been concentrated on, 
and in 1722 a new design, for the first time known as the 
'King's Pattern' was settled upon and promulgated as the 
standard. It was also officially laid down at this time 
that colonels wanting arms made for their regiments would, 
in future, adhere to this basic pattern. This instruction 
was largely ignored, and it was not until the major re- 
armament of 1740-1 that circumstances forced the army into 
a degree of arms uniformity hitherto unseen in its ranks. 
There was a hiatus in small arms production from 1721 
until 1728 when the first of a new series of arms began to 
be produced, and it is really from this time that the 
fully developed Ordnance System came into operation. All 
of the various components flowed from the contractors into 
Ordnance stores where they were inspected for quality of 
workmanship and materials, and for conformity to the 
established pattern. These materials were then issued to 
selected contractors for gradual assembly into complete 
arms, with the processes sub-divided and inspected at each 
stage, so that by the time a completed arm arrived back in 
the hands of the Board's officials, it had been inspected 
and approved at every stage of production from raw 
materials to completed arm. It was a highly centralized 
and carefully controlled system involving a minimum of 
individual contractors who were obliged to work to a very 
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high standard of pattern keeping, which clearly limited 
the number of workmen within the unstable gunmaking trade 
who could be successfully employed. 
Fortunately for the development of the System, it was 
placed under no particular pressure for the first decade 
of its functioning, and all concerned had opportunities to 
see how it would work. There were no recorded problems 
with new production, but subsequent events showed that the 
quality and uniformity of arms in the hands of the troops 
up to 1740 had been totally unaffected by the new 
manufacturing system. This situation may be seen as a very 
clear example of the typical situation in which 
manufacture of arms was considerably in advance of the 
issue of new arms to the troops for whom they were being 
made. There was no officially established 'service life' 
for a musket during our period, although the subsequently 
recognized term of twelve years seems to have been 
realized in fact during the Eighteenth Century. When there 
was no need to re-arm the troops, they were not re-armed, 
and if regimental officers were slack in their attention 
to the state of their men's arms, the arms soon 
deteriorated to an unserviceable and often dangerous 
condition. Knowing this situation to exist, and realizing 
that the efforts of central government to increase its own 
control over regimental responsibilities were fraught with 
long delays and little success, the Board exerted as much 
pressure as it could to keep new arms in their own hands 
for as long as possible. Only when the arms of a regiment 
were passed by Ordnance inspectors as being totally unfit 
for service were new arms issued on specific warrants from 
the responsible authorities. 
The wars of Jenkins' Ear and the Austrian Succession 
(1739-48) put the Ordnance System to its first test of 
responding to wartime demands, and the evidence suggests 
that it performed as its designers intended. There was a 
tremendous drain at the beginning of this period when 
widepsread inspections showed the deplorable state to 
which the armies' small arms had sunk, and a wholesale re- 
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armament took place. For the first time the British Army 
was equipped with a uniform pattern of musket. The only 
area in which significant expansion of the System was 
required was that of the setters up, since the components 
makers were apparently able to furnish more materials than 
the existing setters up could complete in a reasonable 
time. Hence, from 1742 about half-a-dozen new contractors 
were taken on for the duration of the war, and with this 
addition the System functioned smoothly under the 
increased demands. 
Wartime experience suggested that the expensive iron 
rammer which had been tried as early as 1724 in British 
service, was indeed a highly desirable improvement in the 
efficient use of the infantry musket, and with the return 
of peace the Board entered on a programme of converting 
the arms in the hands of the troops to take the new 
stronger rammer. Virtually all of this work was carried 
out by the workforce of the Small Gun Office in the Tower 
of London, and there was almost no contractor activity 
between the end of the war in 1748 and the build-up for 
the next conflict in 1755. The System thus proved its 
elasticity without jeopardizing the tasks undertaken by 
the Board. 
At the opening of the Seven Years' War the Board 
experienced its first recorded clash with the London 
guntrade since the founding years of the System, when a 
combination of contractors refused to work unless prices 
were considerably increased over what they had been during 
the previous war. Thanks to the business acumen of a 
single contractor, John Hirst, the Board overcame this 
problem, and Hirst became virtually the only setter up 
employed by the Board for almost twenty years. He was able 
to command a sufficient workforce to perform the work 
required by the Board, and during the Seven Years' War the 
Ordnance System unquestionaly achieved its greatest 
results with the smallest number of problems. The 
comparatively recent re-armament of the army, and the 
relatively small percentage of the troops actively engaged 
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during the previous war meant that the stores were full of 
arms of a modern design and in good condition at the 
outbreak of the new war, and there were fewer foreign arms 
purchased during this war than at any other time during 
our period. Among other benefits, this allowed increased 
attention to the design and production of a series of new 
arms for various areas of the services which had either 
been neglected in the past, or had recently come into 
being to meet newly perceived military requirements. Thus 
there were muskets for the newly raised marines and 
militia, and carbines for the cavalry, light dragoons, 
Highland regiments, artillery (officers, men and cadets), 
and various elite units. The rifle made its first combat 
appearance in the hands of British troops, although it was 
supplied from abroad and apparently used by troops who 
were largely of foreign birth. With the proliferation of 
new designs produced, and a total of nearly 305,000 arms 
delivered during the period, the Ordnance System clearly 
reached its apogee during the Seven Years' War. 
Britain's greater involvement in the war had produced 
much high casualties amongst both troops and their arms 
than during the previous conflict, and production of small 
arms continued at a reduced level for several years 
following the peace of 1763. Also in the wind was a major 
re-designing of the infantry musket to allow greater 
mobility, facility of use, and comfort for the troops. The 
acceptance of this new design, the Short Land Pattern, in 
1768, produced a spasm of components manufacture into the 
early 1770s, and a proportion of these parts were turned 
into complete arms before the American Rebellion erupted 
in 1775. At the same time that the Short Land Pattern 
became the standard line infantry arm, new carbines were 
produced for the light infantry and serjeants of grenadier 
regiments9 dragoons and artillery. 
That the Ordnance System failed to achieve the 
objectives apparently set for it by the Board during the 
American Rebellion was probably due to a number of factors 
not directly attributable to the structure or operation of 
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the System itself. It seems likely that the Board over- 
reacted to the crisis of French entry into the war in 
1778, and demanded more than the available workforce could 
produce without an unacceptable lowering of quality. Even 
given the raising of the Volunteers from 1779 which 
created a new and large demand for arms, the ultimate 
production achieved by various methods was very far above 
any possible needs of the service. In addition to this 
domestic over-production, more than 100,000 foreign arms 
were imported during the war. It was an early instance of 
over-kill, and one in which the resources of the domestic 
guntrade were apparently unable to meet the demands of 
Government if confined to the rigorous standards 
previously imposed. The alternative was a partial 
breakdown in the System, and a return to the earlier 
practices where contractors were allowed to turn in 
complete arms which had not undergone the several 
individual stages of inspection before the final 
acceptance inspection. This would allow the utilization of 
a portion of the workforce which was normally considered 
as unable to work to Ordnance standards. Although this was 
mainly confined to Sea Service muskets, there were also a 
large number of Land Service muskets accepted on this 
older system, some with components varying from the 
established King's Pattern. There were also more labour 
troubles, this time with the Birmingham lockmakers, an 
area where the Board had almost no alternative source and 
where no individual saviour appeared to rescue them as had 
John Hirst at the beginning of the previous war. The 
result was a delay of almost two years in the significant 
production of arms for lack of a major component. This was 
probably a relevant factor in the subsequent over- 
production, coinciding as it did with the entry of France 
into the conflict and turning it into a virtually global 
commitment for Britain's armed forces. If, however, the 
end justfies the means, then the Board certainly did 
achieve its objective in the total acquisition of small 
arms. The Ordnance System itself produced over 298,000 
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arms (compared with some 305,000 during the previous 
war), but the Board acquired a total of about 504,000 arms 
through the use of other domestic and foreign sources. 
The number of arms obtained by the use of the established 
System compare favourably with the commitments of the 
armed forces, remembering that Britain's involvement 
during the Seven Years' War included sizeable bodies of 
troops in North America and on the Continent, while the 
American Rebellion was, so far as troop concentrations 
were concerned, largely a matter of troops in North 
America and an anti-invasion force at home. It seems 
almost as if the Board lost control of its manufacturing 
agencies, and let the supplies run on almost unheeded. 
The conclusion of the American Rebellion and the war 
with the Continental powers in 1783 found the Ordnance 
stores full to overflowing, and the basis of its long 
established System badly undermined by wartime 
expediencies. There followed a decade during which there 
was very little contractor production, and that confined 
to secondary arms such as various carbines and a few Sea 
Service muskets. Component production ceased altogether. 
The personality and views of the Master General who 
assumed office in 1782 ensured that the vacuum thus 
created in Ordnance affairs would be filled with a 
programme of modernization, experimentation and general 
improvements in the quality of design and materials. But 
in all of this small-scale work there was no requirement 
for the Ordnance System to be used, and it was apparently 
allowed to disintegrate from dis-use. Simplification of 
arms design, improvement in the quality of materials, and 
lack of need for large quantities of arms seemed to 
suggest to those in power that there would be no real need 
for the elasticity of an Ordnance System when the next 
emergency arose. Inspection procedures had been pruned 
during the war, and the processes of rough stocking and 
setting up had been combined in one firm and allowed to 
continue. There would be no return to the older methods. 
During the decade following the end of the war many new 
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ideas in small arms design were tried, and most were 
rejected on the grounds of cost v. actual utility in 
service, but by 1790 it had been decided to change the 
basic design of the infantry musket. This plan appears to 
have been thwarted only by the outbreak of the French 
Rvolutionary Wars in 1793, by which time the tooling up 
and new gauges for the radically different arms were not 
well forward in preparation, and there had been too little 
opportunity for the workmen to familiarize themselves with 
the new requirements. 
With the outbreak of war all thoughts of attempting 
to return to the old Ordnance System went by the board in 
the face of overwhelming demand. Not only did the regular 
army require its arms, but both the Militia and a 
Volunteer force were called into being, both of which 
required far larger quantities of arms than those needed 
by the army alone; in addition there were thousands of 
refugees from the Revolution who were organized into 
regiments to fight the new political force, and who were 
to be armed by the British Government. In the face of this 
unprecedented demand Liege was lost as a basic source of 
supply, and British agents combed the European markets to 
acquire whatever they could of serviceable arms. The 
supplies of military pattern arms in the hands of the 
domestic trade were also absorbed, and finally, in 1797, 
the Board accepted that a lowering of quality and 
simplification of design for the basic Land Service musket 
would have to be officially sanctioned in order to make 
use of those portions of the workforce who could not 
produce to the usual Ordnance standards. Arms of the 
'India Pattern' had been initially purchased directly from 
the East India Company in 1793, and by 1795 they were 
beginning to be produced directly for the Ordnance, but in 
1797 the adoption of the cheaper design was made official 
and a large-scale production programme initiated. 
The Ordnance never abandoned the intention of 
returning at the first opportunity to a high quality Land 
Service musket for the infantry, and with the Peace of 
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Amiens in 1802 an attempt was made to begin production of 
the New Land Pattern series. This was abruptly curtailed 
by the renewal of war in 1804, and the India Pattern 
continued as the standard arm in the hands of most 
regiments for the remainder of the flintlock era which 
ended in the early 1840s. Maximum utilization of the 
entire domestic guntrade came closest to achievement in 
the years from 1804 to 1815, when the Tower of London 
itself became, for the first time, a manufacturing 
facility on a full-time basis, and the totality of the 
Birmingham trade were brought into the Board's 
manufacturing organization. Proof and inspection 
facilites were established at Birmingham, and complete 
arms were constructed by the contractors there, as well as 
components2 with the London trade continuing to act 
chiefly as setters up, or, as they were now termed, rough 
stockers and setters up. By 1815 some two-and-a-half 
million arms had been produced, more than two million of 
which were India Pattern muskets, but the Ordnance System 
had played no part in their creation. 
Can the Ordnance System, then, be credited with 
performing successfully the role established for it by its 
originators in the second decade of the Eighteenth 
Century? The answer to this broad question is a qualified 
'Yes. ' The System worked without notable fault during the 
wars up to 1778, when Britain's military and naval 
commitments were expanded beyond what they had ever been 
before, and certainly beyond what could have been 
envisaged in the early part of the century. It may be said 
that times changed and the System did not change with it, 
but this is not strictly the case. Times changed, but the 
overall number of skilled gunworkers did not increase 
significantly. The bulk of Britain's arms manufacture was 
in the middling and lower categories of small arms which 
did not require working closely to a pattern and the use 
of top-quality raw materials. This requirement did not 
change throughout and well beyond our period, while the 
military requirements of Government 
did both change and 
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expand. The basic quality guidelines of the Ordnance 
System did not change, but as quantity requirements 
increased the numbers of qualified workforce did not 
increase to meet this new demand, since it was extremely 
uncertain and periodic, and therefore not worthwhile to 
train men to meet it. Therefore, while the times and 
military requirements changed, one essential part of the 
Ordnance System, the skilled workman, did not grow in 
numbers in line with the increased requirements. It is in 
this way alone that the Ordnance System principally failed 
to meet it goals, and this was a factor outside the 
control of the Ordnance to remedy. Indeed, the civilian 
guntrade had always been, and would continue to be, a most 
unstable industry, with its workforce expanding and 
declining as the demand dictated. It was for this reason 
that, finally, in 1808, the Government took the first 
tentative steps towards establishing a permanent 
Government-based gun making facility, which eventually 
became the Royal Manufactory at Enfield Lock. It was hoped 
that this facility would provide a permanent cadre of 
highly skilled workmen who could swiftly train up the 
required additional workforce in emergency circumstances. 
During our period, the Board of Ordnance, having 
established a system of manufacture which, given the 
constraints imposed by the financial limitations 
originating in annual Parliamentary grants, managed to 
gain and maintain sufficient control over the civilian 
guntrade which had to form its focal point, to enable it 
to produce a wide variety of small arms for all of the 
armed forces to a higher-than-normal standard of 
workmanship and finish, and (from 1755) to closely gauged 
patterns for all the components. As it was understood at 
the time, in a pre-Industrial Revolution non-factory 
complex, a high degree of standardisation was achieved in 
the manufacture of the mainstream weapon- the infantry 
musket- and in certain major components for other basic 
arms such as the barrels and locks for carbines and 
pistols. That other European nations achieved an even 
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higher standard was due to their having more centralised 
and authoritarian forms of government, and a much greater 
perceived military awareness with the budgets to back up 
that awareness. 
From 1714 to 1783 the Board of Ordnance produced, 
within the framework of what we now identify as the 
Ordnance System, a total of 998,162 small arms. Of these 
643,201 were Land Service muskets, 148,544 were Sea 
Service muskets, 53,459 carbines, 2000 musketoons and wall 
pieces, 1100 rifles and 149,858 pistols (counted singly). 
These figures do not include foreign purchases (at least 
175,000) or captured arms, which would have added 
substantially to the number of arms available for issue. 
Taking as many factors into consideration as can be 
accounted for in the records, this seems to be a very high 
level of achievement for a pre-Industrial Revolution 
manufacturing complex, one which suggests to the present 
writer that the Board of Ordnance acquitted itself 
extremely well of all its responsibilities in the supply 
of small arms during our period. 
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1725 - 1740 John, 2nd Duke of Argyll 
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1742 John, 2nd Duke of Argyll 
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1763 - 1770 John Mann ers, Marquis of Granby 
1772 - 1782 George, 4 th Viscount Townshend 
1782 - 1795 Charles, 3rd Duke of Richmond 
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1714 - 1718 Thomas Erle 
1718 Thomas Nicklewaite 
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1742 - 1748 George Wade 
1748 - 1757 Sir John Ligonier 
1757 - 1759 Lord George Sackville 
1759 - 1763 John Manners, Marquis of Granby 
1763 - 1767 George, 4th Viscount Townshend 
1767 - 1772 Henry Seymour Conway 
1772 - 1782 Jeffrey, 1st Baron Amherst 
1782 - 1804 William, 5th Viscount Howe 
Surveyors General of the Ordnance 
1714 - 1722 Michael Richards 
1722 - 1742 John Armstrong 
1742 - 1750 Thomas Lascelles 
1750 - 1782 Sir Charles Frederick 
1782 - 1783 Thomas Pelham 
Clerks of the Ordnance 
1714 - 1718 Edward Ashe 
1718 - 1731 Thomas White 
1731 - 1740 Leonard Smelt 
1740 - 1772 William Rawlinson Earle 
1772 - 1782 Sir Charles Cocks 
1782 - 1783 Gibbs Crawfurd 
Principal Storekeepers 
1712 - 1717 Dixie Windsor 
1717 - 1722 Sir John Weate 
1722 - 1746 George Gregory 
1746 - 1762 Andrew Wilkinson 
1762 - 1765 Sir Edward Winnington 
1765 - 1778 Andrew Wilkinson 
1778 - 1780 Benjamin Langlois 
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1780 - 1782 Henry Strachey 
1782 - 1783 John Aldridge 
Clerks of the Deliveries 
1714 - 1715 James Craggs 
1715 - 1722 Thomas Frankland 
1722 - 1733 Leonard Smelt 
1733 - 1741 William Rawlinson Earle 
1741 - 1746 Andrew Wilkinson 
1746 - 1751 Charles Frederick 
1751 - 1758 Job Staunton Charlton 
1758 - 1772 Sir Charles Cocks 
1772 - 1778 Benjamin Langlois 
1778 - 1780 Henry Strachey 
1780 - 1784 John Kenrick 
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APPENDIX 1B. 
CONTRACTORS TO THE BOARD OF ORDNANCE 1715-1783. 
The list which follows contains the names of one 
hundred and seventy-one contractors who supplied arms 
and/or major components of arms to the Board of Ordnance 
during our period. Examination of the list will show that 
the contractors fall into several clearly defined periodsý 
generally coinciding with wartime years and their 
aftermath. Of the total number, eighty worked during the 
transitional years before the Ordnance system came into 
full operation in the late 1720s. For the purposes of this 
study, these may therefore be subtracted, leaving ninety- 
one firms. Of these forty-one were located in the 
Birmingham area and fifty in London. However when a 
further sixteen are subtracted from the London figure, and 
two from that for Birmingham, as being of very short 
duration and/or minor importance, a clearer balanced 
picture emerges, with some forty Birmingham and thirty- 
four London firms carrying out the bulk of the Ordnance 
small arms manufacture. 
For most of our period the number of contractors 
required to execute the Board's work was fairly small. It 
was not until the 1790s and the wars against Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic France that the Board's requirements 
brought about a great enlargement of the number of 
contractors and, presumably, their workforces. Thus we 
find that, for the years from 1727 until 1756, the first 
clearly definable period, the supply of barrels was 
handled by four firms, locks by two additional firms and 
two of the barrel firms, furniture by one firm, rough 
stocking by one firm, and setting up by two firms until 
1742 when there was a temporary increase of some seven 
firms for the duration of the war until 1749. The second 
clearly defined period occurred from 1756 until 1777, 
during which time the number of setters up was reduced 
effectively to one, with no important increase in the 
suppliers of barrels and locks. There are changes in 
firms, but not in the numbers of firms involved. In 1769 
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one firm is added to the number of rough stockers, making 
two, but until the importance of the American Rebellion 
was brought home to the Government in 1777, there was no 
overall increase in the setters up or component suppliers. 
The third period consists of the American Rebellion yearsq 
during which both the Wallers and Hirsts lost their 
virtual monopoly of, respectively, rough stocking and 
setting up to a new, though small group of London firms, 
and bayonet supply was extended to several Birmingham 
firms for the first time. The years between the end of the 
American Rebellion and the outbreak of the French Revolu- 
tionary wars saw the disappearance of almost all of the 
old names from the previous two periodsý and the 
recognition of a tiny number of new names who subsequently 
merge into the greatly increased numbers which swell the 
system after 1793. The older divisions of labour broke 
down during the 1790s, with the same firms performing both 
rough stocking and setting up, many supplying their own 
brasswork (to Office pattern) and smallwork. 
Whom amongst the many names listed below can be 
considered as the 'most important'? Speaking in terms of 
quantity in their several areas, there is no doubt that 
Waller, as the primary rough stocker, and Hollier as the 
supplier of furniture, Barber and Pickfatt as the two 
setters up, dominate the 1730-42 period. With Waller and 
Hollier continuing, a small group of setters up joined the 
force 'for the war' from 1742-9, of whom the most 
important was Birkell. From 1756, with Waller still 
dominating the rough stocking, the Loxhams replace Hollier 
for bayonets and Hartwell & Mayor for furniture, and Hirst 
becomes virtual monopolist setter up until 1763, with 
Farmer, Jordan, Oughton, and Grice, as the leading 
components suppliers. These firms remain unchanged until, 
in 1769 Loder joins Waller in rough stocking. Fromý777 
Hirst's position is eroded principally by John Pratt, and 
by a small number of setters up who supply chiefly Sea 
Service muskets. 
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NOTE: The years during which each contractor worked for 
the Board are shown as: ID 28 Mar. 1715 and FD 13 Jan. 
1721. These represent 'intial date in Bill Book (or 
Treasurer's Ledger warrant date)' and 'final date of 
appearance in either of the above sources. ' 
A. 
ALDRIDGE, George. London. ID 13 Sept 1705* FD 14 June 
1716. Stocker and setter up from 1711. 
B. 
BARBER, James. London. ID 2 Mar. 1741; FD 4 May 1749. 
Setter up to the Board. Also supplied all of the 
carbines for Lord Loudoun's Regiment and the Duke 
of Cumberland's Dragoons. 
BARBER, Lewis. London. ID Sept. 1722; FD 2 Mar. 1741. 
Setter up to the Board, one of the two major firms in 
this activity during his operational span, along with 
Charles Pickfatt. Also supplied some complete 'regi- 
mental' muskets. 
BARKER, Matthias. Birmingham. ID 30 Sept 1775; FD 1783. 
Supplied barrels in partnership with John Whately. 
One of four contractors who supplied complete muzzle 
loading and breech loading Ferguson rifles to the 
Board in 1776. 
BARNES, John. 
Supplied 
London. ID 18 
complete arms. 






London. ID 19 
complete arms. 
Oct. 1719; FD 25 Mar. 1720. 
London. ID 31 Dec. 1779; FD 1783. Supplied 
Sea Service muskets, and set up a few other 
BIRKELL, William. London. ID 1 June 1742; FD 11 Apr. 1749. 
Important setter up to the Board. 
BISSELL, Isaac. Birmingham. ID 12 Aug. 1779; FD 1783. 
Supplied barrels. Also supplied all-metal Highland 
pistols to regimental colonels' orders. 
BLAKEMORE, Thomas. Wednesbury. ID 7 Apr. 1775; FD 1783. 
Supplied locks. 
BRAZIER, John. London. ID 26 Feb. 1756; FD 1 Feb. 1757. 
Setter up. 
BRAZIER, William. London. ID 12 Feb. 1714; FD 1716. Setter 
up. 
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BUMFORD, John. London. ID 26 Feb. 1756; FD 5 Jan. 1757. 
Setter up. 
BUCKMASTER, Joseph. London. ID 26 Feb. 1756; FD 19 May 
1757. Setter up. 
BUCKMASTER, Robert. London. ID 8 May 1719; FD 7 Aug. 1719. 
Setter up. 
BUCKMASTER, William. London. ID 5 Apr. 1720 only. Setter 
up. 
BUNDAY, John. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 7 Nov. 1717. 
Setter up. 
BURGIN, Mary. London. ID 9 Sept 1718; FD 30 Dec. 1727. 
Supplied brasswork. Widow of William. 
BURGIN, William. London. ID 11 Jan. 1715; FD 2 Dec. 1715. 
Supplied brasswork. 
C. 
CARTER, Benjamin. London. ID 16 May 1718; FD 29 Mar. 1721. 
Setter up. 
CLARKE, William. London. ID 8 Oct. 1739; FD 23 Oct. 1741. 
Supplied locks and barrels. 
COLE, Elias. Birmingham. ID 8 Feb. 1715; FD 9 Mar. 1733. 
Supplied barrels, locks and bayonets. 
COLLETT, Joseph. London. ID 18 Sept 1718; FD 26 Apr. 1720. 
Stocked and set up. 
COOKES, Edward. Birmingham. ID 1 Apr. 1715; FD 3 Apr. 
1739. 
D. 
DAVIDSON, Alexander. London. ID 31 Mar. 1782; FD 1785. 
Setter up. 
DAVIS, Thompson. London. ID 30 June 1777; FD 1780. Setter 
up. 
DAVIS, William. London. ID 2 June 1702; FD 19 Oct. 1719. 
Stocker and setter up. 
DENNISON, John. London. ID 6 Mar. 1718; FD 9 Feb. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up. 
DREW, John. London. ID 5 Apr. 1715; FD 19 Oct. 1719. 
Stocker and setter up. 




EBBUTT, Lancelot. London. ID 26 Sept 1704; FD 6 Apr. 1715. 
Setter up. 
EDGE, Richard. Wednesbury. ID 3 June 1757; FD 20 May 1763. 
Edge & Son, 27 Feb. 1760; FD 11 Feb. 1774. 
EVERARD, William. London. ID 16 Jan. 1718; FD 7 July 1719. 
Stocker and setter up. 
F. 
FALKNER & CO., Edward. Birmingham. ID 31 May 1778; FD 
1779. Supplied locks2 barrels and bayonets. 
FARLOW, John. Birmingham. ID 18 May 1715; FD 15 Feb. 1736. 
Supplied locks. 
FARMER, James. Birmingham. ID 13 Jan. 1741; FD 13 Jan. 
1756. Supplied locks, barrels and some complete arms. 
Successor to his father Joseph. 
FARMER, Joseph. Birmingham. ID 27 Jan. 1708; FD 23 Apr. 
1741. Large-scale supplier of barrels and locks. 
FARMER & GALTON. Birmingham. ID 13 Dec. 1757; FD 1774. 
Supplied locks and barrels. Partnership of James 
Farmer and Samuel Galton. 
FITCHETT, William. London. ID 14 Aug. 1718 only. Setter 
up" 
FORT, Mary. London. ID 8 Jan. 1709; FD 28 Mar. 1715. Set- 
ter up. 
G. 
GALTON, Samuel. Birmingham. ID 13 Jan. 1756; FD 23 Apr. 
1757 (then see FARMER & GALTON). Again 21 Apr. 1775; 
FD post-1783. & Son from 1775 to 1797, then Samuel 
jun. Large-scale suppliers of locks and barrels; 
one of the four contractors for muzzle loading and 
Ferguson rifles in 1776; barrels, locks, bayonets and 
rammers from 1775. 
GANDON, Peter (junior). London. ID 31 May 1743; FD 26 Feb. 
1756. Setter up. 
GILL, Thomas. Birmingham & London. ID 1778; FD post-1783. 
Supplied tools and bayonets. 
GLUVIAS, Hewit. London. ID 13 Sept. 1743; FD 21 Feb. 1744. 
Stocker and setter up. 
GOFF, Daniel. London. ID 13 Mar. 1782; FD 1785. Setter up. 
GOODBYý James. London. ID 16 Dec. 1701; FD 14 June 1716. 
Setter up. 
269 
GREEN, Thomas. London. ID 8 Mar. 1697; FD 5 July 1728. 
Stocker and setter up. 
GREEN, Thomas & Hezekiah. London. ID 1780; FD post-1783. Supplied locks and barrels. 
GRICE, John & William. Birmingham. ID 20 Mar. 1742 only. 
Supplied complete pistols and carbines, one contract. 
GRICE, Joseph. Birmingham. Two men of this name, uncle and 
nephew. ID May 1762; FD post-1783. Supplied barrels 
and locks. 
GRICE, William. Birmingham. ID 31 Dec. 1770; FD 1788. 
Supplied barrels, locks and rammers. One of the four 
contractors for muzzle loading and Ferguson rifles in 
1776. Died 24 July 1790. 
GRICE & EDGE. Birmingham. ID Jan. 1756; FD 1760. Supplied 
barrels and locks. Partnership of William Grice and 
Richard Edge. 
GRICE & SON, William. Birmingham. ID 1761; William only 
from 1770 to 1782, then & Son to 1789. Supplied 
barrels, locks and rammers. 
H. 
HADLEY, Thomas. Birmingham. ID 10 May 1776; FD 1781. 
Supplied barrels, locks, bayonets and rammers. 
HADLEY, Henry. London. ID 18 Mar. 1756 only. Setter up. 
HALFHIDE, George. London. ID 19 Jan. 1719; FD 21 June 
1720. Setter up. 
HALL, John. London. ID 1 Jan 1706; FD 26 Apr. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
HALL, Joseph. London. ID 26 Feb. 1756; FD 10 July 1756. 
Setter up. 
HARRIS, Joseph. Birmingham. ID 6 Apr. 1756; FD 14 July 
1762. Supplied barrels and locks. 
HARRIS & BARKER (BARKER & HARRIS). Birmingham. ID 9 Jan. 
1762; FD 1775. Supplied barrels. Partnership of 
Joseph Harris and Matthias Barker. 
HARRISON, John. London. ID 30 Sept 1778; FD Apr. 1779. 
Supplied complete arms. 
HARRISON & THOMPSON. London. ID 30 Oct. 1779; FD post- 
1783. Supplied barrels, locks and complete arms, also 
rough stocked and set u. Partnership of Penelope 
Harrison (widow of John5 and James Thompson. 
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HARTWELL & HASKINS. Birmingham. ID 21 Apr. 1775 only. 
Supplied locks. Winding-up partnership of widow 
Abigail Haskins (widow of George) and Thomas 
Hartwell. 
HARTWELL & MAYOR. London. ID Sept 1754; FD Apr. 1761. 
Supplied gun furniture. Partnership of Joseph 
Hartwell and Thomas Mayor. Mayor continues after 
Hartwell's death. 
HASKINS, George. Birmingham. ID 19 Feb. 1757; FD 20 Sept 
1758; then partnership with George Vernon to Apr. 
1767, then reverts to his own name to death in 1775. 
Supplied locks. 
HASKINS & VERNON. Birmingham. ID 2 Feb. 1759; FD 1767. 
Supplied locks. 
HAWKINS, John. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 1716. Stocker 
and setter up from 1714. 
HAYNES, James. London. ID 1 Jan. 1706; FD 1715. Stocker 
and setter up from 1714. 
HEASLER, William. London. ID 19 July 1692; FD 9 June 1717. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
HENSHAW, Thomas. London. ID 26 Feb. 1756; FD 19 Aug. 1756. 
Setter up. 
HIRST, James. London. ID 30 June 1777; FD 1784. Setter up. 
Partner of and successor to his father John. 
HIRST, John. London. ID 22 Oct. 1745; FD 1777. Setter up, 
with virtual monopoly 1757-75. Took son James into 
partnership 15 Apr. 1774. Repaired large quantities 
of barrels and refurbishing of arms. 
HOLDEN, William. Birmingham. ID 27 Jan. 1776; FD post- 
1783. Supplied barrels. 
HOLLIER, Thomas. Lewisham, Kent. ID 18 Apr. 1716; FD 3 May 
1748. Died 1754. Leaseholder of the Armoury Mills. 
Supplied iron and brass gun furniture, on a virtual 
monopoly basis from 1728 to 1748; also bayonets, 
swords, hangers and polearms, as well as refurbishing 
work. 
HORNBUCKLE, Richard. Lewisham, Kent. ID May 1756; FD 1784. 
Leaseholder of the Armoury Mills, took over after 
Hollier's death. Mostly re-furbishing work, some 
bayonets during American Rebellion. 
HOW, Richard. Lonodn. ID 18 Mar. 1756; FD 4 July 1758. 
Setter up. 
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HUGGINS, William. Birmingham. ID Apr. 1704; FD 16 May 
1730. Supplied iron and brass gun furniture, locksq 
and bayonets. 
HUMPHRYS (HUMPHRIES), Veritas. London. ID 16 May 1778; 
FD 1781. Setter up. 
HUNT, Joseph. London. ID 18 Dec. 1778; FD 1781. Setter up. 
i. 
JOHNSON, Christopher. London. ID 5 Feb. 1708; FD 1716. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
JOHNSONy Margaret. London. ID 7 Oct. 1717; FD 1 Mar. 
1729. Setter up. 
JOHNSON, John. London. ID 26 Mar. 1696; FD 29 Mar. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up. 
JORDAN, Edward. Birmingham. ID 18 Feb. 1733; FD 5 Apr. 
1757. Large-scale supplier of barrels and locks. 
JORDANq Thomas. Birmingham. ID 6 Apr. 1744; FD 14 July 
1762. Supplied barrels, locks, rammers and bayonets. 
JORDAN & FARMER. Birmingham. ID 6 Nov. 1742; FD 1747. 
Supplied barrels, locks, and complete arms. Partner- 
ship of Edward Jordan and James Farmer. 
K. 
KELSO, Isaac. London. ID 23 Jan. 1756; FD 7 June 1757. 
Rough stocker. 
KIPLING, Charles. London. ID 29 July 1690; FD 14 Apr. 
1715. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
KIRKHAM, Henry. London. ID 14 June 1716; FD 6 Apr. 1728. 
Stocker and setter up. 
L. 
LEONARD, John. Birmingham. ID Nov. 1780; FD 1782. Supplied 
locks. 
LLOYD, Evan. London. ID 1716; FD 6 Apr. 1728. Setter up. 
LOADER, Edward. London. ID 5 June 1711; FD 17 Mar. 1715. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
LOADER, Mary. London. ID 15 Nov. 1716; FD 19 Jan. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up. Widow of Edward. 
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LOADER (LODER), Joseph. London. ID Mar. 1769; FD 1787. 
Rough stocker. One of the two main rough stockers 
during this period. 
LOADER, Richard. London. ID 29 June 1689; FD 27 Apr. 1715. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
LOOKER, Robert. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 30 Aug. 1717. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
LOXHAM, William & Edward. London. ID July 1754; FD July 
1780. Uncle and nephew partnership, sword cutlers. 
Had virtual monopoly of bayonet supply until 1778. 
M. 
MAYO, John. London. ID 16 Dec. 1701; FD 19 May 1715. Sup- 
plied locks and did Sea Service refurbishing work. 
MAYOR, Jane. London. ID 1768; FD post-1783. Supplied gun 
furniture. Succeeded husband Thomas. 
MAYOR, Thomas. London. ID Apr. 1761; FD 1768. Supplied gun 
furniture, originally partner with Joseph Hartwell. 
Succeeded by widow Jane. 
MEMORY, Michael. London. ID 26 Feb. 1756; FD 14 Mar. 1758. 
Setter up. Returned 31 Oct. 1778; FD p. ost-1783. 
Rough stocked and set up, complete Sea Service mus- 
kets. 
MOORE, Daniel. London. ID 31 Aug. 1778; FD 1780. Supplied 
complete Sea Service muskets and a small number of 
Short Land muskets. 
MOORE, William. London. ID 9 Sept 1689; FD 13 Nov. 1719. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
MORRIS, Isaac. London. ID 16 Sept 1701; FD 13 Nov. 1719. 
Stocker and setter up. 
N. 
NOCK, Henry. London. ID 30 Sept 1775; FD post-1783. 
Supplied locks, especially Extra Flat carbine locks, 
and seven-barrelled guns. 
NUTT, William. London. ID 29 June 1689; FD 1715. Stocker 
and setter up from 1714. 
0. 
OUGHTON, Joseph. Birmingham. ID 25 Mar. 1755; FD 1759; 
& Son 9 Mar. 1759; FD 1776; Joseph only (son) 29 June 
273 
1776; FD post-1783. Large-scale supplier of barrels 
and some locks. 
P. 
PEDDELL (PEDDALL), James. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 
1717. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
PERRY, William. Birmingham. ID 14 Aug. 1756; FD 25 Mar. 
1757. Supplied locks. 
PHILLIPS, Francis. London. ID 17 Apr. 1689; FD 16 Mar. 
1720. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
PHILLIPS, Thomas. London ID 6 Apr. 1708; FD 14 Mar. 1723. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
PICKFATT, Charles. London. ID 13 Feb. 1727; FD 14 Dec. 
1756. Setter up. With Lewis Barber, the chief setter 
up from 1730 to 1742. 
PICKFATT, Humphrey senior. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 7 
Aug. 1719. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
POWELL, Hugh. London. ID 16 Feb. 1716; FD 11 Jan. 1720. 
Rough stocker. 
POWELL, Richard. London. ID 7 July 1719 only. Rough stock- 
er. 
PRATT, John. London. ID 28 Feb. 1777; FD 1781. Rough 
stocker and setter upq some complete arms and 
barrels. Designed a flared-mouth second rammer pipe 
adopted as standard in 1778-9. The most important 
single contractor during the 1777-81 period. 
PREDDEN, William. London. ID 28 Feb. 1691; FD 25 Mar. 
1720. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
PRESS, Joan. London. ID 2 May 1719; FD 19 Oct. 1719. 
Stocker and setter up. 
PRINGLE, John. London. ID 1715; FD 12 Apr. 1720. Stocker 
and setter up. 
PROBIN, Thomas. London. ID 2 Mar. 1708 only; then again 7 Nov. 1717; then again one order 1 Nov. 1727. Sup- 
plied complete arms. 
R. 
ROSE, William. London. ID 14 Jan. 1706; FD 19 Oct. 1719. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
S. 
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SALE, Edward. London. ID 6 Apr. 1715; FD 7 Aug. 1716. 
Stocker and setter up. 
SALE, Edward. London. ID 15 Mar. 1743; FD 11 Apr. 1749. 
Setter up. 
SAUNDERS, Thomas. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 16 Feb. 
1715. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
SHARP, Richard. London. ID 1 Nov. 1743; FD ? Gun engraver 
to Board. 
SHARP, William. London. ID July 1754; FD post-1783. Gun 
engraver to Board, also supplied smallwork and steel 
rammers. Took son William as partner in Dec. 1781. 
SIBTHORPE, Robert. London. ID 25 Mar. 1706; FD 1717. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
SIMPSON, William. London. ID 24 Feb. 1718; FD 16 Mar. 
1720. Stocker and setter up. 
SINCKLER, Richard. London. ID 15 Sept 1714; FD 13 Apr. 
1728. Stocker and setter up. Complete regimental 
arms 1727-8. 
SMART, Francis. London. ID 30 Apr. 1695; FD 3 May 1720. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
SMART, John. London. ID 30 Oct. 1719; FD 3 May 1720. 
Stocker and setter up. 
SMITH, John. Birmingham. ID 15 Feb. 1736; FD 27 Oct. 1747. 
Supplied locks and lock forgings. 
SMITHETT, Dorothy. London. ID 21 Mar. 1718; FD 19 Jan. 
1720. Stocker and setter up. 
SMITHETT, George. London. ID 11 Sept 1703; FD 7 Nov. 1717. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
SMITHETT, George junior. London. ID 31 July 1717; FD 19 
Oct. 1719. Stocker and setter up. 
SOWERBY, Joseph. London. ID 1716; FD 18 Aug. 1719. Stock- 
er and setter up. 
SOWERBY, William. London. ID 5 Feb. 1708; FD 8 June 1728. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
STRINGER, Elizabeth. London. ID 15 Sept 1714; FD 7 May 
1715. Stocker and setter up. 
T. 
t 
TAYLOR, John. London. ID 16 Apr. 1747; FD 2 Nov. 1748. 
Setter up. 
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TIPPING & EDGE. Birmingham. ID 17 Feb. 1746; FD 27 Oct. 
1747. Supplied locks and barrels. 
TITTENSOR, John. Birmingham. ID 8 Nov. 1707; FD 31 July 
1717. Supplied barrels; from 1714 also stocker and 
setter up. 
TOMKYS & SHORT. Birmingham. ID 2 Feb. 1759; FD 1769. Sup- 
plied barrels and locks, originally as executors of 
John Willets. 
TOUGH, Mary. London. ID 31 Dec. 1694; FD 27 Feb. 1716. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
TOUGH, Robert. London. ID 22 Feb. 1705; FD 16 Feb. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
TOWLE, Elizabeth. London. ID 25 Feb. 1693; FD 24 Sept 
1715. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
TOWLE, Thomas. London. ID 11 Sept 1703; FD 29 Mar. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
TRESTED, Richard. London. ID 31 Dec. 1777; FD 1786. Rough 
stocker. 
TREVEY, Nathaniel. London. ID 17 May 1743; FD 11 Apr. 
1749. Setter up. 
TUCKER, Thomas. London. ID 20 Nov. 1777; FD 1785. Rough 
stocker. 
TURVEY, Edward. London. ID 24 Sept 1692; FD 6 May 1715. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
TURVEY, William. London. ID 19 Oct. 1719 only. Setter up. 
TYLOR (TYLER), Thomas. London. ID 27 Oct. 1688; FD 6 Apr. 
1715. Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
V. 
VAUGHAN, John. London. ID 25 May 1706; FD 12 June 1747. 
Large-scale supplier of barrels and locks, some 
complete arms, setter up. Chiefly lock supplier. 
VERNON, George. Birmingham. ID 19 Feb. 1757; FD 20 Sept 
1758. Supplied locks. Subsequently in partnership 
with George Haskins, as Haskins & Vernon. 
WI 
WALLER, James. London. ID May 1767; FD 1781. Rough stock- 
er. In partnership with father Richard 1755-67, took 
over business 1767, shared rough stocking with Joseph 
Loder from 1769. 
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WALLERy Richard. London. ID 29 July 1718; FD 1767. Gun- 
stock maker and wood supplier. Rough Stocker. In 
partnership with son James 1755-67o Enjoyed mono- 
poly of rough stocking for the Board from ca. 1730 
to 1756, and virtual monopoly until his death. 
WARD, Richard. London. ID 16 Jan. 1718; FD 7 July 1719. 
Stocker and setter up. 
WELFORD, Richard. London. ID 15 Sept 1714; FD 26 Apr. 
1720. Stocker and setter up. 
WESTON, Edward. London. ID 28 Nov. 1699; FD 1717. Stocker 
and setter up from 1714. 
WHATELY (WHATELEY), John. Birmingham. ID 28 Oct. 1756; FD 
1776. & Son 13 Dec. 1757. John only (son) 31 Dec. 
1776; FD 1786. Again 1793; FD 1804, partnership with 
Henry. Large-scale supplier of barrels, locks and 
rammers. 
WHITE, John. London. ID 14 June 1716; FD 3 June 1720. 
Stocker and setter up. 
WHITE, Thomas. London. ID 2 June 1702; FD 1716. Stocker 
and setter up from 1714. 
WILLETTS (WILLETSt WILLET). Benjamin. ID Apr. 1769; FD 
1783. Supplied barrels and locks, and muzzle 
loading and Ferguson rifles in 1776. 
WILLET(S), John. Birmingham. ID 23 Nov. 1742; FD 23 Apr. 
1757. Supplied barrels and locks. Executors were 
Tomkys & Short. 
WILLIAMS, John. London. ID 16 Dec. 1701; FD 16 Feb. 1720. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
WILLOWES, John. London. ID 22 Feb. 1705; FD 7 July 1719. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
WILSON, Richard. London. ID 15 Apr. 1746; FD 27 Aug. 1761. 
Setter up, also supplied barrels and locks. 
WILSON, William. London. ID 24 Jan. 1777; FD 1782. Setter 
up, also some barrels and locks. Son of Richard. 
WINESOP, John. London. ID 26 Mar. 1696; FD 1717. Stocker 
and setter up from 1714. 
WOOD9 John. Birmingham. ID 19 Feb. 1747; FD 10 Feb. 1757. 
Supplied locks. 
WOODELL, George. London. ID 7 July 1719 only. Rough stock- 
er. 
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WRIGHT, Thomas. London. ID 13 Oct. 1688; FD 15 Sept 1714. 
Stocker and setter up from 1714. 
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APPENDIX 2 
FROM KING'S STORES TO REGIMENTAL RACKING: 
THE ISSUE OF SMALL ARMS 
The final stage in the supply of small arms to the 
British armed forces was to get them from the King's 
Stores (either in the Tower of London or at various Out 
Ports and other depots throughout the kingdom) into the 
hands of the soldiers and sailors who would use them. As 
with all other aspects of the process of supply, the 
issuing of arms was much hedged about with paperwork; 
but, fortunately, much of this has survived in comparison 
with some of the other areas, and we are able to see with 
better than average clarity just how the mechanism for 
issuing arms actually functioned. 
The ultimate objective of the operation was not, as 
one might expect, the expeditious delivery of arms into 
the hands of those needing them but, rather, what the 
Twentieth Century calls 'accountability. ' At every step, 
as with a Recorded Delivery letter, someone had to accept 
responsibility in writing, for the movement of King's 
Property from its safe haven in the Stores into the 
utterly unsafe and vulnerable hands of the King's front- 
line servants. 
As far back as 1686 the precedent had been 
established which was to guide the minions of the Ordnance 
in their protection of the King's property from abuses 
outside their immediate control. The King's Warrant to the 
then Master General of the Ordnance lays bare the 
structure which applied throughout and beyond our period: 
JAMES R. 
Whereas Our Right Trusty and welbeloved Council- 
lor George Lord Dartmouth, Master General of Our Ord- 
nanceq has by Our Order compleatly furnished with new 
Arms Our several Regiments, Troops and Companys of 
Horse, Foot, and Dragoons, We have thought fit hereby 
to signify Our Will and Pleasure, That all Colonels, 
Captains, and Commanders, in Chief of any of Our said 
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Regimentsq Troops, and Companys, do give strict 
Charge to the Soldiers under their Command, that they 
take Care to preserve and keep in good Order, and 
repair, all such Arms as are already or shall be de- 
liver'd to them; We further declaring hereby that 
all Captains shall be accountable unto Us for any 
Arms that shall be lost, embezzled or Spoiled by the 
Soldiers under their respective Commands; And that 
they are forthwith to provide New Arms at their own 
Charge, to supply all defects that shall happen in 
any Case whatsoever, except upon our Actual Service; 
And all Colonels, Captains, and Commanders in Chief 
of any of Our Forces, are to take Notice of this Our 
Royal Pleasure, and duly to conform themselves there- 
unto, Given at Our Court at Windsor, this 4th day of 
August, 1686, in the Second Year of Our Reign. 
By His Majesty's Command 
William Blathwayt' 
An admirably clear, concise instruction, one easily 
circulated and straightforward to implement- one would 
think. One would, however, be completely wrong. No single 
function of the Ordnance over the ensuing century required 
more frequent reiteration, clarification, argument and 
correspondence with the army than this over-riding 
question of who was responsible for what, and under what 
precise circumstances. The chief difficulty was that the 
army was not a single unified body under a central 
administration, and although the first two Hannoverian 
monarchs took a great personal interest in their army and 
did much to reduce its administration to a unified central 
control, throughout our period and beyond the army 
retained its regimental focus to the detriment of logistic 
requirements and their administration. So far as the army 
was concerned, the Royal Warrant was reduced and re-stated 
as part of the all-powerful Articles of War, which bound 
every unit in the service. Section 13, Article 4 reads: 
That every Captain of a Troop or Company is charged 
with the Arms, Ammunition, Accoutrements, Cloathing 
or other Warlike Stores belonging to the Troop or 
Company under his Command, which he is to be account- 
able for to his Colonel, in case of their being Lost, 
Spoiled or Damaged not by Unavoidable Accidents or on 
Actual Service. 2 
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Despite this clear statement of responsibility and 
accountability which every officer concerned must have 
seen fairly early in his career, every possible 
interpretation of the words 'Lost, Spoiled or Damaged not 
by Unavoidable Accidents' was put forward in an attempt to 
obtain new arms at the Crown's expense. 
The organization of the British army was, and still 
is, based upon the basic unit of the regiment. Each 
regiment was run very much as a proprietary, personal 
entity by those into whose hands the King had given it. 
All attempts to introduce centralization and uniformity 
were rigorously evaded or ignored where-ever they 
conflicted with the views of regimental officers, 
particularly when a unit was stationed at any distance 
from the influence of the Adjutant General's Office and 
its inspectors. Regiments in Ireland, or on foreign 
service quickly developed individual styles of uniform, 
drill, administration, and in many cases small arms. This 
was partially due to poor supply procedures which meant 
that some locally available materials had to be made use 
of in default of those from the central authority, but 
also to the whims of the commanding officers. When a 
regiment returned to England the process of bringing it 
back into line with those regiments stationed at home had 
to begin almost as from the beginning, and indeed many 
regiments were ordered to leave their arms in the stores 
of the depot from which they were departing, and were 
issued with a new set upon returning to England. These 
were officially (and often actually) 'worn out on service' 
and therefore replaceable at Crown expense. 
Even officials in other Government departments, and 
ministersq were accustomed to treating the regulations as 
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if they did not apply to themselves. Thus Lord Nottingham, 
Secretary of State, forwarding a demand for a set of spare 
arms for the British troops in Portugal, was informed by 
the Board in 1703 
concerning the arms demanded by the Duke We think it 
our Duty to represent to your Ldp that this Demand 
being altogether unusuall, may be of very ill Conse 
quence to her Majys Service by introducing a Custom 
of furnishing to all Regiments a quantity of Spare 
Arms, which will infinitely increase the Charge of 
this Office for whatever is allowed to one officer 
always grows a Precedent for another to ground his 
Pretensions and wee Submitt to your Ldp that whereas 
there never has been any Spare Arms allowed to the 
Army in Flanders if the Duke of Marlboro should make 
the same proportionable Demand as now is made for 
Portugal whether the Charge would be able to be com- 
plyed with, besides at this time being other great 
and necessary Demands for Armes. Wee hope no extra- 
ordinary Issues will be ordered wee not being in a 
Condition without an Extraordinary Supply of money 
for that purpose to fill up the Stores again as her 3 Majestys Service will require, 
The Board lost this particular point, and, as they 
had predicted, the principle of a supply of spare arms for 
an army serving abroad was henceforth established, when 
funds were made available. 
In general the needs of the service did tend to 
override the breaking of precedents so feared by the 
Ordnance, but there were generally two good sides to most 
of the arguments. The establishment of precedents counted 
for much in an era when so much of governmental business 
was conducted within the very loose limitations of vague, 
ill-defined regulations and personal interpretation and 
adaptation. The Ordnance therefore sought to protect all 
those which defined and clarified its role, and to destroy 
or nip in the bud any which threatened its own, 
particularly in cases where an argument for additional 
funds outside the annual Parliamentary grant would have to 
be put forward by the officers of the Board. Converselyq 
when the source of the funding was expressed and approved 
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at the time of the unprecedented demand, the Board 
complied with little opposition. 
Having made it clear that the system about to be 
described was under constant assault by wilfully ignorant 
and/or independently minded officers and officials, we can 
now pass on to the system itself. There were several basic 
reasons why an issue of arms might be requested: 
1. A regiment or other smaller unit (such as an 
Independent Company) was being raised and required a full 
set of arms for its Established numbers. 
2. An already existing unit was being augmented, and 
the additional men required arms, preferably of the same 
pattern and dimensions (such as calibre and overall 
length) as those already in the hands of the 'old numbers' 
of the unit. There were many problems here for the Board, 
especially with regiments which had been in Ireland for 
any length of time, where they acquired arms from the 
Irish Board of Ordnance of different patterns to those 
issued by the English Board, often leaving a regiment with 
at least two distinct patterns and calibres of musket. 
This situation was usually resolved by the entire unit 
being re-armed with one pattern of new arm. 
3. Through long use, training and maintenance (or 
lack of it), some portion of the arms in a unit became 
'unfit for service' i. e. worn outq and required 
replacement. This was a major problem area for the Board: 
had the arms been abused and neglected, or were they 
legitimately worn out? If the former, the regiment must 
pay, if the latter, the Crown. 
4. Losses in battle or in transit to or from a 
campaign had to be replaced. 
5. Expeditionary forces being outfitted required a 
quantity of spare arms and ammunition in addition to those 
supplied to the men of each regiment. Such forces were 
often re-armed with new weapons at short notice. 
6. Regiments ordered on foreign service in wartime 
were generally re-equipped with the newest arms available, 
all of a uniform pattern and calibre. 
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7. Garrisons in colonies (e. g. Gibraltar, Jamaica, 
Minorca, New York, South Carolina) periodically required a 
new set of arms to replace those long in store and usually 
neglected, or worn out in local campaigning or policing 
service. Colonial governments, as distinct from British 
garrisons in a colony, normally purchased their own 
militia arms, or put the burden on the individual 
militiaman; in either case the arms were normally of 
English origin to a military pattern similar to the 
current Ordnance pattern but less well made and finished. 
8. Occasionally groups of new settlers being sent to some 
colony were given arms by Government to aid their 
establishment and survival in what was assumed to be a 
hostile environment. 
The beginnings of the long road down which a request 
for the issue of arms must travel was succinctly described 
by John Boddington, long-time Secretary to the Board, in 
testimony before the Board of Commissioners of Public 
Accounts in 1784: 
The Orders under which the Board of Ordnance act are, 
Warrants from the King or Privy Council; and, in Sea 
Affairs, from the Admiralty; Letters from Secretaries 
of State 4 and Significations from the Master 
General. 
In the case of a newly raising regiment, the Master 
General would receive a warrant from the Principal 
Secretary of State, in the King's name, ordering the issue 
of a given number of arms based on the official number of 
men established for that regiment. A typical warrant for 
this type of issue would read: 
GEORGE R [l. s. ] 
Whereas We have thought fit to Order a Regiment of 
Light Dragoons to be forthwith raised under the Com- 
mand of Our Trusty & Welbeloved John Manners Esqr 
(commonly called Marquis of Granby) Lieutenant Gen- 
eral of Our Forces, which is to Consist of Six Troops 
of Three Serjeants, Three Corporals, Two Drummers and 
Sixty Private Men in each Troop besides Commission 
Officers; Our Will and Pleasure is, that out of the 
Stores remaining within the Office of Our Ordnance, 
under your Charge, you cause Four hundred & eight 
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Pair of Pistols, Three hundred and ninety six Car- 
bines, Three hundred & ninety six Cartouch Boxes, and 
Twelve Drums, to be issued and delivered to the said 
John Manners Esqr (commonly called Marquis of Granby) 
or whom He shall appoint to receive the same, taking 
his Indent as usual; And you are to Insert the Ex- 
pence thereof into your next Estimate to be laid be- 
fore Parliament and for so doing, This shall be, as 
well to you as to all other Our Officers and Minis- 
ters herein concerned, a sufficient Warrant. 
Given at Our Court at St. James's the sixteenth day 
of April 1760 in the Thirty Third year of Our Reign 
By His Majesty's Command 
W. Pitt [l. s. ] 
To Our Trusty and Welbeloved 
Cousin and Councillor John Viscount 
5 Ligonier, Master General of Our Ordnance. 
All the elements called for by the Board are here: 
the number and types of arms required, specific reference 
to the responsible officer (Granby) giving a receipt for 
the keeping the arms in good order and taking 
responsibility for them, and the assigning the debt to the 
next Parliamentary estimate of expenses. At this point, 
if the required numbers and type of arms of arms were not 
in store, the manufacturing process described in the text 
would be initiated by the Board. The warrant does not 
mention that the type of arm might be something 
particular, which would have to be newly made- as in this 
particular instance it was, for Granby's new regiment was 
the Royal Forresters, and he wanted a special carbine and 
pistol made for it, which, given his position and 
influence, he obtained. The above warrant, dated 16 April, 
was endorsed as received on 2 May, and ordered into effect 
by the Board on 3 May; in itself this was not an unusual 
time span, but since the arms had to be specially made, 
the unit did not receive its arms until later in the year. 
This is one of the major pitfalls when relying upon a 
warrant to determine when a regiment actually received its 
arms; the other is that the arms called for in the warrant 
are sometimes changedg substitutions being made by the 
Board in the interests of time and/or expense. 
Having received the initial authority for action, the 
-) Aý 
Master General would pass on the relevant facts to 
... the Clerk of the Ordnance generally, or if he is 
absent, some other Board Officer, [who] endorses upon 
the Requisition [in this case a King's Warrant] an 
Order for the Supply; this Order is sent to the Prin- 
cipal Storekeeper, for him to see whether he can com- 
ply with it; he transmits it to the Clerk of the 
Deliveries, that he may draw a Proportion, which is 
an Instrument that contains a Specification of the 
Stores to be issued, the Place to which they are to 
be issued, and the Date of the Order of the Board: 
This Proportion is signed by any Three Board 
Officers, entered in the Proportion Book in this 
[i. e. the Clerk of the Deliveries'] Office, and then 
delivered to the Storekeeper, as his Warrant for the 
Issue. The Issuing Clerk... having entered in the 
Issuing Book the Articles contained in the Propor- 
tion, carries that book to the Storekeeper and re- 
ceives those Articles from him, sees them packed, 
sends them away, and takes a Receipt from the 
Person instructed to convey them; which Receipt 
is kept by the Clerk of the Deliveries, as his 
Voucher. Upon the Delivery of Arms or Ammunition, 
the Voucher taken from the Person who receives them 
is an Indenture, by which he undertakes to be 
accountable for the Arms he receives, and he certi- 
fies that they are good and sufficient. 6 
This extraordinarily detailed description of each of 
the steps taken within the Office for the issue of arms 
requires little clarification: modifications to the 
general procedure occurred mainly at the source of the 
request, as shown in the list of reasons for issue. 
Unfortunately, most of the lesser paperwork is no longer 
extant, having been officially 'weeded' over the years by 
subsequent generations of office workers. There are, 
however, a number of Proportions surviving, and these play 
at times a crucial role in our understanding of who 
received what arms, since they normally contain more 
descriptive and technical details than the warrants. 
There also survive a small number of Indentures for 
the receipt of arms, which are printed forms with 
particulars written in (underlined portions in the example 
quoted below). The following Indenture is of particular 
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interest as it shows the last instance of muskets with 
iron furniture being issued to the Guards as late as 1739: 
THIS INDENTURE made the Thirýy 
First day of July 1739 and in the 
Thirteenth Year of the Reign of our Sovereign 
Lord, George 2d by the Grace of God, King of 
Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the 
Faith, &c. Between His Grace John Duke of A 
and Greenwich Master General of His Majesty's 
Ordnance, and the Principal Officers of the same, for 
and on behalf of His said Majesty2 on the one Part; 
And The Rt Honble the Earl of Scarbo on 
the other Part; Witnesseth, That the said 
, 
Earl of 
Scarbo doth acknowledge by these Presents, 
by Virtue of His Majesty's Warrant bearing date the 
2d, and by Order of the Board dated 17th Instant to 
have had and received the several sorts of good, well 
fixed and serviceable Arms and Habiliaments of War, 
hereunder specified. For all which Arms and Habilia- 
ments of War, the said Earl of Scarbo doth 
hereby undertake to be accomptable, and to maintain 
and continue the very same Arms in good repair; and 
to return and deliver the very same Arms up into His 
Majesty's said Magazine, fixed and serviceable, when 
he shall be thereunto required (the hazard of the War 
only excepted. ) And that in case any of the said Arms 
be lost, by Negligence, or by any other Default, that 
then the said Earl of Scarborough shall and 
will buy so many good Arms out of His Majesty's Maga- 
zine, as shall re-supply the Arms so lost, at the 
Rates usually paid by His Majesty for the like Arms. 
being to Arm the Additional Men to the Cold 
Stream Regiment of Foot Guards, under his Lord- 
ship's command. 
Land Service Musquets with Iron 
Furniture and Steel Rammers 198 
Bayonets for do. 198 
hand-written certificate 
Hedworth Lambton for 
the Earl of Scarborough7 
is pinned to the above 
Indenture which completes the story: 
I do hereby Appoint Lt. Coll. Hedworth Lambton 
Quarter Master, to receive and Indent for the 198 
Musquets with Bayonets for the Additional Men to His 
Majesty's Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards under my 
Command. Pursuant to His Majesty's Warrant bearing 
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Date the 2d of July 1739. 
Scarborough 
It should be noted that replacement arms2 in the event of 
loss by negligenceg were to be purchased from H. M. stores2 
and at the going rate: 'regimental' muskets were not 
allowed. 
In cases where arms were to be issued to regiments or 
other units already in existence, the initiative came from 
the company officers of the unit, who would report a 
number of arms lost or defective beyond the scope of local 
repair. These deficiencies could be discovered through a 
local formal inspection, or by report from the con- 
commissioned officers to their company commander. The 
colonel, or his appointee, would then address the 
Secretary at War, who would in turn write to the Principal 
Secretary of State, as did Henry Fox: 
War Office 
11 march 1752 
My Lord 
It having been Certify'd that the undermention'd 
arms &c. are wanting for the Use of Lieut. General 
Wolfe's Regiment of Foot, to replace the like Number 
worn out and unfit for Service; I have the Honour to 
acquaint Your Lordship therewith, that Yor Lordship 
may be pleas'd to receive His Majesty's Commands 
thereupon, and signify the same to the Lieutenant 
General & Principal officers of the Ordnance, that 
the said undermention'd arms may be deliver'd out of 
His Majesty's Stores, and the Expence thereof charg'd 
to the Estimate of Ordnance for Parliament, and the 
old Arms receiv'd into the Stores. 
I am, with the greatest Respects, My Lord, Your 
Lordship's most obedient and Most Humble Servant, 
Henry Fox [1-s-I 
30 Halberts 
20 Drums 
730 Firelocks & Bayonets 
730 Cartouch Boxes, with Strops, and Frogs. 
Earl of Holdernesse 
His Majesty's Principal 
Secretary of State 
8 
The above request refers to the complete re-arming of a 
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regiment. Whenever existing arms were to be replaced, for 
whatever reasont the old arms in the hands of the troops 
were to be returned into the King's stores at the same 
time that the new arms were issued. The only exception to 
this general rule was in the case of regiments on foreign 
service who were returning to England. In many instances 
their arms were ordered into the local Ordnance depot, and 
the costs and wear of bringing home old arms was saved, 
when it was known that a regiment would have to be re- 
armed on its arrival in England. 
Battle losses were covered by similar warrants, but 
omitted the stricture to return the old arms. A typical 
note of a group warrant for battle loss replacement arms 
appears in the Ordnance Minutes for 6-7 April 1759: 
Received His Majesty's Warrant dated the 16th 
Ultimo directing arms &c to be Issued for use of the 
several Troops and Regiments mentioned in a List 
therein inclosed, Vizt: 
1 The King's Regiment of Dragoons 
1 Royal Regiment of Dragoons 
2 Royal North British Dragoons 
3 King's Own Regiment 
6 Inniskilling Dragoons 
7 Queen's Dragoons 
10th Regiment of Do. 
11th Regiment of Dragoons 
Coldstream Regiments of Foot Guards, 1st Battalion 
3 Regiment of Foot Guards 1st Battalion 
5thq 24th, 30th, 33d, 34th, 36th, 67tht 68th and 
72d Regiment of Foot 
to replace the like Number lost and rendered Unser- 
viceable in the Expeditions on the Coast of France, 
the same to be delivered to the Colonels of the Res- 
pective Regiments or to such Persons as they shall 
appoint to 9 
receive the same taking their Indents as 
usual, e* 
Warrants for battle loss replacements were often issued 
long after the arms themselves had been put in the hands 
of the troops; this merely clarifys the role of the 
warrant as establishing who was paying for the arms, not 
the question of entitlement to the arms. 
Very occasionally a few details of the arms to be 
issued are contained in the warrants, especially when a 
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new type of arm is being introduced, or it is a relatively 
new pattern, or there is a choice of arm requiring some 
clarification. In the explanatory warrant quoted below the 
details were necessary because the pistols in question 
(originally made for the Royal Forresters) had not been 
made for at least fifteen years; and, as so often 
happened, the office people were not sufficiently aware of 
technical features to write them into the original 
warrant. 
GEORGE R. [l. s. ] 
Whereas it has been humbly desired that the one 
hundred and thirty six pairs of Pistols which we were 
pleased by Our Warrant bearing date the 29th of No- 
vember last, to direct should be issued and delivered 
for the Use of Our first Troop of Horse Grenadier 
Guards to replace a like number borken and unfit for 
Service, may be of the Pattern hereafter specified, 
OUR WILL AND PLEASURE is that out of Our Stores re- 
maining within the Office of Our Ordnance under your 
charge, you cause the said Pistols agreeable to the 
said Pattern to be forthwith issued and delivered to 
such Person or Persons as shall be duly authorized to 
receive them ... 15th day of April 1776. ... 
Dimensions of the Pistols wanted for the 1st Troop 
of Horse Grenadier Guards, Calibre 6/8 of an In, 
length of the Barrel 10 Ins, whole length includinjo 
the Stock 16 Ins. Commonly Call'd Carbine Pistols. 
The pistols were actually referred to as 10-inch carbine- 
bore pistols in the Ordnance records. 
When time was of the essence, and large numbers of 
troops whose arms required replacing were bieng moved from 
one point to another, the system sometimes suffered 
temporary modifications. When, in 1776, a number of 
regiments were being sent directly from their Irish 
garrison areas to North America, it was found advisable ro 
re-arm them through the facilities of the Irish Board of 
Ordnance in Dublin. The Master General was informed by 
Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State: " 
St James's 9th Janry 1776 
My Lord 
It being expedient that Arms, Drums &c. should be 
furnish'd at the Expence of Great Britain for the 
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augmentation to the 3d, 9th, 11th, 19th, 20th2 24th, 
30th, 33d, 34th, 53d2 54th) 57thý 62d & 67th Regimts 
of Foot in Ireland, and it appearing that it would be 
more for the Benefit of His Majesty's Service if the 
said Arms, Drums &c, should be made up in Ireland, 
and the Expence thereof defrayed from hence, I am to 
signify to your Lordship His Majesty's pleasureý that 
the Expence thereof be repaid by the Board of 
Ordnance to Ireland, according to the annexed Esti- 
mate, and the amount thereof charged to the Estimate 
of Ordnance for Parliament [marginal note: Estim 
17771 
I am to add that His Majesty's Pleasure has been 
signified to the Lord Lieut. of Ireland that the 
necessary Orders be given there for carrying into 
Execution this Service accordingly. 
I am My Lord Your Lordships most obedient humble 
Servt 
Weymouth 
State of the Charge for furnishing Arms &c for 
Augmentn to 14 Battns Foot. 
2 Serjeants Fuzils ea. E1.15 f 3.10. - 
8 Halberts ea. 11.4ý2 4.11. - 
10 Drums and Cases ea. 2.7ý 20.6.3. 
160 Firelocks and Bayonets ea. 1.15.280. 
Total charge for one Battn 308.7.3. 
Which for 14 Battalions amounts to E4,317.1.6. 
Once the warrants had been acted upon and it had been 
determined that the required arms were available from 
stores, the final operation prior to packing up the arms 
in arms chests containing twenty-five muskets each, was to 
have the markings of the units to which the arms were 
being issued engraved on each arm. This engraving was 
carried out by one, or at times two, firms, their men 
working in the Tower workshops. The name or number of the 
regiment was engraved along the top of the barrel; the 
company and rack number within the company (usually 
separated by a horizontal line) was engraved on the thumb 
piece; these two numbers were repeated on the shank of the 
rammer on steel rammered arms, just below the button-head 
of the rod; the socket of the bayonet was also engraved 
with the company and rack numbers, and sometimes with the 
regiment number as well. On arms lacking the thumbpiece, 
the company was sometimes included in the barrel markings, 
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or else engraved with the rack number on the tang of the 
buttplate. The numbering was done according to the 
Establishment of a particular regiment, not by the number 
of men actually in the various companies. On pistols 
lacking thumb pieces the troop and rack number was 
frequently engraved on the trigger guard bow. The records 
suggest that all arms issued to regularly established 
units were engraved (not stamped) in this manner 
throughout our period and beyond. Those arms shipped in 
bulk as spares for troops on foreign service, for issue at 
the discretion of the local area commander, were not 
engraved. Old arms returned into store which were in good 
condition had their marks removed by the Small Gun Office 
workmen, and if appropriate, re-engraved by the Office 
engravers when next issued. This removal of out-of-date 
markings was a standard part of the re-furbishing work 
carried out on all arms returned from regiments which were 
not considered likely to be re-issued to that same 
regiment in the foreseeable future. Although there is no 
specific evidence to support the assertion, it appears 
that large Ordnance depots , like Gibraltar or New York, 
may have had engravers amongst their workforce who would 
locally engrave arms being issued to regular units in 
their area; there are numbers of arms with non-standard 
but obviously old engraving on them whose markings may 
have originated in this manner. Sea Service muskets were 
not engraved, although many pistols have been noted with 
location markings engraved on the buttcaps. The survival 
of arms with markings to the present day is very unusual; 
these must have 'escaped' from Government service by a 
number of means, and not returned into store. 
Once the arms were packed into arms chests, they were 
either taken down to Tower Wharf for loading into lighters 
and carrying out to ships waiting in the Thames, or loaded 
into smaller coastal vessels at the Wharf itself for 
transmission by sea to ports where transports were 
assembling. Still others would be loaded into waggons if 
time allowed, and sent overland to the regimental depot or 
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Out Port concerned. Sometimes regimental waggons would 
call at the Tower with the old arms and receive the new. 
But the onus seems generally to have been on the Ordnance 
to collect the old arms and deliver the new ones to those 




Apart from the irregular replacement of arms worn out 
in service, or the equipping of newly raised regiments, 
there were three major re-armaments of virtually the 
entire British army during our period. The first of these 
occurred in 1740-41, following an inspection of the arms 
of many regiments stationed in England, and the outbreak 
of the largely maritime War of Jenkins' Ear, when it 
appeared that involvement on the Continent would not be 
long in coming. Many of the arms still in the hands of the 
regiments had been issued during the later years of the 
War of the Spanish Succession, or only slightly later, and 
large numbers were completely useless. At this time all 
these older arms, particularly those with iron furniture, 
and non-standard 'regimental' muskets were replaced by the 
Pattern 1739 brass mounted musket, most of which had 
double bridle locks. The second re-armament took place in 
1756-7, at the beginning of the Seven Years' War, when 
those regiments serving in England or bound for service on 
the Continent, were re-equipped with Pattern 1756 muskets 
having steel rammers. Wooden rammered muskets were 
relegated to troops serving in colonial theatres, chiefly 
North America and India, and continued on arms such as Sea 
Service, the marines, and arms for mounted troops. The 
third and last major re-armament took place in the early 
and middle 1770s, following the introduction of the 
Pattern 1768 Short Land musket for all line regiments, and 
steel rammered carbines for týe dragoons, artillery and 
serjeants. I Much of the re-equipping was carried out when 
the regiments were sent to North America following the 
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outbreak of the rebellion in 1775. By this time the 
militia had converted its originally wooden rammered 
muskets to steel, and the marines were also equipped with 
steel rammered arms during this last period of re- 
armament. The Navy would have to await the gradual 
replacement of its wooden rammered arms as the result of 
service in the wars following 1793. The Guards regiments 
did not give up their Long Land muskets until after 1790, 
although they were amongst the first regiments to have 
their muskets altered for steel rammers in the early 
1750s. 
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